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Abstract  
This thesis analyses policy reform in the public health sector implemented between 
2000 and 2007 in Nigeria. It does this by exploring the perceptions of different 
categories of public health workers in tertiary hospitals of the policy formulation and 
implementation process itself and the implications of these perceptions for the 
desired changes in service delivery. Changes in salaries and benefits were introduced 
at the same time as the reforms and form part of the analysis here. These changes in 
the benefits for public workers were expected to motivate and incentivise 
cooperation with the reforms. These reforms involved changes in hospital 
procedures but more importantly, a shift in the culture of public service delivery 
from one driven by the provision of excellent medical care and led largely by the 
clinical professions, to a demand-led system within which the public become clients 
purchasing services to meet their needs and interests.      
The promotion of demand-driven public service delivery has been promoted in a 
wide range of different economies and there is a growing interest in this policy for 
improving the operation and efficiency of public health systems in developing 
countries. However, it has been widely argued that the way in which this interest has 
been formulated in policy and its mode of implementation has been highly 
prescriptive and top-down and this has implications for policy outcomes. It is also 
argued that the socio-political context in which the reforms are being sought, the 
policy implementation process, and the attitudes of clinical workers who are often 
the target of such reforms, all determine policy outcomes and need to be considered 
in  both policy formulation, implementation and in monitoring and evaluation 
procedures. This thesis addresses these concerns.  
This study deploys an actor-oriented approach to the analysis of organisational 
change and therefore seeks to capture the perceptions and behavioural responses of 
those directly involved, including hospital managers and frontline doctors and nurses, 
and the relationships between clients and providers. Using the case of a single 
hospital, the Abia State Federal Hospital that has functioned as a hospital since 1976 
the thesis provides a detailed account of procedural changes, perceptions of changes 
by key workers, and some insight into the processes of change, especially in relation 
to the interaction between key frontline workers and clients. For this the study uses 
semi-structured interviews of doctors, nurses and members of the hospital 
management team, in addition to members of the implementing agency and policy 
makers. It also details a number of reported events that point to the complexity of 
change, and suggest ways in which policy implementation processes might have 
facilitated the change process for those involved in service provision. The changes in 
incentive structures are also detailed.  
The thesis supports a number of the conclusions from other studies, that the 
professional or frontline clinical workers were not sufficiently consulted in the 
policy formulation, and that the monitoring and evaluation procedures contest their 
professional values about good service, and suggests that these policy processes 
have resulted in high levels of mistrust between the health workers and the service 
performance audit agency.   
In terms of incentives, the analysis suggests that while there is a general feeling that 
pay packages are largely inadequate given the state of the Nigerian economy, a 
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greater source of discontent is that the changes did not address a longstanding issue 
of pay differentials between doctors and nurses, and in addition, the monetisation of 
benefits earlier provided in kind, reduced their overall social status in society. As a 
result, this study suggests that by introducing these new reward systems in parallel 
with the health policy reform, the process of policy implementation may have been 
made more difficult, rather than easier. Providing incentives to this particular 
category of workers would appear to be more complex than the policy-makers 
envisaged, Although not investigated in great detail in this study, the findings 
suggest that a view of professional frontline workers as having a vested interest in 
their work that goes beyond pay, needs to be adopted in policy formulation, rather 
than one of self-interested individuals with minimal interest in the service they 
provide.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
This thesis is about public sector service reforms that are at the centre of public 
debate in many countries. The aim of the thesis is to increase the understanding of 
the processes of policy reform. It focuses specifically on health sector reforms 
implemented in Nigeria between 2000 and 2007, and on changes introduced in 
tertiary hospitals. In Nigeria, these tertiary hospitals are key organisations 
responsible for the delivery of health care, and therefore are central to the reform 
process. 
In spite of the popularity of public sector reforms, a number of studies have 
expressed concerns that despite the growing recognition of the transformative 
potential of these reforms, outcomes are rarely as straightforward as suggested in the 
documentation (Syed et al, 2008
1
; Syed and Hyder, 2007). Adeyemo et al (2008) 
argue that past public sector reforms in Nigeria have seldom focused on the reality 
on the ground. Other studies (e.g. Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 
Becker, 2004), have argued that there is inadequate understanding of reform as a 
change process from an organizational perspective, especially in terms of capturing 
the dynamic processes and interactions of organizational life (Pettigrew, 1985; 
Senge, 1990). 
Increasingly, debates about public service provision in developed and developing 
countries have focused on the public health sector more than on other service sectors 
(Arah et al, 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; WHO, 2006; Kruk and Freedman, 
2008). There are a number of reasons for this. First, the issue of healthcare services 
has wide appeal because of the widespread supposition that good health is 
fundamental to social and economic development.  Finlay (2007: 1) notes that 
“healthy people are more vibrant, energetic and have a more positive outlook on 
life”. Better health has also been identified as a major pathway to improved life 
                                                          
1 The exploratory case study was conducted in Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan, Uganda and Nigeria  
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expectancy (Bloom et al, 2004) and extended participation in the workforce (Barro 
and Lee, 1984).  
Second, access to good healthcare services has been shown to have wider 
implications in developing countries, such as for poverty reduction and equity 
(Canagarajah et al, 1997; Aigbokhan, 2000; Canagarajah and Thomas, 2002; 
Ravallion, 2001; Ferraira and Ravallion, 2008). All the studies referred to show that 
the majority of those without access to quality healthcare are poor.  
Third, increased interest in health systems is connected to the growing call to 
integrate workforce-related issues such as motivation and how work is carried out 
into health policy analysis (Martinez and Martineau, 1998; Buchan, 2000; Dubois 
and McKee, 2006). This emanates from often uneven outcomes of health reform 
programmes implemented in the 1990s across developing countries which focused 
on administrative management (Berman, 1995; Tendler, 1997; Berman and Bossert, 
2000; Mills et al, 2001; Rowe et al, 2005; Mills et al, 2006). Finally, health accounts 
for a big share of public spending and employment.  
Moreover, although there has been an increasing interest in the performance of 
government organizations including hospitals (WHO, 2000; Rowe et al, 2005; Mills 
et al, 2006), there is only limited empirical data regarding the specific operation of 
health policy reforms. Thus, while the crucial role of public hospital organizations in 
improved healthcare service delivery is recognised, specific evidence about how 
hospitals provide services, especially at the supply-end remains surprisingly scanty 
(McKee and Healy, 2002). Furthermore, there is a perception that understanding 
about public health service performance rarely encompasses the perspectives of the 
service providers, a situation which as past researchers argue, has resulted in 
misinterpretations about how public health workers do their work (Morris and Pond, 
2007, Lee et al, 2000). As Franco et al (2002: 1265) declare:  
There is currently very scarce empirical evidence on what the key 
determinants of worker motivation are in developing countries’ health-care 
system contexts. Worker motivation is a critical component of health system 
performance, and yet, it is largely understudied in the context of health sector 
reform and across different organizational contexts  
Overall, the conceptualization of health sector reforms appears to have been driven 
by a high-powered administrative mandate supported by technical advice from donor 
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agencies.  All this emphasizes the fact that while it is often contended that the 
functioning of public hospital organizations can easily be changed, these 
organisations are highly complex  and outcomes are likely to be variable (Berman, 
1995; Cassels, 1995; Mills et al, 2001). 
To improve the performance of Nigeria’s public health sector, the government 
initiated a series of public sector reforms between 2000-2007 (NEEDS, 2004; 
Okonjo-Iwuala, 2005; Adegoroye, 2006; Soludo, 2007; Adeyemo et al, 2008). The 
health reform focused on improving the performance of health service organizations, 
and the key concepts and approaches of the health reform was similar to those 
reforms implemented in other developing countries (e.g. see Russell et al, 1999; 
Mills et al, 2001; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000; Witter et al, 2007a). The objective was to 
achieve a “sustained, purposeful, and fundamental change process which seeks to 
improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of the health sector” (Berman, 1995: 
15). In Nigeria specifically, the health sector reform seeks to improve the 
performance of health workers, and aims to achieve this by providing incentives to 
motivate changes in the way they work.   
1.2 Aims and Objective of the thesis  
This study is about policy reform in the public health sector implemented between 
2000 and 2007 in Nigeria. The purpose of this study is to throw light on how health 
sector reform works by investigating how frontline health providers perceive, and 
respond to, reform as an organisational change process.  
The study addresses three distinct but closely related research questions about the 
reforms: 
1. What changes did the health reform introduce with respect to work practices 
and pay systems?  
2. How do frontline health providers perceive the change process as it relates to 
their day-to-day work practices?  
3.  How the different categories of workers in the hospital perceive the reforms 
have influenced their motivation to perform their jobs?   
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In order to answer the above research questions, this study adopts a case study 
approach. The case study provides a means of gaining a holistic view of how reform 
works as an organisational change process. Specifically it analyses changes from the 
view of frontline doctors and nurses working in the Federal Medical Centre 
Umuahia (FMCU) based in south-eastern Nigeria.  
1.3 The Reforms 
The thesis concerns itself with the comprehensive health sector reform implemented 
in Nigeria by the Obasanjo-led administration in 2000-2007, and which linked 
public sector reforms in pay and benefits.  
The health reform involved changes in hospital procedures and more importantly, a 
shift in the culture of public service delivery from one driven by the provision of 
excellent medical care, and led largely by the clinical professions, to a demand-led 
system within which the public become clients purchasing services that are expected 
to meet their needs and interests. Operationally the creation of a demand-led service 
has involved providing clients with adequate information and self-directed signs and 
leaflets to improve operational effectiveness (e.g. reduce overcrowding), and to 
enhance awareness of available services and customer choice. Changes in work 
practices on the part of frontline workers have involved the introduction of a target 
culture within which performance is measured according to strict criteria. Clients are 
deliberately encouraged to report on whether their needs have been met, and workers 
are held directly accountable. These changes have involved the establishment of a 
performance audit agency, in this case called SERVICOM. The role of SERVICOM 
is to ensure worker compliance with the reform, and to guarantee quality assurance, 
both to the public, and government.  
The pay reforms that were introduced in the public sector as a whole consist of 
changes in actual levels of pay, reductions in the differences between pay levels of 
doctors and nurses, monetisation of fringe benefits in kind, and performance-related 
pay. The main interest of this thesis is in the performance related pay elements of 
these pay reforms since this issue is directly linked with the health service delivery 
reforms already noted. These changes in pay are expected to motivate and 
incentivise cooperation with the reforms.  
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The thesis is based on fieldwork completed in Nigeria in 2007 over a twelve-month 
period. The thesis is based on information collected from a number of sources 
including policy documents, semi-structured interviews, and direct observation by 
the researcher.   
 
1.4 Theoretical Approaches to the Study 
This study sits within the context of debates about poor public service delivery and 
how this can be addressed. The present study is mainly informed by two bodies of 
knowledge: New Public sector Management (NPM) and elements of organisational 
change theory that address the issues of worker motivation and behavioural change.  
NPM provides an understanding of how public sector reform can occur through top-
down rational prescriptions, and is based on the assumption that one size fits all.  
Therefore, while the theory sheds light on how reforms can come about, it lacks 
detailed insight into the drivers of change, and the role of various actors in the 
process. As outlined by past organisational studies (e.g. Delaney and Huselid, 1996; 
Feldman, 2000; Becker et al, 2005), organisational change theory argues that 
organisational change reflects what actually happens within an organization, and 
does not provide of what needs to be done. 
In line with the thinking of organisational theory, the thesis adopts an actor-oriented 
approach that involves exploring the perceptions and behavioural responses of 
different actors directly involved in change processes. In its policy analysis, it uses 
the approach outlined by Walt and Gilson (1994) of capturing of the policy context, 
content, and process. It therefore examines the policy drivers as well as detailing the 
policy content, and focuses in particular on policy implementation processes.   
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews in detail the 
theoretical context for the study. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology 
including the research methods, data sources, and ethical considerations. This is 
followed in Chapter 4 by the content and context of the health reform policy and the 
pay reforms. The FMCU, which is the case study hospital on which the thesis is 
based, is also introduced. Chapter 5 details the implementation process of the health 
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reforms at FMCU, and its link with the pay reform, while Chapter 6 presents the 
views of the various FMCU hospital actors on the organisational changes introduced. 
The last data chapters, Chapters 7 and 8, examine the way in which the different 
categories of workers are affected by the change process. The thesis ends with 
conclusions in Chapter 9. 
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2 Theoretical Foundations  
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to throw light on how health sector reform works by 
investigating how frontline health providers perceive of, and respond to reform as an 
organisational change process.  
Specifically, it explores the perceptions of different categories of public health 
workers in tertiary hospitals of the policy formulation and implementation process 
itself and the implications of these perceptions for the desired changes in service 
delivery. As noted in Chapter 1, the study adopts three main theoretical approaches – 
New Public sector management (NPM), policy analysis theory, and organisational 
change theory.  
This chapter begins with an examination of literature on health policy reform in 
developing country contexts (section 2.2). It then considers the literature on key 
concepts relevant to this study: organizations change theory (section 2.3); 
organizational change (section 2.4); performance (section 2.5); incentive systems 
(section 2.6); motivation (section 2.7); and behaviour (section 2.8). The final part of 
the chapter reviews the literature on the linkage between incentives, motivation and 
performance, and on procedural justice.  
2.2 Health policy reform in a developing country context 
Over the last three decades, there has been an evolving trend of market-driven health 
sector policy reform across developing countries. Much of the debate has revolved 
around the issue of how to transform the structures of public health organizations to 
make them perform better. In general, health sector reforms across developing 
countries have been far-reaching. For Berman (1995: 15), such reform is a 
“sustained, purposeful change process seeking to improve the efficiency, equity and 
effectiveness of the public health service delivery system”. Notably, health sector 
reforms generally spread from developed countries (Mills et al, 2001; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004).  
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In the literature, health policy reform is seen as a change process (Oliver, 1991; 
Osborne and Gaebler, 1993), laden with competing rationalities, interests, 
power/politics and roles, and operating in a given historical context (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001; Townley, 2002). As in the current Nigerian context, the 
key debates converge around how to improve organizational efficiency and 
performance. Thus, there are strong indications that policy reforms are not only 
concerned with transforming organizational structures. They are also about 
reshaping the configuration of the transition state to better manage resources, 
provide services and deal with exposure to global market interactions (World Bank, 
1997). 
It is worth noting that international organizations like the World Bank (World Bank; 
1993; 1997; 2002) have been key players in supporting and financing health sector 
reforms across many developing countries like Nigeria. The structural reforms of the 
1980s, which focused on improving the economic efficiency of public organizations, 
and the 1990 decentralization reforms with neoliberal inclinations towards the use of 
fees and private sector initiatives, are good examples. In the 21
st
 Century, the World 
Bank’s renewed support for reforming institutions (World Bank, 2002) seems to be a 
current policy instrument intended to improve work structures and incentive systems. 
This, perhaps, reflects an indirect acceptance of failure of the reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s, which the Bank attributed to weak and inadequate institutions to support 
government programmes. In addition, the 21
st
 Century reforms seem to be gaining 
ground because of the ways they focus on issues of service delivery, governmental 
accountability and responsiveness to people as a mark of good governance (World 
Bank, 2004a). 
The literature suggests that policy reform seeks to influence existing organizational 
structures and the status quo by introducing new work practices, incentive systems 
and rules and procedures (e.g. Aiken et al, 2001; Witter et al, 2007a). However, 
despite the growing recognition of the importance of reforms for organizational 
success, there is still inadequate empirical evidence about how they operate in 
practice (Berman and Bossert, 2000). Moreover, there is growing awareness that 
across developing countries, knowledge of the effectiveness of reforms remains 
inconclusive and often contentious (Sen and Koivusalo, 1998; Lloyd-Sherlock, 
2005).  
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This lack of clear evidence often makes it difficult to arrive at a concise conclusion 
as to the impact of health sector reforms. Past studies have noted that the health 
sector reforms in the 1980s and 1990s tended to be unfavourable to the poor and in 
fact contributed negatively to health outcomes across developing countries arising 
from difficulty of access due to inability to pay (Ogunbekun et al, 1999; Russell, 
1996; 2004).  However, evidence of such links remains elusive due to the problem of 
attributing causality of change in a dynamic environment.  
Lethbridge (2004) also points to the fact that health sector reforms in developing 
countries seem not to have really addressed the specific issues of the workforce 
(human resources), a problem also highlighted by other studies (e.g. Martinez and 
Martineau, 1998; Buchan, 2000; Steijn, 2002). In general, and as noted above, the 
understanding of the intricate nature of the operational processes of health sector 
organizations suggest that no two hospitals or countries are the same. This study, 
therefore, focuses on a specific case hospital organization (Abia State Federal 
hospital). Thus, a detailed survey of the literature on health sector reform across 
developing countries demonstrates that while change has often been presented as a 
sweeping process, it seems to have been driven more by theoretical and ideological 
arguments and lacks empirical evidence (Franco et al, 2002).  
It is also important to emphasize that while health sector reform has often been 
presented as part of wider social policy recommendations, often alongside the 
demand for development cooperation by donors, this ignores its context-specific 
nature: 
“The effectiveness of a given health policy will depend, not only on country 
level analysis, but also on facility level context. In addition, the impact of 
policy reform even within a hospital organization will differ significantly 
mainly because of the differentiated nature of individual worker 
characteristics and organizational context” (Franco et al, 2002: 1265) 
Moreover, there is inadequate context-specific policy analysis that focuses on 
exploring dependent issues about how hospital organizations operate (Walt and 
Gilson, 1994; Mckee and Healy, 2002). Of specific importance to this study is the 
argument by Van de Ven and Huber that: 
“Policy analysis needs to capture the question of how policy reform develops 
and continues and the general sequence of events that unfold within the 
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organization wherein the policy is implemented and including how the policy 
is perceived and why, and why the organization changes or fails to change in 
the context of the change.” (1990: 213) 
In addition, as Franco et al (2002) note, the understanding of how and to what extent 
health sector reforms impact on health workers is not an attribute of the health 
workers alone, but also of the reform and organizational context, including the 
interactions and relationships that emerge in the day-to-day work processes. Thus, to 
capture the dynamics of health sector reform as an organizational change process, 
the conceptual framework for this study follows a process (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de 
Ven and Huber, 1990) and systems approach (Ackoff, 1971; Checkland, 1999; Flood, 
2000).
2
. However, there has been little of this type of attention on the implications of 
health sector reform. As noted by Flood (2000) systems thinking as an interpretive 
research approach entails going beyond observation and theory to explore the 
authentic explanations about what is happening and how it is interpreted by those 
involved. It facilitates the exploration of the “whole process” and the “interpretations 
and perceptions that individual people form within their work context, social system 
and rules, practices and underlying constitutive meaning” (p. 726). 
More importantly, key policymaking and implementation studies (e.g. Barrett and 
Fudge, 1981; Barrett and Hill, 1984; Barrett, 2004) have highlighted how the 
continuing top-down perspective of policymaking and analysis bypasses deeper 
knowledge of organizational processes. Thus, there remains inadequate recognition 
of the policy processes (policy in action) particularly at the level of the organization 
wherein policy is implemented, and including the activities and actions of primary 
(micro-level) actors involved in implementation (i.e. frontline health workers). Other 
studies suggest a huge gap between what is known as policy as prescribed (policy 
intentions) and policy in action (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Van Horn and Van 
Meter, 1975). These studies argue that policy, often presented as a top-down change 
package, is prone to failure because of the lack of consideration as to what happens 
after it has been packaged and promulgated.  
                                                          
2 According to Checkland (1999: 3) a systems approach offers a holistic approach to analysis capturing people’s 
perceptions and interpretations (humanistic aspects) of change in their workplace. It treats the organization as a 
system consisting of individual worker characteristics and perceptions, which constitute the software of 
organizational structure.  
11 
 
Based on this review, and in line with the aim and objectives of this research, a 
process-based approach to policy analysis is adopted here. This, as supported by 
numerous studies (Pettigrew, 1990; Walt and Gilson, 1994; Collins et al, 1999), is 
about exploring policy as a process and developing insights into its context, content 
and process, including the underpinning of complex organizational arenas, structures, 
processes and human action and interaction, all of which converge to determine how 
policy operates in practice and its likely impacts.  
Table 2.1 below summarizes the policymaking and implementation theories. This 
study is located within the continuum of bottom-up, bargaining and evolution 
perspectives (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter and van Horn, 1975; 
Mazamanian and Sabatier, 1989; Barrett, 2004). More specifically, the analysis takes 
the form of a case study of specific policy process and attempt to explore what 
happens after policy has been designed and implemented and including the complex 
processes arising from interactions interests and actors involved in organizational 
phenomena.   
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Table 2.1: Policy-making and implementation theories (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter and 
van Horn, 1975; Jordan, 1995; Mazamanian and Sabatier, 1989; Barrett, 2004) 
Context  Top-down Bottom-up Bargaining and evolution 
Aim To improve organizational 
performance (achieve set 
goals) 
To explain what actually happens as 
policies are implemented  
To explain how policy is 
the product of bargaining 
between interests  
Dominant theme  Hierarchy, control and 
compliance 
Complexity, messiness and devolved 
power 
Bargaining, exchange and 
negotiation  
Dominant actor  Policy-makers, government, 
policy experts  
Workers and organizational 
managers  
Workers and 
organizational managers  
Focus  Effectiveness of achieving set 
macro goals  
Operational processes and practices 
that realistically influence day-to-
day actions and interactions  
Bargaining interplay 
between goals and local 
conditions, constraints and 
opportunities  
Policy 
formulation and 
implementation 
perspective  
Policy is a distinct and 
discrete event made by top 
executives, which others must 
obey.  
Unclear distinction between policy 
and policy implementers as policy 
may be remade or restructured 
through prevailing structure and 
shared beliefs 
Policy needs to be 
understood in a policy-
action continuum and seen 
as a series of intentions 
around which bargaining 
and interactions take place 
Policy view  Policy as an independent 
variable with a starting point, 
a benchmark and end point 
Policy is dependent upon existing 
interactions, structures and actors 
at the local organizational level  
Policy is dependent on the 
process of bargaining  
Criteria for 
measuring 
policy success  
Based on output/results along 
a priori objectives or 
standards  
Complex change process, messy and 
difficult to objectify, but attempt 
can be made to understand it 
No benchmark – policies 
restructured as a result of 
negotiation  
Policy outcomes  Predictable and results-
oriented  
Unpredictable; depend on local 
interactions and structures  
Unpredictable; dependent 
on bargaining  
Research 
methodology  
Focuses on modelling of what 
should happen and 
comparing with reality 
(deductive, positivist view) 
Dependent on what situation on the 
ground reveals based on empirical 
evidence and from the perspectives 
of those involved  
Deductive and inductive  
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Summarizing the above, policy reform remains critical to developing economies as a 
means of outlining what should be done and the incentives for doing it. Yet, its 
actual realization as prescribed remains intricate and messy. Policy is essentially an 
intervention that seeks to transform the structures and operations of public 
organizations, human action and behaviour, and in the context of health service 
delivery remains critical to improving organizational performance. Thus, the 
argument here is that one way of understanding policy reform is to treat it as a 
process, but one which needs to be understood within context.  
This study seeks to develop an in-depth view of the policy implementation process 
at the local level of public organizations. To do this, it draws from the perspectives 
of organizations as systems consisting of diverse worker categories operating within 
set organizational structures and processes.  
2.3 Organizational Change Theory  
Organisational change theory argues that organisational change reflects what 
actually happens within an organization, and not prescriptions of what needs to be 
done (Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Feldman, 2000; Becker et al, 2005).  
A hospital organisation as used here is an exemplar of public organizations.  As 
North (1990) notes, organizations are both components of the structural framework 
that supports human action and interaction, and organizations are groups of 
individuals who work towards a common goal or objective and have common 
interest. This simplified definition is however in line with the very early view of 
Gauss (1936: 66 cited in Selznick, 1948: 25), which considers “organizations” as 
“the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed 
purpose through allocation of functions and responsibilities”. In this regard, Selznick 
(1948: 25) sees formal organizations as a “structural expression of rational (policy 
reform) action”.  
The fundamental issue is that organizations’ activities are concrete social structures, 
embedded in the rubric of underlying social systems, and contexts (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1992); power and trust (Luke, 1974; Knight, 1992). For 
Selznick (1948: 27-28), the public organization is both an economy and an adaptive 
social structure. As an economy, it represents a system of institutions and 
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relationships, which define resource availability and centre on improving efficiency 
and effectiveness. As an adaptive social structure, it is construed as consisting of a 
structure, human relations and actions, and made of elements (workers) with 
different personalities. While the economy (institutions) provides the rules, the 
functioning is determined by human action, interaction and relationships. Thus, 
understanding the interplay of institutions, structures and human actions requires a 
detailed exploration of what is happening as perceived by those involved (Klein and 
Myers, 1999).  
An important element of organization is its structure. This relates to the shared 
beliefs, patterns of interaction, processes and culture that underpin how workers 
function to do their work (Ouchi and Wilkins, 1985; Schein, 1996; 2004). As noted 
by Deshpande and Webster (1989: 4) it reveals, “why things happen the way they 
do”. The early literature on organizations (e.g. Bernard, 1938; Selznick, 1948), 
shows that the structure of an organization explains why there are differences in 
organizational outcomes. Organizational structure, as a concept, is embedded in 
shared values and beliefs, work identities, and the way workers perceive their work.  
It can also explain prevailing work practices, procedures, responsibilities and 
patterns of relationships among workers (Geertz, 1973; Weick, 2001). These past 
studies also show that organizational structure is embedded in historical context. For 
example, the hospital as a public organization operates on the logic of bureaucracy 
and professional orientation. This implies that work practices and structures are 
interwoven in the traditional idea of chain-of-command, authority and power and job 
specialization as well as being influenced by professional discretion (Lipsky, 1980; 
Schneider and Ingram, 1993).  
In sum, from the perspective of organisational structures, the focus of this study is 
on day-to-day activities within the structures of the organization. It relates to how 
workers as primary organizational actors attribute meaning and interpret their 
experiences within the structures of the organizations where they work. The analysis 
of organizational processes also emphasises the social aspect of work alongside 
formalized work practices, procedures and incentives. The data emerged as a 
product of individual experiences of policy changes, organizational processes and 
structures. The focus on the workers as primary organizational actors is therefore 
considered paramount to this analysis. With the public hospital organization 
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representing an arena where policy institutions operate (Zucker, 1987), it represents 
a mechanism by which government seeks to achieve its aim of meeting the service 
needs of the populace. Yet, as noted by Meyer and Rowan (1977: 252) how public 
organizations “conform to existing institutions” could influence their capacity to 
realize the policy reform objectives. Other studies (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell; 1983; 
Lawrence, 1999) noted that the consequence of human action and interactions in a 
changing institutional context is complicated. It is therefore important to note that 
policy reform can introduce both opportunities and challenges, and therefore the 
consequences of interactions between policy institutions and organizations (human 
action and interaction) can be both intended and unintended.  
 
2.3.1 Theoretical Approaches to Public Organization Management  
There are different theoretical approaches to understanding and managing 
organizational life, each of which influences work practices, incentive systems, work 
motivations and performance differently (Pfeffer, 1982; Oliver, 1991; Jawahar and 
McLaughlin, 2001). Public sector management styles include approaches that are 
referred to as classical (using a bureaucratic and mechanistic metaphor) (Fayol, 1949; 
Carroll and Gillen, 1987); structural and neo-liberal (Williamson, 1975; 1990); 
human relationship-focused and political (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1983) and systems 
based (Ackoff, 1971; Checkland, 1981). This section examines each of these in turn.  
 
2.3.1.1 The Classical Approach 
The classical approach sits within the earliest organizational bureaucratic settings 
with a defined hierarchy and bureaucracy (Fayol, 1949; Weber, 1947), and a 
mechanistic perspective based on clearly defined scientific planning procedures 
(Taylor, 1911). It builds on the understanding that rational economic principles 
guide worker behaviour and ignores the societal or external environmental influence. 
According to Morgan (1986), this approach is grounded on the conceptualization of 
public organization as a rational system which is run according to top-down 
bureaucratic principles (hence the ‘‘bureaucratic metaphor’’) and the defined 
scientific process of planning, coordination and control using basic techniques of 
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Management by Objective (MBO) and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Systems (PPBS) (ibid: 29). The classical model conceptualizes public organizations 
as agencies of government and means of social control through orders, structures 
and regulations, managed by bureaucrats and experts, operating within set rules and 
regulations with defined hierarchies and spans of control (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Pfeffer, 1982).  
Within this approach, the problems of public sector workers’ are perceived as 
technical issues requiring technical solutions (Scott et al., 2003) thus legitimizing 
the model as an indispensable form of public management based on bureaucratic 
rules and technical functions (Presthus, 1975). Thus, public workers are critical 
instruments to achieve economic and productive goals within a closed organizational 
system. However, as agents, they need to be institutionalized into the existing 
organizational structure. As rational individuals, their behaviour is predetermined 
within the bounded rationality of the organization, a well-defined bureaucratic 
administration and a reward system structured into grade levels.  
However, the classical approach has been severely criticized for not encouraging 
innovativeness and instead encouraging people to obey ‘orders’ and ‘rules’ without 
question (Morgan, 1986). Morgan (1986: 39) argued that it is often presented, as 
“this is the way government want you to do your work, so you must do it exactly”. 
As noted by Morgan, classical approach “reinforces power and control” of 
government over the organizations. Meanwhile, Myerson (1994) and Kooiman 
(2003) argue that it could result in feelings of alienation, tension and conflict in the 
workplace.   
 
2.3.1.2 The Structural and Neoliberal Approach – ‘Market 
Metaphor’   
The structural approach is underpinned by a neo-liberal perspective and the 
understanding that the market is the most efficient and effective way of allocating 
public resources (Williamson, 1985). This sees restructured organizations (e.g. those 
that have been decentralized) as enhancing performance and efficiency, which in 
turn guarantees quality services to clients. This also involves exposing customers to 
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user fees, decentralization and introducing competition in hospital organizational 
processes (Propper, et al, 2004; Gaynor, 2004; Maynard, 1993). It is exemplified by 
the structural adjustment programme implemented in many developing countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s as public sector-and specifically health sector reforms (Mills et 
al, 2001; Russell et al, 1999).  
While this approach allows for opportunities for improvement in service quality, 
there is no denial that rising costs of access to health services have been difficult to 
curtail across developing countries (Russell, 2004: Goudge et al, 2009). In addition, 
in a market driven organization, issues of comparability of rewards and opportunities 
within and across public organizations, and social system variables have remained 
factors that, though poorly understood, influence an organization’s capacity to 
achieve the efficient market agenda. Equally notable is that decentralized health 
systems have in most areas failed to deliver expected health outcomes (Mills et al, 
2001). Other studies have criticised the structural approach as neglecting the 
workforce (Martinez and Martineau, 1998; Buchan, 2000; Hongoro and McPake, 
2003) and social aspects of healthcare provision (Frohlich et al., 2001; Williams, 
2003; Moore et al., 2006).  
 
2.3.1.3 The Human Approach-‘Organizational Ecology Metaphor’  
The human approach incorporates human relational aspects such as needs, 
motivation, behaviour and process, and the synergy between workers and their 
environment (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1957). The popularity of this approach was 
influenced by what became known as the ‘‘Hawthorne effect’’, drawn from Elton 
Mayo’s study in the 1920s and 1930s of public organizations. Mayo’s (1933) work 
conducted at the Hawthorne electrical plant in Chicago, introduced human issues 
into the understanding of organizational operations. The development of the human 
relation model provided information that underlined the importance of a public 
organization first as a structured institution that supplies goods and services to the 
people, but more importantly as a place of interaction, which facilitates the 
integration of individual workers and the wider public service context (Reed, 1999). 
It provided information underlining the importance of organizational ecology. Thus 
– work and worker characteristics, relations and interactions are as important in 
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achieving organizational performance (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; 
McGregor, 1960).  
Besides contributing to the development of modern human resource management 
through incentives systems and other motivational factors (conceptualized as forms 
of job enhancement), and principally to encourage workers to improve their 
organizational roles, the human relation approach integrates aspects of workers’ 
well-being into our understanding of organizational processes (Feldman, 2000; 
Feldman and Pentland, 2003). In addition, Ferlie and Mark (2003:313) in their 
qualitative study on new public organizational management draw attention to the 
fact that “work conditions and worker characteristics influence organizational 
performance’’. Valuable insights into the importance of the relationship between the 
worker, work conditions, motivation and performance are also provided by Morgan 
(1986), Hannan and Freeman (1989), and Franco et al (2002). For example, Franco 
et al, 2002) indicate that there is relationship between worker motivation and 
performance, while Hannan and Freeman (1989) argue that changes in work 
conditions may have differential impacts on workers. Following on from this, 
Morgan (1986) is of the opinion that workers will perceive change differently 
depending on their situation and disposition. This reinforces the need for 
understanding differences in worker categories, work cycles and other characteristics 
of importance, which may have influence on their behaviour.  
 
2.3.1.4 The Systems Approach – ‘Systems Metaphor’ 
The system perspective conceptualizes the public organization as a collection of 
workers of different categories and socio-economic characteristics, and is an 
extension of the human relation approach, identifying public organizations as 
dynamic and open systems (Scott, 1992). Public workers are seen as agents whose 
choices and activities are restrained by formal organizational rules and available 
resources (Giddens, 1984; Holbeche, 2006). The perspective of a public organization 
as a self-organizing system extends our understanding of organizational elements 
(workers) through an integrated window of organizational ecology (culture and 
climate), cognitive science, economics, and social sciences (Schein, 2004). The 
systems approach is in line with the view that public organizations consist of groups 
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of individuals who work towards a common goal or objective and have common 
interest (Gaus, 1936:66 cited in Selznick, 1948:25).
3
 As a system, it operates as “a 
coordination of interrelated behaviours of people who are working together to 
achieve organisational goal” (Lawrence and Lorsh, 1967: 3). As an “open system”, a 
public organization may be influenced by inherent activities within its operating 
structure and changes in the environmental context (e.g. reform) (Scott, 2001; 
Holbeche, 2006). Earlier studies (Bernard, 1938; Selznick, 1948; March and Simon, 
1958; Cyert and March, 1963), conceptualize an organization as a problem-solving 
mechanism. Thus, organisation serves as a unit of interaction of individual elements 
with set governing and operating structures.   
From the perspective of this study, this approach offers valuable insights into the 
characteristics of organizational elements (workers), particularly in a service 
organization such as a public health provider. In that connection, a public health 
organization as identified in this study is adapted from the conceptualization of 
Meyer and Rowan (1977:340) as follows:  
“[A] formal organization which operates along set institutions and structures 
and involves day by day processes, human actions and interactions which are 
embedded in the underlying complex social context of relationships and 
exchanges.” 
According to Meyer and Rowan (ibid: 240), policy reforms therefore operate as 
‘institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies and programs which public 
organizations often adopt ceremoniously’. This suggests that public organizations 
reflect the cultures, structures and outcomes of the wider system in which they are 
situated. Operationally, public organizations do not function haphazardly but follow 
clearly laid down blueprints which link to the policies and goals of the wider 
economy.  
In public organizations, public health workers are the primary elements who interact 
and engage in activities and processes aimed at achieving organizationally set goals. 
However, it is also understood that they are not only pursuing the goals of the 
organization they work for; they are members of households and other institutions 
by virtue of their networks and ties, and hence may be equally committed to meeting 
                                                          
3
 Selznick (1948: 25) sees formal organizations as a “structural expression of rational (policy reform) 
action”. 
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personal, household and social needs. In addition, the public organization does not 
exist in a vacuum but is part of a system or environment with laid down institutions. 
Therefore, to understand the web of processes, relationships and interactions 
associated with organizational functions, the systems approach is considered the 
most appropriate (Ackoff, 1971; Checkland, 1999). The key focus is therefore to 
understand public health sector organizational processes and functions, interactions 
and relationships and the embedded constructs, which shape work practices.  
 
2.4 Organizational Change  
According to Holbeche (2006), change is inevitable in an organization. Change in an 
organization is the way to stay competitive and grow and thus how change happen 
remain a dominant theme of management (both in private and public organization) 
(Heller, 1998). As an organisational change tool, policy reform can impact positively 
on an organization by reorganizing how work is done and the incentives available to 
workers to enable them to perform better (Berman, 1995; Berman and Bossert, 
2000).This study is premised on this understanding of policy reform as a change 
process that may have different levels of impact on the workers, organizational 
structures, incentive systems and service delivery outcomes (Berman, 1995; Biscoe, 
2000; Holbeche, 2006). 
The organizational management literature suggests different change typologies 
depending on the level of impact on the organization, the processes, its workers and 
outcomes (Walzlawick et al, 1974; Bartunek and Moch, 1987). In this connection 
too, the success of a change process in an organization largely depends on how 
change is managed (Kotter, 1996). As Kotter (1996) notes, subsequent to change 
initiation, it is important to know how change managers (organizational managers) 
and change implementers (frontline workers) respond. Other studies (Lorenzi and 
Riley, 2000; Nevin and Grace, 2000; Rowden, 2001) suggest the need to understand 
how organizational workers perceive and learn from their experiences in a change 
process, since this perception may shape their mind-set and attitudes to work and 
commitment to service provision. How to manage change, particularly in a complex 
service organization like the public health sector (Kernick, 2004; Pettigrew, 1990), 
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remains a key challenge.  Lorenzi and Riley (2000: 121) state that change can be 
resisted based on whether it is perceived as a threat, challenge or opportunity: 
 ‘‘It is easy to change the things that nobody cares about. It becomes difficult 
when you start to change the things that people do care about or when they 
start to care about the things that you are changing.’’   
Equally, they argue that change could contribute to the success of an organization 
particularly where there is ‘‘trust, good communication, involvement and 
participation and simplicity of content and process in addition to perceived 
favourable outcomes’’ (ibid: 118). The understanding of institutional policy reform 
is grounded in the logic that reform is an on-going process and depends on the day-
by-day organizational practices, behaviour, and action of primary organizational 
actors (Orlikowski, 1996; Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). Other 
studies (e.g. Feldman, 2000; Becker, 2004; 2005) highlight that workers, by their 
day-to-day work practices and routines make change to happen. Furthermore, as 
March (1981b: 564) notes, organizational change happens because workers are 
‘intelligently attentive to shifts in their job context and can alter their behaviour 
based on how well they feel motivated’.   
Despite the relevance of policy reform as a change process, it is important to 
reiterate, based on the aforementioned studies, that change is a complex activity. As 
noted, the focus of this research is on developing insights into the emerging patterns, 
structures, processes and relationships arising from the implementation of policy 
reform as a change process. Since a change process generally seeks to bring about 
improvement in organizational performance, it is necessary to discuss the concept of 
performance.  
 
2.5 Performance 
In recent years, the performance of public organizations has attracted significant 
attention in developed (Boyne et al, 2006a; Andrews et al, 2006) and developing 
countries (Kruk and Freedman, 2008). Organizational performance is seen as a key 
benchmark that differentiates organizations, managers and workers (Ichniowski et al, 
1997; Folan and Browne, 2005). Yet, while the performance of public service 
organizations has been in the spotlight in recent times, performance remains a 
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subjective concept (Boyne et al, 2006a; 2006b). Furthermore, understanding of what 
performance is and how to measure it remains controversial and inconclusive (Van 
Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; Boyne et al, 2006a, Andrews et al, 2006). 
The literature links performance with strategic planning, operational control (Neely 
et al, 1995; Kaplan and Norton, 2001), work processes (Feldman, 2000; Pentland 
and Rueter, 1994) and the behaviour of workers (Franco et al, 2002), with the focus 
about how to transform dysfunctional public health organizational structures and 
processes and to make workers achieve set goals. However, there is a contradiction 
as to what public health performance is because of the multiplicity of interests 
involved (Boyne et al, 2003; Boyne et al, 2006a). In an attempt to understand the 
concept, this review considers a number of different perspectives. First, performance 
is related to hospital operational effectiveness. Adair et al (2006:98), for example, 
describe performance as a measure of “how well an organization or workers carry 
out its functions in relation to set goals”. Thus, performance is related to the setting 
and/or realization of set goals or targets. 
Second, from an economic perspective, performance is explained in terms of cost-
benefit calculations (Williamson, 2000; Boyne, 2002). In particular, the economic 
efficiency definition of performance relates to how well organizational operations 
maximise available resources in delivering services. Closely related to the economic 
perspective is the political or institutional logic. As noted by Meyer and Zucker 
(1989: 111) public sector performance is related to “how existing power, politics and 
interests operate within a system to achieve maximum recognition and impact”. This 
definition underscores the importance of power and legitimacy, interest and goals as 
critical elements that drive the demand for performance.  
From a market perspective, public sector performance is associated with the neo-
liberal discourse of competition and individual choice. Simons and Ingram (2004) 
note that performance is related to how well organizations compete to achieve set 
organizational goals within changing ideology of work. In addition, from a service 
management perspective, performance is related to how and to what extent services 
are delivered to satisfy customer needs (Gronroos, 1994). On this account, 
performance can thus be seen as a means of improving wellbeing of clients 
(Gronroos, 2001).  
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In the context of this study, the concept of performance is linked to how well 
hospital organizations achieve set targets. This in turn is strongly related to the 
strategic business planning and management logic in which performance is 
measured along set targets as a way of establishing a scorecard for comparison 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996). This business management perspective has been a driver 
of performance issues within the public sector and focuses on service delivery 
processes such as customer orientation, including relationship management, 
responsiveness, timeliness, and waiting and consultation times.  
Finally, performance by public sector organizations has become part of the language 
of democracy and good governance (Forbes and Lynn, 2006; Hughes, 2006). Thus, a 
public health organization can be said to perform well if it is working in line with the 
tenets of accountability and transparency of public service operations. Politically, the 
language of accountability and transparency in public service delivery has become 
associated with democracy and good governance (Lynn et al, 2000; World Bank, 
2004a). All the same, it has exerted (and continues to) much influence within the 
wider political subsystem over the perspectives of public service performance. 
Drawing from the theory of bureaucracy (Selznick, 1943; Carnis, 2009), public 
organizations and public bureaucrats are expected to be responsible for doing what 
they are assigned to do – that is serving the best interests of the public. Of 
importance to the discussion on performance as an aspect of organizational 
governance, therefore, is to what extent (if at all), and how a public health facility 
provides services to the people (World Bank, 2004a). While public policy seeks to 
align interests and emphasises how well public facilities should operate to provide 
those facilities and services people need, the realization of policy objectives relies 
heavily on how organizational workers do their work day-to-day (Feldman, 2000). 
Thus, the functional operations of public organizations may differ from logical 
prescriptions of policy. The complex peculiarity of organizational outcomes 
(performance) seems to result from the inherent characteristics of roles and interests, 
including the work characteristics of public workers. For example, Lipsky (1980: 40) 
shows that public workers (addressed as street level bureaucrats) do their jobs under 
conflicting and ambiguous goals arising from differing legislative interests.  
Overall, performance as presented by the policy reform seems to have been driven 
by the political ambition to reposition and re-invent government and public 
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organizations (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and to create value from ‘tax-payers’ 
money (Osborne and Hutchinson, 2004) and meet the needs of the majority, 
especially the  poor (World Bank, 2004a). This suggests that issues of public sector 
performance are linked to wider development issues such as poverty, inequality and 
deprivation (Bloom et al, 2004; DfID, 2004; WHO, 2007).   
 
2.5.1 Performance Targets  
Recently, the focus of reform as a means of improving public service performance 
has resulted in the outlining of targets as standards for measuring performance in 
public hospitals (Bevan and Hood, 2006a/b; Kruk and Freedman, 2008; Propper et al, 
2008a/b). The reviewed policy documents suggest that governments opted to set 
national performance targets as a way of assuring corporate standards. In the past, it 
was often said that public workers across developing countries public sector contexts 
were “lazy”, often not knowing what was expected from them (Delfgaauw and Dur, 
2008). Thus, one of the core concepts of the reform is that setting targets will create 
uniformity of behaviour and of standards to measure performance.  
The “performance target culture” is a private business- and market-based 
management philosophy which originated in the industrial sector (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996; Neely, 1999). The literature suggests that it has been an emerging 
trend in and characteristic of new public sector management, enshrined in the public 
health systems of many other countries (e.g. UK, USA, New Zealand, Australia, 
South Africa)  (Hood, 1991; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Bevan and Hood, 2006a/b). 
Specifically, the use of targets as a policy instrument for improving service delivery 
systems is common, particularly in the context of developed countries’ health 
systems (Marshall et al, 2002; Mannion et al, 2005: Propper et al, 2008b). Although 
the use of targets has emerged more recently in the context of developing countries, 
their effectiveness remains unclear and indeed may be context specific (e.g. Maritz 
et al, 2010; Kruk and Freedman, 2008). At the same time, government’s interest in 
performance targets within the on-going policy reform process remains 
unprecedented. For example, based on evidence from policy documents (see 
Thompson, 2004; NEEDS, 2004), the Nigerian government hardly knows what 
public service providers do or that the service providers often pursue their own 
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interests – a concept rooted in principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989a). Performance targets therefore serve as a strategic tool used by 
government to align service providers to nationally-set government interests and 
goals. However, it is important to point out that the operation of performance targets 
suggests an extension of the culture of regulation and control, a way of “telling the 
workers what to do” (Hood et al, 1999; Power, 2000; James, 2000; 2003).  
Operationally, the presentation of targets appears to have been based on the 
assumption that workers will see them as a “taken for granted rule” and therefore 
obey rationally (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Nevertheless, drawing from past 
organizational studies (e.g. Lipsky, 1980; Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; Scott, 
2001; Greenwood et al, 2002), there is consideration that the link between target and 
performance may not occur automatically because workers as professionals often 
operate with significant amounts of discretion and may or may not follow the targets. 
In line with the view of other past organizational studies (e.g. Smith, 1995; Smith 
and Goddard, 2002), a key issue is what are the incentives for meeting targets and 
how management of performance target operate in practice. This remains one of the 
central concerns of this study.  
 
2.5.2 Measurement of Organizational Performance   
In many developing countries, there is evidence that the quality and performance of 
healthcare services have remained unsatisfactory (WHO, 2000; FMOH, 2004; Rowe 
et al, 2005; Mills et al, 2006). Yet, the measurement of performance remains 
contentious, complex and difficult (Andrew et al, 2006; Brewer, 2006). Much of 
what is known today about public health performance is drawn from the service 
management approach (Morris and Pond, 2007; Gronroos, 1994), with most of what 
has been researched about performance based on customer-based assessment of 
hospital operations (Parasumaman et al, 1993; Zeithaml et al, 1994; Groenewegen et 
al, 2005). While recognizing that the customer approach may have served to show 
how service users perceive organizational outcomes, it is nevertheless important to 
note that it remains inadequate as it fails to account for the process component and 
how workers perceive their work and the outcomes. The literature (e.g. Al-Qutob 
and Nasir, 2008; Sudhahar and Selvam, 2008) demonstrates that providers’ 
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(workers’) own assessment of performance has hardly been examined (Wadhwa et 
al, 1999; Lee et al, 2000). Since workers are the primary actors in service delivery, it 
is important their perspectives as they relate to issues of performance on the supply 
side.  
The relevant organizational literature demonstrates that the processes of delivering 
quality care remain complex and linked to broader issues of work practices, skills, 
attitudes (motivation, commitment and satisfaction) and organizational policies and 
procedures (Gerhart, 2005; WHO, 2006; Katou and Budhwar, 2007). In recent years, 
measuring performance has come to spotlight as a means of identifying how well 
organizations perform and also improve relevance to the people (Boyne et al, 2006a). 
In doing this, the use of customer satisfaction has often been used (Wadhwa, 2002; 
Sofaer and Firminger, 2005). Yet, there are challenges to data validity of consumer 
reports particularly across developing countries (Agyepong et al, 2004; Andaleeb, 
2001). In general, healthcare quality and performance encompass the total features 
and characteristics of a product or service that bears the ability to satisfy a given 
need.  
There is the potential, therefore, to argue that we cannot fully understand 
performance without integrating the views of workers, and the processes involved in 
achieving performance. Yet, the former are hardly considered even though the 
actions and interactions of health workers and their managers improve or retard 
performance. It is logical, therefore, to engage them in mapping out how and to what 
extent policy reform may have influenced organizational performance. In practice, 
although health workers and their managers are often bombarded with pressure from 
government to perform, and in fact often blamed for poor performance, they may 
have particular insights about what optimum performance is and how it can be 
achieved. Thus, focusing on the views of the workers will provide a believable 
assessment of performance.  
The literature also reports performance measurement as a subjective implicit 
incentive (Baker, 1992; Baker et al, 1994; Gibbs et al, 2004). It is presumed that 
when workers know that information about how they do their work is being 
collected and that they will be rewarded by doing well (or having a good 
performance assessment), they will be motivated to do better. However, despite the 
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existing theoretical prediction and supposition of the possible link between 
performance measurement and worker motivation (Baker, 1992; Baker et al, 1994), 
empirical evidence remains scarce (Gibbs et al, 2004; Hayes and Schaefer, 2000). 
Theoretically, the logic of performance measurement is situated within the context 
of the debate on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Baker, 1992). It serves 
as a means of generating information about workers (agents) and at the same time 
generates information used to reward best performers. The overall aim is that it 
serves as a means of aligning workers’ actions to the organizational objective. There 
is, however, ambiguity about how and to what extent performance measurement 
influences worker behavior, motivation and performance in practice (Gibb et al, 
2009; Baker et al, 1988). 
Finally, while the introduction of performance targets acts as a means of aligning 
workers’ interests to those of government, the attachment of rewards to achieved 
targets acts as an incentive to motivate workers to work in line with the targets. The 
literature of organizational control (Ouchi, 1980; Power, 2000) also suggests that the 
introduction of an overseeing agency serves as a disciplinary and controlling 
measure. Workers may respond differently based on whether they perceive the 
change either as an incentive or as a regulatory or controlling measure (Gibb et al, 
2009). 
 
2.6 Incentive Systems (Compensation/reward) 
As noted, changing the incentive (compensation/reward) structure is a major 
objective of the public sector reform. The public compensation/reward system is 
crucial as a human resource management tool (Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Baker and 
Huselid, 2006) with implications for worker motivation and performance (Lawler, 
2000; Armstrong and Brown, 2006; Armstrong, 2007). The literature highlights a 
potential link between incentive systems and poor performance of public health 
systems in developing countries (Franco et al, 2002; WHO, 2006; Dielemann and 
Harnmeije, 2006; McCoy et al, 2008). Thus, one of the primary aims of reform is to 
put the “incentive right” to improve public workers’ motivation (WHO, 2006; 
Drager et al, 2006).   
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The WHO (2000: 61) defines incentives as:  
“All rewards and punishments that are provided to service providers as a 
consequence of their work in the public health organization” 
Armstrong (2007:3) notes that incentive/reward systems consist of “strategies, 
policies and processes in place through which the contributions of people to 
organizations are recognized by both financial and non-financial means”. The WHO 
Report (2006: xvi) highlights that “incentives seek to enhance effective management 
of public health organizations and contribute to improving the performance and 
provision of quality of services”. While organizations must have good incentive 
structures, the literature shows that the effectiveness of an incentive system is based 
on a core philosophy of procedural and distributional fairness and its appropriateness 
and linkage to efforts (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Greenberg, 1990).  
According to Armstrong (2002: 4), incentive systems consist of salaries, allowances, 
fringe benefits, and pensions and non-financial recognition (praise, achievement, 
promotion, responsibility and personal growth). In practice, an incentive could be a 
reward for effort already carried out as in performance incentives, salaries and 
pensions; a punishment for not doing what is expected; a form of regulation; and a 
means of reinforcing behaviour. An incentive contributes to shaping and directing 
health worker actions, attitudes, behaviour and motivation, pushing them to do better. 
In addition, as a regulatory mechanism common within the principal-agent 
relationship, it seeks to reduce the ambiguity of roles and to direct activity towards 
the achievement of corporate goals, often representing the vested interests of the 
principal. 
One of the reasons why the concept is intuitively appealing is that it encompasses a 
whole array of aspects of human behaviour and interactions, and cultural and 
institutional elements of a given context (Bernard, 1938; Simon, 1985). A frequently 
cited characterization is that it is a tool of institutional change, which sets out what is 
to be done and the associated rewards and punishment. Yet the divergence in the 
literature on incentive systems demonstrates the different views and predictions 
about human behaviour. The broadest approach to incentive systems as an element 
of policy reform is that they present a new workplace practice consisting of 
formalized work rules and standardization of procedures as a means of regulating 
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workers (North, 1990). The generalized idea of incentives as a driver of the 
institutionalization process is that they provide a formalized structure and 
relationship between the government and the service providers on the one hand, and 
between the provider and the service users on the other.  
The theoretical foundation of incentives as highlighted by the literature suggests that 
it is underpinned by assumptions about organizations and human action and 
behaviour (Gibbons, 1998; Ratto et al, 2002; Saltman, 2002; Lewin, 2003; Besley 
and Ghatak, 2005; Miller, 2005). In particular, many of the past studies on the 
structure of organizational incentives appear to follow the formal analysis of 
principal-agent models (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). The explicit prediction of this model is that public organizations 
consist of two parties who operate in the form of a contract. The first is the 
government as owners (principal) who provide resources and set out what should be 
done and how, including expectations about the actions required. With the 
government expected to serve the public interest but unable to do all those things 
directly, it thus employs health workers (agents) (the second element of the contract), 
who provide both the labour and skills.  
Technically, there is a subsisting agency problem with this, arising from the fact that 
the actions and choices of the workers in doing what is expected are often 
unobservable by government (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992; 
Lambert et al, 1993). Therefore, the national government designs an incentive 
structure as a means of optimizing performance. Given that public workers are often 
construed as being lazy and rarely behaving as directed because of self-seeking 
motives (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008), incentives therefore serve as human 
“constraints” that direct, motivate or enforce compliance to corporate goals.  
The literature on incentive systems also sits within the theory of the firm or the 
‘happy-productive worker’ thesis, which argues that incentives make workers happy 
and happy workers produce more (Ledford, 1998; Wright and Staw, 1999). Thus, 
organizational incentives act as bait to attract or motivate workers to behave in a 
rational manner relevant to the organization. Meanwhile, such systems can either be 
economically- or behaviourally-oriented (Murphy and Alexander, 2000). 
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The logic of incentive systems that good incentives equal better performance is not 
conclusive without empirical backing as there may be some variation that is not 
accounted for by intrinsic financial rewards or that goes beyond economic behaviour. 
Equally, although the behaviour of workers’ groups in relation to incentives has 
been analysed in the labour relations literature (Nelson, 1991; Brito et al, 2000), the 
relationship between organizational incentive systems and public workers’ 
behaviour and performance is still poorly understood in Nigeria (Ademolekun, 2002; 
Ajila and Abiola, 2004) because of the seemingly unexplored influence of the 
broader social system and organizational environment. Thus, existing incentive-
related research, though important, is inadequate as it fails to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the particular situation of Nigeria’s public sector. 
More recently, there has been a vigorous debate regarding hospital incentives to 
health workers in developing country health systems, particularly in Africa (McCoy 
et al, 2008; Witter et al, 2007a; Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006; Drager et al, 2006). Yet, 
while policy initiatives on health worker incentives have been rife as part of the 
wider health reform agenda, very little is known about their underlying structures 
and practicalities, and especially how and to what extent (if at all) existing incentives 
may have impacted on hospital workers’ performance. The literature suggests that 
while there may be various factors that could influence how workers perceive an 
incentive system, of greatest importance is the concept of fairness (equity) in terms 
of distribution and procedure. The literature of organizational theory, for example on 
the logic of organizational justice (McFarlin and Sweeney, 1992; Greenberg, 1996) 
claims that perceptions of fairness and trust could influence how workers perceive 
an incentive system. 
Overall, work practices and pay remain central features of public service work, 
providing background characteristics about worker incentive systems. The critical 
role of work practices stems from the way these shape day-to-day experiences, while 
pay are supposed to have a direct impact on the welfare of the workers and their 
reciprocal attitude at work. The reviewed policy documents demonstrate that the 
government believes that reforming the incentive system will contribute to changing 
the way organizations and workers operate. As part of the initiative, it is claimed that 
changing pay and pensions, and introducing business models for performance 
measurement with appropriate targets will motivate workers to do better. It is also 
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construed by the policy reform that when workers know that information about how 
they do their work is collected or measured, they will again be motivated to perform 
better. In general, incentive systems are assumed to serve as a tool for unlocking the 
productive potential of health workers and enhancing the responsiveness, timeliness 
and fairness of service delivery (WHO, 2006). It is important to point out also that 
incentives operate as an expression of strong leadership and the management 
capability of government to make change happen.  
Based on the review so far, it is understandable that the primary purpose of policy is 
to influence organizations through the introduction of purposeful incentives. It also 
suggests that how well workers are motivated will go some way to influencing their 
willingness to engage in organizational activities related to public health service 
delivery and thus their capacity to perform. At the same time, it is important to note 
that it is not enough to assume that incentives will always motivate workers as 
prescribed. 
The theoretical foundation of incentives (e.g. pay) draws insights from a diverse 
range of theories. First, neoclassical labour market theory conceptualizes that under 
perfect competition pay is a function of supply and demand variables (Borjas, 1996; 
Booth, 1995). Second, efficiency wage theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 1994) indicates that an organization may pay above market value in 
recognition of a worker’s level of effort, supposing that a higher incentive (e.g. 
higher pay) means higher performance or productivity. From the principal-agent 
literature (e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 2002), pay is a tool used to align interest and 
improve performance of agents. Other organizational studies (e.g. Gibbons, 1998; 
Saltman, 2002; Besley and Ghatak, 2005) point out that incentive is applied to 
influence human action and behaviour. 
There seems to be a consensus that public sector incentive systems are complex 
(Dixit, 2002; Le Grand, 2003; Prendergast, 2007). Although it is widely theorized 
that a relationship exists between incentives, behaviour, and performance of workers 
(Ledford, 1998; Wright and Staw, 1999; Kuvaas, 2006), in practice the linkages are 
not always so straightforward because of multiplicity of interest and roles. More 
recently, there has been a vigorous debate regarding putting incentives right for 
public health workers across developing countries as a means of improving their 
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motivation and performance (McCoy et al, 2008; Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006; 
Drager et al, 2006).  
 
2.7 Public Health Worker Motivation  
Defined as the “individual worker’s willingness to exert and maintain an effort 
towards the realization of hospital organizational goals” (Franco et al, 2002: 1255), 
motivation, is critical in influencing health workers’ performance. They go on to 
declare that motivation is a “complex transactional process between the individual 
worker and his/her interactions with hospital organizational structures and the social 
system as part of the work environment” (ibid).  Many other studies have identified 
public health workers’ motivation as crucial to the realization of organizational goals 
(Hongoro and Normand, 2006; WHO, 2006; Perry and Hondeghen, 2008).  In 
Nigeria currently, low motivation due to inadequate incentives (Raufu, 2002; 
Stllwell et al, 2004; and Oshiomhole, 2006) has been identified as the key challenge 
to public service performance. However, accompanying this have been other 
important factors that have impacted on motivation, including events in the wider 
context outside the workplace such as what others earn in other countries and sectors 
(Froehlich et al, 2001; Gore and Pratten, 2003), and a breakdown of trust between 
government and workers (Gilson, 2003 and Gilson et al, 2005; Mollering, 2006). 
Another important determinant is how workers perceive organizational processes 
including the policy processes (Weiner, 1992). This includes how they make sense 
of the organization or of events within it (including policy changes) (Weick, 2001). 
As noted earlier, the issue of trust as well as existing power dynamics within the 
organisational structure could play a decisive role in shaping workers’ perceptions. 
The literature also demonstrates that health worker motivation is equally related to 
agency – that is, how well available work practices and incentives influence their 
capacity to engage in an autonomous action or act (Le Grand, 2003: 2). Interestingly, 
while there remains a lack of empirical evidence to support these assumptions, 
particularly within the context of developing country healthcare systems, some 
significant new research has been conducted in recent years. For example, Lindelow 
and Serneels (2006) in their qualitative research on the performance of public health 
workers in Ethiopia revealed that workers responded to changes in the public 
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hospital organizations where they worked. The authors argued that this is contrary to 
the traditional assumption that public health workers are passive. Indeed, their study 
suggests that they are economic actors with their own options and preferences (ibid: 
2235). Meanwhile, Agyepong et al (2004) in their study of Ghana’s public health 
sector found that the workplace environment contributed considerably to worker 
motivation. In Mali, Dieleman et al (2006) conducted exploratory qualitative 
research into the match between public health workers’ motivation and performance 
management. Their study concluded that the key motivating factors of public health 
workers include recognition, responsibility and training. Other studies have looked 
at public hospitals in Jordan and Georgia (Franco et al, 2004); Tanzania (Manongi et 
al, 2006); Benin and Kenya, (Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006); and South Africa (Gilson 
et al, 2005). These past studies draw on context-specific information to explore 
aspects of worker motivation and emphasize that the motivation of health workers 
cannot be generalized.  
While there has been a lot of interest in how to measure health worker motivation 
within developing country health systems, an understanding of the key determinates 
of motivation remains elusive (Franco et al, 2002; Hongoro and Normand, 2006).  
Indeed, there are indications that across poorly-resourced health systems, and those 
undergoing varying levels of transition and modernization, incentives to health 
workers as a driver of motivation are seen as inadequate. The need to address this, 
particularly as it relates to workers in public hospital organizations upon which the 
majority of the population depend for basic health services, has been highlighted by 
a number of researchers (Dolea and Adama, 2005; Dieleman et al, 2006 and 
Mangongi et al, 2006).   
Given this, a key empirical challenge to researching health worker motivation and 
performance remains how to measure such motivation, especially in a public 
hospital undergoing restructuring.  Earlier work by Kanfer (1999) and Franco et al 
(2002) on this issue suggests that there are no hard and fast rules, except that it is 
context-specific and depends on the individual worker. They do recommend the 
need to appraise the ‘will do’ and ‘can do’ factors.  The ‘will do’ factors relate to 
worker motivation and behaviour, which are further linked to how the worker makes 
sense of existing institutions, structures and processes within their hospital.  The 
‘can do’ factors, meanwhile, concern workers’ personal capacities, their discretion 
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and experience of events and processes associated with change in their workplace. 
Franco et al (2002: 1260-61) also highlight the need to explore the wider social 
system and organizational culture. In general, this can be expected to provide 
informed knowledge about the workers’ own characteristics and their interactions 
with the organizational structures and processes, and the wider environment.  
 
2.8 Health Worker Behaviour  
The literature demonstrates that by many standards, the behaviour of public health 
workers is often stereotyped as lazy (Klitgaard, 1997; Frank and Lewis, 2004; 
Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008). It also shows that good behaviour and work outlook 
among health workers are hugely important to correct poor organizational 
performance (Franco et al, 2002; WHO, 2006; Hongoro and Normand, 2006). The 
behaviour of health workers across developing countries is complex. For example, 
they have often been criticized as asking for informal payments from service users 
(Lewis, 2007; Ensor, 2004). Gupta el al (2002) for example conceptualize such 
behaviour as open corruption and theft while others (e.g. Ferrinho et al, 2004b; 
McPake et al, 1999b) see it as a coping strategy, especially under systems of poor 
incentives. McPake et al (1999a) highlight that public health workers often engage 
in other jobs while in the service of a public hospital, thus putting pressure on 
government resources.   
Other studies within sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Ghana-Asenso-Okere et al, 1999; 
Uganda-McPake et al, 1999; and Nigeria-Uzochukwu and Onwujekwe, 2005) 
identify public health workers’ behaviour as perverse in how they attend to 
customers and more specifically in their handling of hospital resources such as drugs. 
In Nigeria, as in other developing countries, high levels of absenteeism have been 
reported (Jike, 2003; Okafor, 2005). Overall, the literature (e.g. Lewin, 2003; Van 
Lerberghe et al, 2002; WHO, 2006) demonstrates that perverse behaviour among 
public workers is linked to inadequate incentives and low motivation.  
The literature further demonstrates that health worker behaviour is contingent on 
how workers perceive or attribute their work and incentive experiences (Champoux, 
2000). In other words, an individual worker makes sense of organisational 
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happenings and draws inferences based on his/her experiences to act in a particular 
way (Weiner, 1992; Kelley, 1973). The literature also highlights that behaviour is 
influenced by the level of discretion at work (Lipsky, 1980), knowledge (Drucker, 
1995) and how well organizational processes interfere with their individual lives 
(Jaffee, 2001). Overall, it is important to note that the concept of public health 
worker behaviour is central to understanding their motivation and performance. 
There is a consensus that worker behaviour is linked to available incentives and their 
level of motivation. However, how this operates in practice remains complex. 
2.9 Exploring the Linkages: Incentive, Motivation and Performance  
 
Based on the above, this section draws together the suggested association between 
incentive systems, motivation and organizational performance with respect to the 
context of the policy reform. The central assumption is that while past studies 
regularly report a possibly crucial role for incentive systems in addressing issues of 
worker motivation and organizational performance, the linkage is rather complicated 
and often lacks empirical justification (Franco et al, 2002; Dixit, 2002; Wright, 
2007).  
As noted, the literature suggests a positive link between incentive systems and health 
worker motivation and performance (Franco et al, 2002; Hongoro and Normand, 
2006; WHO, 2006). Reinforcing this logic, evidence from developing countries 
indicates that poor performance of public organizations is linked to inadequate 
incentives and low morale or motivation (WHO, 2006; Hongoro and Normand, 2006; 
McCoy et al, 2008). Thus, when workers are adequately motivated they are more 
likely to collaborate and improve organizational efficiency and performance. 
Although the evidence of the linkages is seemingly quite vast, in practice, there are 
indications that the linkages (particularly in a public sector setting) may not be as 
straightforward as suggested, certainly compared with private organizations (Dixit, 
2002; Le Grand, 2003; Prendergast, 2007).  
Several factors converge to influence public service motivation including the 
multiplicity of roles, expectations, interest and agency of public workers (Le Grand, 
2003; Perry and Hondeghem, 2008). Thus, the operational practice of incentive 
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systems and their linkages with public worker motivation and performance most 
likely depend on context. As outlined by Franco et al (2002), research is needed 
particularly across developing country public health systems to map out, identify and 
enhance the constellation of specific contextual factors that influence public health 
worker motivation and performance especially in a changing policy regime.  
This study therefore attempts to map out the issue from the perspectives of the 
workers themselves. It argues that while there is optimism that changing the 
incentive system will positively influence workers and hospital organizations, there 
is a need to further explore through empirical research the mechanism at work 
behind the observed link between incentive systems and worker motivation and 
performance. To do this, it investigates the on-going policy reform, which has 
introduced various forms of incentives and changes in work practices. From the 
perspective of financial incentives, the pay changes represent a direct incentive 
designed to influence motivation and performance. Meanwhile, changes in work 
practice represent a form of non-financial incentive because of their likely influence 
on work itself, autonomy, recognition, relationships and status. As noted by the 
reform it is expected that the introduction of performance measurement as a means 
of generating information about work is likely to impact on the behaviour and 
actions of workers (Baker, 1992; Baker et al, 1994).  
Overall, the policy reform will likely present opportunities, constraints and 
challenges, all of which could influence workers differently depending on how an 
individual perceives the changes in work practices and incentive system. In order to 
adequately capture the diversity of the linkages outlined above, this study therefore 
adopts a holistic approach. First, it draws from wage efficiency theory which posits 
that paying workers more will motivate them to do better (Shapiro and Stieglitz, 
1984). Second, the analysis will consider how pay compares based on the equity and 
sociological comparison literature (Blau, 1964; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), equity 
theory (Adams, 1965), and the concept of organizational justice (Lind and Tyler, 
1988; Cropanzano and Randall, 1993). These all broadly support such an analysis of 
incentive systems, motivation and performance.  
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Meanwhile, the team performance literature pinpoints the need to consider 
satisfaction as a relevant performance factor; thus, satisfied workers perform better 
(Vroom, 1964). However, despite the positive correlation between job satisfaction 
and organizational performance, our understanding of what and how to satisfy public 
workers remains insufficient. Maslow’s (1954) Needs Theory predicts that any 
initiative that enhances the capacity of the worker to meet their needs leads to job 
satisfaction. Other literature posits that job satisfaction remains an individual 
construct, dependent on having a positive work environment, good work 
relationships, feelings of autonomy and discretion in the work one does, a sense of 
trust and perceived involvement, and participation in organizational decision-making 
processes (Franco et al, 2002; Herzberg et al, 1959).  
While overall, therefore, it is possible that adequate incentives and well-motivated 
health workers will improve organizational performance (Franco et al, 2002; WHO, 
2006; Hongoro and Normand, 2006); it cannot be assumed that this will always be 
reflected in practice. This is not enough to suggest that there is no link at all between 
incentives, motivation and performance. Rather, what is argued here is that the link 
may not be linear, especially in a public sector setting (Dixit, 2002; Le Grand, 2003; 
Prendergast, 2007; Wright, 2007), as often presented. This study thus adopts a 
process-approach to shed light on the relationship between efforts, perception of 
equity, reward and satisfaction, which are critical to motivation and performance.  
 
2.10 Procedural Justice 
Equity theory as it relates to this study suggests that health workers are motivated by 
the perception of equity (Adams, 1965). This is because workers are predicted to be 
in a continual and never-ending state of social comparison with referent others. This 
social comparison logic is based on perceived inputs and outcomes (Adams, 1965). 
The inputs of an individual worker as a social exchange concept represent the 
perceived individual qualities and characteristics such as age, status, seniority, 
length of service, qualification, efforts and skill. The outputs relate to privileges, 
rewards, authority and duties. Whenever an individual perceives that inputs exceed 
output, a sense of inequity and de-motivation sets in.  
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Meanwhile, Blau’s (1964) social exchange logic demonstrates that workers are 
always comparing themselves with others. In other word, workers are equity 
sensitive. Thus, the equity assumption is based on the prediction that health workers 
develop beliefs about what they do and in comparison with colleagues infer how 
fairly or unfairly they are treated or remunerated for the same or similar efforts. 
When for example remuneration is perceived as fair, motivation is sustained; but 
where there is a sense of unfairness, motivation could be disrupted. This 
understanding also implies that health workers could compare with referent others 
either within or between organizations. 
The arguments of equity theory are developed by the theory of organizational justice 
(Lind and Tyler, 1988; Cropanzano and Randall, 1993), which incorporates notions 
of procedural, distributive and interactive justice. Procedural justice (Greenberg, 
1990), the focus in this study, relates to individual workers showing concern with 
the procedures used in allocating resources or pay. The organizational justice 
concept and drive for fairness in the workplace remain key issues in the structure of 
an incentive system (Greenberg, 1987; Greenberg and Cropanzano, 2001), and inter-
functional relationship researchers (e.g. Dewsnap and Jobber, 2002) not only 
reinforce this point, but also underline the importance of ideal pay decisions (Folger 
and Konovsky, 1989; Lind and Tyler, 1988). According to these researchers, if 
reward decisions are poorly managed, it could ignite an atmosphere that jeopardises 
the goal of integration, an outcome which leads to negative organisational 
performance. 
While the concept of equity has led to beliefs that it plays an important role in 
mapping out how workers perceive their incentive system, how this influences 
health worker motivation and performance remains unclear. Moreover, while it is 
supposed that equity enhances motivation and commitment of efforts towards 
improving performance, the practice of the relationship remains complicated.  
 
2.10 Summary  
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature in order to define the theoretical 
foundations for the framework of the study, presented in the next chapter. It has 
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highlighted that the operations of public organizations are complex and intricate 
(Kernick, 2004). Thus, developing an understanding of how the reform of policy and 
institutions influences organizations, work structures and processes in public health 
settings is challenging.  The evidence above supports the use of a holistic and system 
or process approach to exploring the issues. This serves two purposes: 1) it captures 
the web of processes, practices and procedures operating in a socially-embedded 
context and system (Capra, 1982: 2) it provides a means of engaging with the 
workers in their day-to-day activities (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Klein and Myers, 
1999). 
The contextual literature argues that a health organization, like any service 
organization, is flexible, adaptable, and constantly undergoing fundamental change 
in the way work is done to meet changing demands. Apart from being the target 
population of the reform policy, the health workers are also on the frontline and 
remain the primary policy implementers and main organizational actors involved in 
work processes and procedural activities. Most importantly, their motivation and 
behaviour are crucial to the realization of healthcare system reforms (Franco et al, 
2002; WHO, 2006; Hongoro and Normand, 2006). The current policy reform in 
Nigeria, unlike past reforms, seems to appreciate this as the policy focuses on 
reforming work practices, pay and pensions. Consequently, in addition to motivation 
and behaviour, this chapter has reviewed the literature on the core issues of 
incentives, performance and wage equity-based procedural justice theory. This 
provides an essential basis to the holistic focus of this study, as the reviewed 
literature demonstrates that the objective, rationale and dimensions of the policy 
reform remain complex. Since the enactment and initiation of the policy reform 
follows a logical approach with increasing emphasis on changing institutions (i.e. 
rules or procedures of doing things) as a way of changing how organizations operate 
to provide better quality services, the approach followed here fits the target of 
bringing about positive change in a public organization – in this case, Nigeria’s 
healthcare system.  
In the next Chapter, the study methodological approach is explained. 
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3 Research Approach and 
Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 detailed the theoretical and conceptual foundations that underpin this 
study. This chapter details the research approach and methods appropriate for 
achieving this objective, specifically to answer the three research questions relating 
to health service delivery and pay reforms, and organisational change: 
1. What changes did the health reform introduce with respect to work practices 
and pay systems?  
2. How do frontline health providers perceive the change process as it relates to 
their day-to-day work practices?  
3. How the different categories of workers in the hospital perceive the reforms 
have influenced their motivation to perform their jobs?  
In order to answer these questions the thesis adopted a case study approach focusing 
on a single case study hospital, the Federal Medical Centre Umuahia (FMCU) in 
Abia State.  
Immediately following this brief introduction, this chapter provide details of the 
research methodology beginning with the research approach, research themes, 
questions and information sources, data collection methods. Then the research 
process is detailed, including the selection of informants from within the case study 
hospital, and SERVICOM, as well as others involved in the policy process; finally, 
data analysis and interpretation are described. The chapter ends with comments on 
methodological challenges.  
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3.2 The Research Approach (Actor-Oriented and Case Study 
Approach) 
This study uses an actor-oriented approach to the analysis of organisational change, 
specifically to capture the perceptions and behavioural responses of different actors 
directly involved in the change processes. An actor-oriented approach emphasises 
the central significance of the human agency, and the way internal and external 
factors and relationships among actors shape, and are shaped by, organisational 
change (Long and Van der Ploeg, 1989; Long, 2001). Long (2001) also emphasises 
that an actor-oriented approach locates individual actors, in this case hospital 
workers and managers, in their specific life world in which they manage or cope 
with their everyday affairs within the constraints brought about by policy 
interventions. The actor-oriented approach to analysis fits within the present study’s 
epistemological stance which supposes that: “social reality resides with the workers 
and can be understood by interaction and dialogue” (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991: 
14) and “social reality is based on how workers envision, define and interpret the 
policy and organisational change processes under which they work” (Newman, 1997: 
69).  Furthermore, the approach provides the researcher with an opportunity to gain 
an ‘insider’s view’ of hospital dynamics, and how different categories of health 
workers do their work in real life or natural settings (Hodgson, 2001: 90).  
The use of a single case for this particular study is appropriate given its actor-
oriented approach to the understanding of organisational change, focusing on 
different actors all working within a specific hospital setting. The use of a single 
case is also relevant given that no previous studies such as this one have been 
undertaken in the health sector in Nigeria. There are, therefore, no data of this kind 
on work processes undergoing organisational change. As a single case study, this 
research does not seek to generalise, but rather to provide insight into an issue that 
can subsequently be investigated over a wider population. Finally, a single case 
study is also most suitable for addressing the research questions presented above, in 
that it allows the development of deeper insights into the unique phenomenon of 
interest (Stake, 2000; Hartley, 2004); it provides an insider’s view of what is 
happening in an organization (Saunders et al, 2007; Atkinson and Hammersley, 
1994), and it offers the opportunity to explore rich empirical descriptions of 
organizational processes, interactions, human action and behaviour in real 
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organisational setting (Yin, 2003; Eissenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  Details of the 
case hospital used in this study are presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4). 
3.3 Research themes, questions and participants 
Table 3.1 below summarizes the research themes, research questions and related 
information sources/ methods, and informants. 
Table 3.1 Research themes, questions and data sources 
Research theme Sub-themes and variables 
examined 
Research questions  Data collection methods 
and informants 
 
Policy analysis 
Implementation framework 
Who is to do what, how, in order 
to achieve what? 
1. What changes did the health reform 
introduce with respect to work practices 
and pay systems? What drove the 
reforms?  
What was the content of reforms?  
What was the process of the policy 
implementation process? 
Policy document reviews 
Semi-structured 
interviews with 12 key 
informants  - policy-
makers, top-level 
administrators and 
policy consultants 
 
Semi-structured and in-
depth interviews with 16 
operational managers  & 
6 executive managers  
 
In-depth interviews with  
40 doctors and 45 nurses   
 
Economic analysis of pay 
awards 
 
Observation and field 
diary 
 
Changes in work 
practices  
Client-driven services; target 
culture and performance 
measurement; external audit 
agency 
 
2. How do frontline health providers 
perceive the change process as it relates 
to their day-to-day work practices? 
What actual changes occurred in 
work practices at FMCU? What were 
the perceptions of policy changes by 
FMCU actors?   
 
Pay reforms and 
pay processes  
Performance-related-pay; pay 
levels and pay gaps between 
worker categories; fringe benefits 
and allowances; payment 
processes 
How do workers perceive the 
performance-related-pay?  
How do workers value different 
elements of the pay reforms? 
 
Improved service 
delivery 
  
 
Worker motivation and job 
satisfaction  
Professional norms of good 
service 
3. How the different categories of 
workers in the hospital perceive the 
reforms have influenced their 
motivation to perform their jobs?   
 
Table 3.2 below provides the justification for the selection of different categories of 
workers within the FMCU. It details what informants know, and where they sit in 
the organisation as a whole. The primary participants in this study are health workers, 
doctors and nurses, involved in healthcare service delivery in the case hospital. In 
the remainder of the thesis, they are largely referred to as frontline workers or 
simply workers. However, these participants were selected from different parts of 
the hospital hierarchy in order to capture different perspectives on the change 
process: hospital executives and operational managers as key organizational 
informants; and frontline doctors and nurses. 
Table 3.2 Categorisation of organizational key informants involved in the study and justification  
Hospital executives  (HEM) Hospital operational 
managers (HOM) 
Workers’ union 
representatives   
Frontline service providers -doctors 
(HWD) and nurses (HWN) 
1. Organisational 
gatekeepers 
2. Very close to government 
3. Perceived as change 
1. Knowledgeable 
about hospital 
operations 
2. Make and facilitate 
1. Possess group reality 
and views  
2. Knowledgeable about 
government policy 
1. Possess understanding of day-by-day 
work operations  
2. Knowledge about health practice  
3. Actions can influence policy and 
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strategists  
4. Very knowledgeable 
about government plans 
including policy, policy 
context, etc 
operational decisions at 
ward level 
3. Know the workers 
very well 
4. Perceived as change 
managers  
5. Understand workers’ 
behaviour and work 
life  
3. Possess professional 
knowledge  
4. Actions can influence 
how doctors and nurses 
perceive their work 
5. Knowledgeable about 
workforce 
representation, 
negotiation processes and 
government policy 
service delivery outcomes 
4. Change implementers  
5. Often presented as the problem as 
well as solution to quality 
improvement because of their direct 
involvement in service delivery 
6. Their behaviour, attitude, 
motivation, performance is very vital 
to care and provide ‘real’ picture and 
reality of public organization 
operations as they are in practice.  
 
Overall, there were 123 participants/ informants and these are detailed in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 is divided in two parts, with hospital staff located in the top half of the 
table and non-hospital and non-medical staff in the bottom part of the table. The 
hospital executive and operational managers were either male doctors or female 
nurses. The majority of the frontline doctors were also men, and the frontline nurses 
were mainly women. While I attempted to ensure that all departments were included, 
both doctors and nurses move across the three clinical departments and wards within 
the hospital. The General Outpatient Department is the entry point to the hospital, 
thus serving as the first point of call for patients. Details of the General Outpatient 
Department are given in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.3).  
Table 3.3 Distribution of research participants according to category and gender 
Category of research participant % total 
participants 
Number and gender Total  
 Male Female  
Hospital executives 5 4 2 6 
Hospital managers 13 12 4 16 
Frontline Doctors  32 33 7 40 
Frontline Nurses  37 6 39 45 
Policy Officers (Abuja based) 3 2 2 4 
SERVICOM (5 FMCU based; 2 
Abuja based) 
6 5 2 7 
Federal Ministry of Health 
(FMOH) officials (Abuja based) 
3 1 3 4 
Policy consultant (International) 1 - 1 1 
Total  100% 63 (51%) 60 (49%) 123 
3.4 Data Collection Methods 
A qualitative research design was considered appropriate since it provides a means 
of exploring worker perceptions and experiences (Yin, 1994). It is also particularly 
suitable for exploring organisation change processes (Pettigrew, 1990; Healy and 
Perry, 2000; Patton, 2002), and for addressing ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions.  
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Three key methods of data collection were used: policy documentary analysis, semi-
structured interviews, and observation of events within FMCU. The policy level data 
sources consisted of key policy documents and interviews with policy actors. These 
documents included ministry circulars, memos and government White Papers 
including the wider NEEDS policy document, the Service Delivery White Paper, 
and pay documents from National Salaries and Income Commission based in Abuja.  
The documentary review took place in two stages. At the first preliminary stage, 
they provided the foundation that shaped the initial exploration of policy events, and 
at the second stage, they served to support the evidence collected from the 
interviews.  
Details of the semi-structured and in-depth interviews and the observation process 
are given in the next section.  
3.5 The Research Process  
The research process at the FMCU began with formal meetings held with hospital 
officials (hospital executives and managers) to receive formal consent for the 
research, and with the administration to seek to access official staff lists. Following 
receipt of approval, hospital departments were visited and this stage was followed by 
a meeting with heads of departments to clarify the research objectives and respond 
to any questions and concerns they had. Subsequently, 200 questionnaires were 
distributed through these departmental heads. The questionnaires asked for 
demographic data (gender, age, position and length of service) and presented the 
study, also asking who was willing to participate in individual interviews. Eighty-
two percent of these questionnaires (165) were returned. Seventy percent were 
completed fully and 120 respondents indicated a willingness to engage in further 
interviews. There is indication that others refused because of time constraints. In the 
end, 107 (53% of the 200) actually participated fully in the research. These consisted 
of forty-five frontline nurses and forty doctors, plus sixteen operational managers 
and six executives (see Table 3.3 above). Following these initial processes, 
interaction with frontline staff started with a group discussion of the key issues 
outlined in a preliminary questions list to be used for individual interviews. Each 
worker received the copy of the preliminary questions relating to a wide range of 
44 
 
issues about the hospital facility, changes in working conditions and pay brought 
about by the public sector reforms of service delivery, and pay systems.  
While semi-structured interviews provided answers to specific issues and even 
served to discover emerging issues, they did not allow for more in-depth exploration 
of particular issues.  Therefore, the in-depth interview method provided detailed 
accounts of issues discussed within and between different actors and worker 
categories. It also serves as a means of following up on other points that had 
emerged, and or clarifying and validating evidence. These in-depth interviews also 
allowed the interviewee more time to explain in their own words how they see their 
work and the changes forced on them. Repeat interviews allowed further checking of 
details, clarification of issues, and ensured that respondents understood what they 
were being asked. They were also useful in allowing the researcher to confirm his 
understanding of the responses to questions (see Appendix 1B for number of 
interviews according to type).  
During the data collection process, the researcher made several visits to the hospital 
departments to make observations. These included visits to the staff room, wards and 
the General Outpatient Department. The observations served as a clue to salient 
issues that were raised in the interviews. Some of these issues emerged as rumour or 
gossip, and even seemed to sit (as it were) underneath the hospital, but all the issues 
signalled points to be covered in interviews. As part of the observation activities, the 
researcher also attended seminars and monthly meetings of workers within the 
hospital.  
 
3.6 Data Analysis and Interpretation     
As noted in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), for its policy analysis this study draws from the 
conceptualisation of Walt and Gilson (1994), which is to assess policy context, 
policy content and the policy implementation process (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
The whole process of analysis of the interview information used is summarized in 
Figure 3.1 below. Data analysis involved firstly, the systematic preparation of data. 
The approach to data preparation used in this study was in line with the investigation 
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and involved coding to allow the simultaneous arrangement of the dataset, and 
pinpointing of the salient feature of the themes within the data. Using the same 
categories as in Table 3.4, in my preliminary coding (i.e. open coding), similar 
expressions and word frequencies were grouped together, themes were identified 
and later grouped into categories. Axial coding focused on making connections 
between themes and grouping them into categories (such as establishing patterns of 
behavioural responses to the target culture),  Finally, having completed the first two 
steps, based on a review of the whole data set, established patterns or groupings 
were validated (selective coding). The coding exercise was aided by the use of 
NVivo software (Gibbs, 2002; Richards, 2005). 
Table 3.4 Coding techniques used for analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) 
Type  Description of activities 
Open  Discovery of concepts from worker interviews in order to conceptualize issues as they emerge. Involves 
a line by line, paragraph by paragraph review of interview transcripts. Grouping of similar 
phenomena, events, happenings and objects under common headings. Categorization of data along 
similar issues. Very time consuming.  
Axial  Relating categories into sub-categories and linking them up into different dimensions. Involves the 
reassembling of the data to represent specific issues or events, which are defined as relevant by the 
workers.  Attempts to address specific questions about events as it relates to when, where, why, who, 
how and what. This provides more specific and greater explanatory power to the phenomena in 
question. The focus is on tracking actual words and expressions used by the worker, the meanings 
ascribed to them and how workers in their own words conceptualize their views and experiences. The 
focus is on the data and the conditions, actions and interactions and the consequences of the actions as 
explained or interpreted by the workers. Also about linking-up issues as they re-emerge from analysis.  
Selective  Involves fine-tuning and refining of the themes towards concretizing evidence. The selective coding 
and analysis develop central categorizations and attempt to explain these using varied sources of 
evidence to build watertight evidence to guide conclusions.  
 
The analysis and interpretation was about searching for sets of meanings, metaphors 
(to give meaning as to why someone received an award for example), 
representations, narratives or statements that advance a particular point of view 
about a specific issue, theme or event. The results of the analysis are presented in the 
thesis using the respondents’ own voices and employing verbatim translation.  
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Figure 3.1: The analysis and interpretation procedure (Adapted from Mason, 2002; Silverman, 2001; Geertz, 1973) 
 
 
 
 
Developing analytical thoughts about 
views, interpretations and emerging 
issues 
Probing, making connections and 
constant comparisons 
Asking questions about emerging 
concrete events, incidents, views 
and experiences, and thoughts 
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The analysis continued throughout the data collection process and began with 
reading and exploring the interview transcripts and notes to comprehend the data and 
the meaning respondents attributed to their experiences as expressed by their 
perceptions. It then sought to synthesize this by searching for recurrent or emerging 
themes before probing further (with follow-up exploratory interviews) to gain more 
insights into these emerging issues. As a more concrete understanding of the data 
developed, the coding and categorisation of these emerging themes were carried out.  
The end of the analysis occurred when a point of saturation was reached. As Strauss 
and Corbin (1998: 212) argue, in qualitative analysis this occurs when: a) no new or 
relevant data seem to be emerging in respect to a given category or theme; b) the 
theme or category is well-developed in terms of its properties and dimensions 
demonstrating variation; and c) the relationship among the categories or themes is 
well-established and validated.  
3.7 Ethical Considerations  
Following approval by the Research Office of the University of East Anglia, the 
researcher sought and obtained approval from the FMCU executives (the 
organizational gatekeepers) to conduct the present research in the case study hospital.  
The participation of respondents was voluntary, and based on informed consent. 
Prospective participants were also informed of their right to withdraw at any time 
should they wish. Furthermore, to protect the integrity and identity of participants, 
interviewees were assured of their anonymity- respondents were allocated individual 
codes - and that data would not be made available to third parties. All data were 
saved in secure computer files to which only the researcher had access.  
Operationalising the research strategy and design involved close contact and 
interaction with the lives and views of respondents. In this connection, ethical 
considerations, particularly the need to build trust and the unequivocal commitment 
to respect the rights and values of the interviewees, were essential throughout. The 
ethical focus thus sought to ensure that “research participants of the study are not 
made worse off (or harmed) by their participation in the research” (Mason, 2002: 
201). During the interview process, interviewees were reminded that the study was 
purely for academic purposes, with no links to any government. This was necessary 
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because, during the preliminary interviews, some workers questioned the identity 
and aim of the researcher, with some even suspecting he was an agent of the 
government. For the same reason, respondents were asked for their approval for the 
recording of their responses.   
 
3.8 Methodological Challenges  
During the exploratory conversations in FMCU, the researcher was somewhat 
surprised by the above-mentioned ‘suspicion’ expressed by some of the prospective 
respondents. One or two openly asked whether the research was for the government 
or an international organization, for example the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DfID) or for the World Bank (WB). As was later discovered, this was 
because both organisations had previously visited the hospital with regard to the 
issue of the government’s reform.  
The workers also tended to treat me as a ‘stranger’ or ‘outsider’ in their ‘own 
professional field’. Although I did not claim to be a health professional, one of them 
queried this saying, “Tell me why you are here, are you a doctor or nurse? You 
economists claim a lot”. Initially this unexpected question led to some 
discouragement on the part of the researcher and the workers were initially unwilling 
to talk to me because they were sceptical about whether the organisation had given 
me approval to do this research. It is important to note that I had spent most of my 
life living in the same city. This created specific opportunities in terms of knowing 
how to interact with the research subjects personally. Two doctors who know me 
personally (as we attended the same university) provided useful information and 
guide that shaped my initial approach to the organisation.  
To get along with the workers a subtle approach was adopted, with myself assuming 
the role of ‘student’, willing to learn from the wisdom of the ‘experts’. In addition, 
by expressing sympathy with their views, the workers were then willing to talk. I 
also used general questions to initiate discussions, such as: 
How do you see your jobs and profession with respect to the reform 
government has introduced? Do you think that government considers your 
opinion in policymaking?  
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The initial informal conversations (some one-to-one; others in twos, threes or fours) 
held at coffee time in the staffroom were very useful in teasing out interesting issues. 
I also used the time to make social contacts and to collect contact numbers. Overall, 
the issues that emerged during this exploratory exercise were very useful and 
contributed considerably in reshaping the focus of my research questions. 
On the third day, I submitted a formal letter of intent, with a brief personal profile, 
my research objectives and focus, including the kind of data required. During this 
time, I continued with my informal conversations, developing my views about the 
emerging issues and reframing my questions. The following week, I received a letter 
calling me to interview with the hospital’s three-man ethical committee. This was 
unexpected because I thought the ethical clearance from the University would have 
sufficed. I revised my ethical form and, satisfied with this, the ethical committee 
gave permission for the research, and authorised the staff to support my research by 
making the required information available. On receiving the approval letter, one of 
the organizational ‘gatekeepers’ introduced me to the heads of department, and the 
Chief Medical Director of the hospital. I was particularly pleased by the 
introductions given by the ‘organizational gatekeeper’:  
This is our visitor from the United Kingdom. As usual, show him your 
hospitality. The management has approved that he does some research here, 
so give him your maximum cooperation and provide any information within 
your capacity to assist his research” (Top level Manager HEM2) 
This introduction was a privilege and opened doors for me. I conducted three rounds 
of interviews with the organizational gatekeeper. Thereafter, the hospital allocated 
me a temporary office located in the Research and Training Unit and an officer to 
attend to my immediate needs for specific information. I was given a visitor’s named 
hospital badge. This badge served as a kind of licence and permit, or ‘certificate of 
pass’ giving me access to all departments in the hospital. This partially made me a 
privileged ‘insider’ and a member of the organization and community but, in terms 
of organizational personality, I found myself still deficient in knowing how the 
hospital and workers functioned.  
After this, in most situations, and on entering a ward, it was common to hear one or 
two workers saying, “This is the person who has come to do research here”. My 
identity was less ‘suspicious’ and many were very willing to talk. Overall, the initial 
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feeling of being an ‘outsider’ diminished and, in time, the workers showed me 
understanding and respect. Some were very willing, directing me to other colleagues 
who they said were “better placed to provide the information you are asking for”. 
However, I still felt that the way the research intent was publicized created a slight 
challenge for me. For example, I found it hard to deal with some of the occasional 
comments from the workers, such as “We hear that you live abroad. What have you 
brought to us?”; “How is the United Kingdom?”; “I want to travel abroad. I hear 
that life is better there”; and “You must be loaded (rich) to study abroad”. These 
questions and comments constantly reminded me of the stereotypical personality 
often attributed to those living abroad. On the one hand, it presented a level of 
respect for me while, on the other, it was clearly inviting demands of me. For 
example, asking what I had brought has both ethical and cultural implications. 
Ethically, the respondents were indirectly asking for reciprocity for their 
participation. Culturally, it is expected that travellers or visitors offer some 
appreciation to those at home on arrival. At the end of the fieldwork, I did offer a 
packet of sweets to each of the ten wards in the hospital. Another challenge was the 
difficulty and delay in accessing the top-level workers/ managers because of their 
busy schedules.  
The next chapter (Chapter 4) presents a detailed account of the reforms with respect 
to the context in which they appeared, and their content. The chapter also includes a 
description of the case study hospital organisation, where the reforms that are the 
focus of the study are being implemented. 
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4 Policy Analysis: Context and 
Content 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis is about public sector service reforms that are at the centre of public 
debate in many countries. The aim of the thesis is to increase the understanding of 
these processes of policy reform in the public health sector in Nigeria. Beginning in 
this chapter on policy analysis, information is presented which aims to answer the 
first research question, that is: What changes did the health reform introduce with 
respect to work practices and pay systems?  
 
As already noted in Chapter 3, the policy analysis approach being used in this thesis 
begins with an analysis of the context within which the policy emerged, followed by 
an analysis of the policy content. In terms of policy context, since public sector 
reform in Nigeria is part of what is referred to as New Public sector Management 
(NPM), any analysis of context in Nigeria must include some reference to initiatives 
undertaken somewhere else in the world. In terms of the policy content, this refers to 
the service delivery reforms introduced in Nigeria between 2000 and 2007, and to 
pay reforms introduced around the same time.  
 
Immediately following this brief introduction, the reforms are outlined and an 
analysis of what drove the reforms is provided.  This is followed by an analysis of 
the content of the reforms, and includes the setting-up of a service compliance 
agency referred to as SERVICOM. The links between the service delivery reforms 
and the pay reforms are also detailed. The chapter ends with a description of the case 
study hospital, the Federal Medical Centre Umuahia (FMCU) in Abia State.    
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4.2 Reforming Nigeria’s Public Health Sector  
While the thesis is focused on the public health sector reforms, pay reforms 
introduced at the same time form part of the whole reform strategy. The health 
sector reform constitutes part of the wider public sector reforms and reflects similar 
concerns in other public service sectors.  
 
The government of Nigeria, under the Peoples’ Democratic Party, and during the 
President Obasanjo-led government administration (1999-2007), initiated a health 
sector reform as part of the wider public sector reform. The vision of the health 
sector reform touches every aspect of the healthcare system, involving the adoption 
of changes in work practices and procedures by the introduction of a target culture as 
well as performance measurement and performance-related pay. Overall, the service 
delivery reform involves a shift in the culture of public service delivery, from one 
driven by the provision of excellent medical care and led largely by the clinical 
professions, to a demand-led system of service delivery within which the public 
become clients purchasing services to meet their needs and interests. As a demand-
led process, the emphasis is on providing information to customers, and receiving 
feedback from customers on their satisfaction or otherwise with services received.  
 
The pay reform consists of changes in actual levels of pay, reductions in the 
differences between pay levels of doctors and nurses, monetisation of fringe benefits 
in kind, and changes in individual pay awards given in recognition of good service 
and referred to as performance-related pay. The interest of this thesis relates largely 
to the performance related pay elements of the pay reform since this is directly 
linked with the service delivery reforms already discussed.  
 
As with other public sector reforms, the health sector reform included the 
establishment of a performance audit agency known as SERVICOM. The role of 
SERVICOM is to facilitate the implementation of the health sector reform, firstly by 
promoting compliance with proposed changes from public health sector workers. 
Secondly, it works to ensure the engagement of clients purchasing public services in 
the process of organisational change.  
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This chapter sets the scene for the other chapters of the thesis. It details the context 
and content of the two reforms that are the focus of the research: health service 
delivery and civil service pay especially as it relates to performance-related pay. 
 
4.2.1 Reform Context: What drove the reforms?   
The health service reforms in Nigeria were driven by both external and internal 
factors.  Beginning with the external drivers, it is widely argued in Nigeria that they 
were able to influence the reform process at the time they did because of internal 
changes in the politics and governance that were occurring at the same time. These 
internal changes were part of what is referred to in Nigeria as the democratisation 
process. Prior to these changes, Nigeria had spent years under military rule, a 
situation often reported as not amenable to reform ideas (Utomi et al, 2007; Soludo, 
2006; Okonjo-Iwuala, 2005). Even though the need for reform had been presented in 
that period, there is suggestion that the military administration seem to have lacked 
the political will to support and encforce significant changes. The 1999 election 
which brought in the Obasanjo-led Peoples Democratic Party provided some 
considerable impetus for reform of public sector services. Thus, the sudden change 
in political context made reform more feasible, especially in terms of changing how 
government does its business, cooperating with others in response to pressures on 
the state from various quarters to improve services. The mainstream government 
opinion expressed by the President did recognise, however, that the reform would 
involve learning from other contexts.  
 The enormity of what is required to realise a ‘New Nigeria’ in which citizens 
will have access to quality services indicate that they cannot do it alone but 
require help from experts and reform in line with global events. We are going 
to learn from other countries [referring to UK], and collaborate in order to 
improve our public service delivery system which has become a symbol of 
inefficiency and corruption (Obasanjo, 2003).  
As noted by one of the key supporters of the reform, Okonjo-Iwuala, the impetus for 
the reform came in part from interaction with global policy happenings such the 
poverty reduction strategy programmes. According to Okonjo-Iwuala (2005), 
Nigeria needed to be integrated into the global happenings, particularly within the 
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conceptualisation of good governance with its emphasis on improving public sector 
management.  
The repeated views emerging from policy texts (e.g. BPSR, 2004 ) demonstrate that 
the democratic processes seems to have served as a window of opportunity for 
external development interaction, and as a means of negotiating policy transfer and 
learning. In general, there is suggestion that the public sector reform is part and 
parcel of wider modernization processes presented to developing countries by 
international development experts as a ‘one cap fits all’ ideology of change (World 
Bank, 1996) that includes changing the role of the state (World Bank, 1997). The big 
picture also indicates that the reform is imbued with the ideology of new public 
sector management (NPM) (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckaehrt, 
2004).  
The formulation of the reforms in Nigeria, therefore, received great external support 
that included technical advice and funding from the UK through the Department for 
International Development (DfID) and the World Bank. As part of its development 
assistance programme in the area of public health service delivery, DfID has played 
a leading role in shaping and addressing issues of health staffing and management 
and service quality (DfID, 2009: 20). For example, between 2002 and 2008, it 
provided £148 million under its Change Agent Programme (CAP) and Partnership 
support for transforming the Nigerian Health System (PATHS2) service delivery. 
Additionally, between 2004 and 2009, it provided another £30 million for health 
commodities and equipment procurement projects, including the provision of drugs. 
Between 2009 and 2010, it also earmarked another £120 million to be spent on 
health issues (ibid). More generally, DfID’s development partnership with the 
Nigerian government has prioritized health service support and the transformation 
and strengthening of the healthcare system, focusing especially on accountability to 
both government and the people, and therefore on changing the responsiveness of 
service providers (DfID, 2004; 2009).  
Continuing with the support from and influence of DfID, in January 2004, a key 
milestone was reached in reforming work practices with respect to service delivery 
with the formation of a Public Service Delivery Team headed by Dr Wendy 
Thompson (adviser to the British Prime Minister on Public Service Reform), and 
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supported by consultants from the UK and South Africa. Given that the reform 
process received adequate funding from the British government, the UK NHS may 
have been seen as a model. Thus, it was evident that the UK government played a 
leading role in advising Nigeria on service delivery reform. Perhaps, in line with this 
understanding, a team of consultants was contracted to conduct a “diagnostic audit” 
of public service delivery in Nigeria (drawing on the British experience of public 
service reform). The team was headed by the then Special Adviser on UK public 
service reform (under the leadership of Tony Blair) in the Cabinet office, with three 
specific terms of reference:  
i. To examine the existing institutional environment for public service delivery 
ii. To reflect on people’s (customers’) lives and experiences of public service 
delivery 
iii. To draw-up a road map for a Service Delivery Initiative (SDI) 
The extract from the policy document demonstrates that the consultants conducted 
in-depth analysis of official documents and other literature on service delivery, 
interviewed ministers and government officials at strategic and operational levels, 
conducted independent market research with service users (customers), and public 
service delivery staff using focus groups discussions and interviews, and undertook 
specific case studies on service delivery outlets. 
There are reports among official policy-makers that people (specifically public 
service stakeholders including workers) were consulted in designing the reform. 
How and to what extent their views were actually incorporated into the report 
remains unclear and is considered in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, within the wider public 
service reform, some concerns have been expressed about the technical feasibility of 
reform based on learning from abroad (James and Lodge, 2003; Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000), given that the British setting is quite different from that of Nigeria. Thus, 
while the Nigerian government has pushed hard in its efforts to make a difference in 
public service delivery, it could be argued that it is trying to learn within a rather 
limited framework and context.  
Nevertheless, In February 2004, following the diagnostic research, the consultants 
produced what has been an influential report. This report was adopted as a 
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government White Paper entitled “Public Service Delivery in Nigeria: A Roadmap”. 
The general conclusions were as follows:  
“That public service in Nigeria is not serving the people well, mainly, they are 
inaccessible, poor quality and service providers are indifferent to customers’ 
needs. Despite their policy ambitions, ministers lack the levers to ensure 
delivery happens ‘on the ground’; there is no established procedure for telling 
who is doing what and how. Central public service delivery departments have 
little information with which to monitor staff performance.  Support services 
are not designed to support frontline services, and are a major impediment to 
improving staff performance. Staff are poorly motivated and there is lack of 
adequate incentives to attract the motivation needed to improve services.” 
(White Paper on Service Delivery, 2004)  
The World Bank also played an active role in the formulation (design), promotion, 
and implementation of the wider public sector reforms, especially in the areas of 
governance, and pay (World Bank, 2004b; 2005b). In terms of governance, its focus 
has been to improve government accountability, through the introduction of due 
process, and documentation. The implementation of the wider public sector reform 
called NEEDS, reflects the World Bank’s development strategy (World Bank/IMF 
2000; 2004). The importance of this strategy in the case of Nigeria might, in part, be 
explained by the presence at the top levels of government of two World Bank-
trained Nigerians Dr.Okonjo-Iwuala and Professor Charles Soludo, who participated 
in the planning of the reform. As already noted, the discussions about pay reforms 
emerged out of a series of internal (national) review committees and subcommittees 
which began in 2000 and are discussed below as part of the analysis of internal 
reform drivers. Certainly the World Bank along with other donors were in agreement 
that health reforms could only work if the workforce was motivated, and this 
motivation was seen to be almost exclusively (if not entirely) linked with pay.   
In terms of internal factors that have driven the health sector reforms, it is widely 
claimed that the context of the current reform in Nigeria is embedded within 
Nigeria’s existing social, economic and political circumstances. The internal drivers 
for reform include conditions in public administration and management, changes in 
politics and governance mainly through a democratisation process, citizen pressure 
from below and poverty, including the health status of the population  
The perceived administrative failure of public sector organisation and management 
was already evident in the early 1980s and was linked to the structural adjustment 
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reforms that were initiated between 1986 and 1988 under the recommendation of the 
World Bank. Although the 1990s saw the implementation of public administration 
and management reforms in the health sector, poor public infrastructure furthered a 
decline in the quality of services delivered and led to the call for the current public 
sector reform in general (Utomi et al. 2007; World Bank, 2006b), and health sector 
reform in particular (FMOH, 2004a).  
In terms of internal factors driving the health reform, there are a number of internal 
conditions that set the scene. Nigeria’s public health service has been described as 
operationally inefficient with a poorly motivated workforce due to inadequate 
incentives, while workers’ behaviour has been characterized as perverse and 
unresponsive (WHO, 2000; Hargreaves, 2002; DfID, 2009). At the same time, 
despite being one of the world’s ten major oil exporters, more than half the 
population remains poor and suffers from ill health (NBS, 2006; 2007; WHO, 2007; 
DfID, 2009). Nigeria has experienced disappointing health outcomes over the last 
four decades, with minimal improvements in general health, wellbeing and living 
standards (NBS, 2006). National and international reports demonstrate that Nigeria’s 
health outcomes are below international standards and among the worst in the world 
(WHO, 2007; DfID, 2009; UNDP, 2009). The public health service suffers from 
underfunding and inefficient governance and management (World Bank, 2005d), 
and “critical health workforce shortage” (WHO, 2006: 25). While the available data 
remain contentious, it is estimated that 660,000 Nigerian children die every year of 
preventable conditions. Furthermore, Nigeria has some of the worst social 
development indicators, with one in five children dying under the age of five while 
approximately, 6% of the population are HIV positive (DfID, 2009). The country 
also suffers from 10% of the total recorded maternal deaths globally, even though it 
has only 2% of the world’s population. Meanwhile, as of 2007, life expectancy was 
forty-seven, unchanged since 2000 (UNDP, 2009). In the context of inadequate 
health services, it is predicted that Nigeria will be confronted by immense challenges 
in accelerating growth, reducing poverty and meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).   
Analysis of the Human Development Index (HDI) which measures social wellbeing 
indicates that Nigeria’s score remains lower than other countries with a lower GDP. 
For example, despite a GDP per capita of US$1900, Nigeria’s HDI is less than 0.52, 
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while Kenya’s, with a GDP per capital of less than US$1600, is 0.54 (World Bank, 
2008; UNDP, 2009). Moreover, Nigeria’s HDI rating has hardly improved since the 
index was first introduced in 1990. Thus, from 1990-2007, Nigeria’s HDI has shown 
only a small improvement, increasing by a mere 0.91 annually from 0.438 in 1990 to 
0.511 in 2007. This compares poorly with other countries in the sub-Saharan region, 
where less resource-rich countries have increased progressively over the same period 
(UNDP, 2009).  
Another important internal driver of the reform is the apparent demand by citizens 
for better services. The notion of democracy (good government), as already noted 
tended to support the need to satisfy citizens’ expectations of public services as a 
mark of good governance. During the democratisation process, which started in May 
1999, there emerged a relatively high level of sustained citizen pressure and pro-
governance institutions that increased pressure for change. Stakeholder seminars and 
workshops organised by different citizen support groups such as the Committee for 
the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), the Civil Liberty Organization (CLO), and 
the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) held immediately prior to the 1999 
elections increased pressure from below on government to implement proactive and 
responsive change that would improve service delivery and the wellbeing of the 
public. Better services may have been seen as a political tool in strengthening public 
support for the ruling People’s Democratic Party.   
Parallel to the above was another important push coming from labour and 
professional organisations including the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), Nigerian 
Medical Association (NMA) and the Nigerian Nurses and Midwives Association 
(NNMA). These professional organisations, in the context of rising economic 
frustration, increased the pressure for more efficient and effective service delivery 
and saw improvements in salaries and general conditions of service as a viable 
option for achieving these goals. Professional unions, including NMA and NNMA, 
instigated a series of strikes and demonstrations throughout the country.  
In response to all this pressure, and in order to maintain its position as the party in 
power, the new government committed itself to reforming the public service. At the 
same time, there emerged a strong perception among the political class that reforms 
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which target improving services delivery are critical element to sustaining the 
nascent democracy (Utomi et al, 2007; Okafor, 2005).  
Against this backdrop, the government repeatedly demonstrated through public 
speeches and addresses its desire to initiate and implement reforms. Public debate 
was encouraged through a series of seminars with prominent Nigerians - a number 
of whom were employees of the World Bank at the time - speaking in support of 
reforms that were expected to change work ethics and organisational culture. For 
example, Soludo and Okonjo-Iwuala -both World Bank staff at the time – were 
recommended by the Bank to take top positions: Soludo as head of Central Bank and 
Okonjo-Iwuala as Special Advisor on reforms and economic matters, later Minister 
of Finance in the Obasanjo’s second term administration. In general, the reform was 
in keeping with good governance prescriptions and considered as a means of 
strengthening transparency and accountability in government activities to improve 
user satisfaction. 
At the same time, and in line with the views of Okonjo-Iwuala (2005), the political 
class in Nigeria understood the need for Nigeria to be integrated into the global 
conceptualisations of good governance with its emphasis on improving public 
management. Therefore, in line with the global concept, the health sector reform 
centres around “restructuring the way government and hospital organizations operate 
by making them stronger, better and more efficient in delivering essential services to 
the people” (NEEDS, 2004: xi). It also seeks t: 
(…) create a public service that would be competent, professional, public-
spirited and customer-oriented, capable of responding speedily to the needs of 
customers and exhibiting the core public service values of fairness, 
transparency and integrity, and one that is well remunerated, competitive and 
innovative  (BPSR, 2006; NEEDS, 2004).  
The reform differs from previous development plans in three important ways: first, it 
is perceived as a people’s plan (often described as home-grown); second, it provides 
a means of coordinating the actions and work practices of government; and finally, it 
is perceived as feasible in that it has a means of recognising and rewarding 
performance. So, while internal drivers can readily be identified, in general it is 
evident that the public health sector reform is part and parcel of wider modernisation 
processes which tend to popularise neoliberal ideology across developing countries 
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(World Bank, 1996), and include changing the role of the state (World Bank, 1997). 
As noted earlier, the big picture indicates that the reform is imbued with the 
ideology of the new public sector management (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004). The reforms became part of the 1999 political manifesto of 
the Obasanjo-led People’s Democratic Government. While this was justified as 
having societal benefits, as already described here, it was also clearly perceived as 
part of the agenda for good governance or government that meets the service needs 
of the citizens.  
Another issue was what happened to the call for the option on pay reform supported 
by the workers and the workers’ unions. The discussions about pay reform arose 
from a series of pay review committees and subcommittees which began in 2000.  
Although the details of the deliberations of the pay review committees remain 
unclear, there is suggection that the realisation of the reform objectives required a 
motivated workforce. The reasoning behind the pay reform stems from the view that 
the realisation of the service delivery reform was dependent on putting the incentives 
right (NEEDS, 2004). Therefore, from a practical standpoint, the pay review 
committees established by the government between 2000 and 2003 were 
commissioned to review the existing public sector pay structure as a means of 
encouraging individual worker motivation and compliance to the changes needed.  
 
The Obasanjo-led administration announced a substantial increase in salaries of 
public servants in 2000 and in the same year, the minimum wage increased 
significantly. This was followed by other changes. In 2003, fringe benefits of 
government workers were monetised. Salaries were further increased in 2004 but, at 
the same time, a new contributory and privately managed pension system was 
introduced. By 2007, all civil service pay, including the monetised benefits was 
consolidated and taxed. What actually happened is that in 2004 the Nigerian 
Government initiated a comprehensive public sector reform called the Nigerian 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). Clearly, there is 
mention within policy documents of a link between public service reform and pay 
reforms. According to the policy statement:   
 
The focus of the public sector reform is about changing the way the government does 
its work. It seeks to restructure the government to make it stronger, better skilled, 
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and more efficient at delivering essential services. The reform seeks to transform the 
government from a haven of inefficiency to an institution that spurs development and 
serves the people well. As an instrument of change, the reform NEEDS provide 
overall direction of change, and supposes that achieving more efficiency require 
reform in pay to provide adequate remuneration and motivation of workers to 
enable them change their work practices (NEEDS, 2004: xi) 
 
Within this reform, one focus was on improving public service delivery, and one of 
the first sectors to be addressed was the health sector. The key elements of the health 
sector reform consisted of changes in work practice, and the introduction of strategic 
incentives, i.e. performance-related pay, as a way of encouraging workers to change 
their work practices in order to deliver improved services. 
 
4.3 The Content of the Health Sector Reform  
This section presents the main thrust of the reform, consisting of reforming work 
practice (Section 4.3.1) and reforming pay (Section 4.3.2). 
4.3.1 Service Delivery Reform 
The content of the health reform is summarised in the White Paper on Service 
Roadmap published in 2004. The document includes the Customer or Social Charter, 
performance targets, and performance measurement for workers based on national 
standard with rewards for good performance. The document also detailed the 
establishment of a reform implementation agency (SERVICOM).    
i. Customer or Social Charter 
The Customer Charter is a pledge entered into by government and its workers to 
provide efficient and effective quality service that is fair, timely, responsive and 
responsible to patients. As outlined in the Charter, every customer is entitled to 
expect and receive open, accessible, and quality information; have access to better 
services; and be involved in decision-making processes that shape healthcare 
delivery. In addition, customers are entitled to receive proper explanations for poor 
services through an appropriate redress system. The overview of the Charter 
highlights four principles. First, it is consistent with government policy intentions 
incorporating a market-led approach to care. This implies a shift in the 
conceptualisation of service users from ‘patients’ to ‘customers or clinets’. Second, 
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there is a commitment to greater customer voice in decision-making processes. Third, 
there is a commitment to promote sound principles and procedures in the conduct of 
government business: increased accountability, transparency, and professionalism in 
the way customers are received and their healthcare needs meet.  
Finally, the Charter commits to providing customers information that will increase 
their awareness of the services available, at which service unit, and so on.   
ii. Performance targets and measurements 
The most notable element of the service delivery reform with respect to public 
hospital organisations is the introduction of a culture of performance targets. The 
specific performance targets as outlined in the policy document related to healthcare 
consist of the following elements that, together, might be referred to as quality and 
quantity of service:  
 Timeliness (waiting time and promptness of attention) 
 Information to customers (leaflets and self-directed signs) 
 Worker behaviour and attitude (e.g. absenteeism) 
 Fairness (i.e. in terms of access to care) 
 Responsiveness (i.e. reception, customer friendliness and courtesy) 
 Patient/customer experience (i.e. level of satisfaction of customers) 
 Accountability and due process (e.g. complaint and payment procedure)  
(SERVICOM, 2004; 2006) 
These targets are supposed to serve as the standards for measuring hospital 
performance as well as for measuring individual worker performance. The 
performance measurement process is expected to provide information about the 
activities of service providers in order to guide the government regarding what 
works and how, and what does not work and why.  
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iii. Performance implementation and measurement agency 
The task of SERVICOM is to ensure organisational change that result in a shift in 
the culture of public service delivery from one driven by the provision of excellent 
medical care, led largely by those in the clinical professions, to a demand-led system 
with the public as customers or clients who want services to meet their needs and 
interests. In order to do this, SERVICOM on the one hand facilitates the provision of 
information that guides customer choice, identification and access to available 
services and, on the other, works with hospital managers to assess worker 
performance based on national standards (see Appendix 3). In this way, 
SERVICOM acts as a kind of middleman mediating the interaction between the 
hospital organisation, the workers, and the customers. More details on SERVICOM 
operations are provided in Chapter 5.  
 
4.3.2 Reforming Pay Systems  
Given the understanding that health worker motivation was clearly a problem for 
public health delivery, the second aspect of the reform, i.e. pay reform, was 
specifically targeted to generate incentives in order to motivate workers to achieve 
changes in work practice. The reform of pay systems includes performance-related-
pay; monetization of fringe benefits, and changes in pension systems. The interest of 
this thesis in pay reforms relates largely to the performance-related-pay (PRP) 
element of the health reforms that is, the link between pay and promotion based on 
good performance. The Nigerian Government implemented PRP to motivate 
workers to change their work practice. However, it is possible to conclude from 
policy documents on pay that the government initiated the pay reform to address the 
reported inadequacy (low pay) of public workers’ pay. For example, the President 
noted that:  
The gap between public sector and private sector wages has often been given 
as one of the reasons for inefficiency in the public sector. It is argued that 
public sector workers deserve adequate compensation commensurate with 
their labour, in order to bring about efficiency. This government will engage 
in meaningful reform to address this and to improve the living conditions of 
public workers and their immediate families (President Obasanjo, 2004) 
64 
 
Nevertheless, with respect to the health reform discussed above, it is acknowledged 
that the PRP element of pay reforms was an attempt to link rewards to the realisation 
of targets. The philosophy is underpinned by the supposition that getting the 
incentives right is a way of motivating workers to change their work patterns in 
order to realise government national targets i.e. PRP will foster good performance. 
As claimed in the policy document, linking pay to performance assessed by 
reference to standard criteria ensures consistency in performance assessment, thus 
guaranteeing remuneration that is fair and deserving across different levels and tasks 
performed. This goes much further than simply talking about PRP. It reflects the 
thinking behind arguments for ‘fair wages’.   
Although PRP is especially relevant to this thesis, the value of paying attention to 
the other elements of the pay reforms is indicated in a number of documents (Pay 
Reform Act, 2000; 2004). In order to attract, retain, and motivate skilled 
professionals in the Nigerian public service, a pay rise was considered essential. 
Nevertheless, while it might be agreed that pay is essential to motivate workers to 
improved service delivery, the issue of poor pay administration has historically 
meant that public servants might receive pay in arrears, or regularly receive their pay 
late. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to suggest that the whole pay 
package and the payment process (routinely paid to a prescribed schedule) should be 
the focus of attention if workers are to be motivated to change their work practice. 
Consequently, public workers’ minimum wage increased to N5500 in 2000 (The 
Minimum Wage Act, 2000). Following further agitation by the workers, the general 
view was that given the prevailing cost of living, the approved minimum wage was 
inadequate. Thus in 2001, it was increased to N7500 and, in 2009, to N11500 (The 
Minimum Wage Act, 2009). Details of the pay trends in basic salaries (a function of 
changes in minimum wage), are presented in Chapter 8. Also, changes were made in 
pay administration: all salaries were paid through designated banks, and the payroll 
office in each health facility was to prepare their pay schedules before the middle of 
the month and submitted to the central administration in Abuja.  
The importance to government of the monetisation of fringe benefits and allowances 
in the reform is that it was expected to facilitate sound budgeting and revenue 
generation through pay as you earn tax once the pay package was consolidated. 
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However, it is possible that this monetisation is also important for thinking about 
motivation to work, and this is considered in Chapter 8.  
Finally, another element of the pay reform was in terms of changes in the pension 
system, since prior to the changes, pensions in Nigeria were based on final salary, 
they were non-contributory and managed publicly. As part of the effort of 
government to ensure that workers have peace of mind about their future and do 
their jobs with maximum commitment, the government introduced a contributory 
privately-managed pension system. Public workers were to contribute 7.5% of their 
basic salary supplemented by a government contribution of another 7.5% into a 
public worker individual pension account. Again, however, it is argued that 
motivation to perform, change practices and so on may not only be about pay, but 
also about what is considered to be fair pay, or how payments are made. This thesis 
did not look at the pension reform because despite its importance, preliminary 
results suggest that it has no direct link with the service delivery reform.  
 
4.3.3 Link between the two reforms  
In general, the reform is about changing health workers’ behaviour. Although there 
are several ways of doing this, the health sector reform considers just two 
approaches: the first about changing work practices, and the second about reforming 
the pay system to generate incentives for individual health workers to encourage 
such changes. The general perspective of the underlying principles of the health 
sector reform is that, for reform to be effective, it must operate in such a way to 
facilitate proactive work practice and at the same time attract the willingness and 
effort of the health workers. In an interview held with a senior government official 
from the Federal Ministry of Health, there is indication that the reform is about 
changing the way people do government jobs.  
To actualise the intentions of the government, this reform is comprehensive in 
approach. It is not only about changing how people do government work; it is 
also about providing guidance based on societal interest and in line with 
political agenda. Government is interested in measuring performance and 
rewarding their efforts to enhance people doing well  (Government Official1) 
 
Other officials from the office of the Bureau of Public Sector Reform noted how the 
reform components represent attempts to address the two performance challenges 
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related to inefficient work practice and inadequate incentive or pay. The views of the 
key government informants correlate texts drawn from policy documents that:  
While government has set out new rules to guide how work should be done, 
the realisation of the intentions cannot be achieved if the workers are not 
motivated. This reform is all-encompassing and will address the two 
challenges of confusing work practice and inadequate motivation to follow 
rules (NEEDS, 2004) 
 
Without improving the pay of public workers, government’s ability to attract, 
retain and motivate civil servants to achieve the set targets is unlikely to be 
possible (The Pay Reform Act, 2004) 
 
Commenting on how the current reform represents a fundamental shift in the 
organisation and management of the health sector, a key informant who compare the 
current health reform with the 1980s and 1990s reforms clearly stated that unlike 
past reforms, this current reform adopts a comprehensive approach. Another key 
informant from the national planning office in Abuja strongly highlights the 
relationship between the two reform elements, which have as their core changing 
workers’ behaviour. 
I think that this government has come to recognise that it is not just enough to 
set targets or measure targets, civil servants need to be motivated to achieve 
the targets. We know ourselves, if there is no “meat” on the table a lot of civil 
servants will not do as directed. People who do well need to be encouraged to 
do better (Government official 2) 
 
Another point of clarification about the linkages in the reform relate to the 
operational nature of the reform elements which operate more like a ‘carrot and stick’ 
mechanism. As outlined by a top-level manager at the case hospital, this is expected 
to steer individual competitiveness and the innovative capacity of public workers to 
achieving government policy plans:  
 When people are recognised and rewarded for doing well, there is possibility 
that others will follow. So, rewarding performance is expected to encourage a 
healthy competition towards achieving government policy goals (Top-level 
Manager HEM2) 
 
Many of the government officials who were interviewed shared the view expressed 
by HEM2. In general, they argue that the pattern of evolution of individual reward 
and recognition was symptomatic of the wider trend in public service culture, which 
before the reform, was seen as ineffective and not encouraging individual talents. 
During the interviews, lack of recognition of individual efforts was presented as a 
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constraint to individual commitment. It was also reported during interviews with 
top-level government officials that public workers in Nigeria will rarely “go extra 
the mile” in their commitment to following directives unless there is evidence that 
their efforts will be fairly rewarded. While this seems to represent an overstatement, 
the emphasis is that rewarding individual efforts has a link to following rules or new 
work practices.  
 
Overall, there is consensus among all the government officials which demonstrates 
that the making of the reforms followed a seemingly formal policy-making process. 
Nevertheless, it is supposed that the realisation of the reform objective in work 
practice is dependent on the incentives to workers being adequate, and how well 
workers themselves are willing to commit their efforts to changing their behaviour. 
While the reform linkages appear to operate as a strategic human resource 
management practice, how they operate in practice, especially in public 
organisations, needs to be understood. 
 
The next section describes the case study hospital that is the focus of the remainder 
of the thesis, the Federal Medical Centre Umuahia (FMCU). Chapter 5 continues 
with the policy analysis started in this chapter by looking at the actual 
implementation process within one specific hospital context.    
4.4 The Federal Medical Centre of Umuahia (FMCU) 
There are three levels of government-funded health care in Nigeria, namely tertiary 
or apex, secondary and primary health care. At the apex are the Federal Medical 
Centres (FMC) and teaching hospitals that are located in the state capitals. This level 
of hospital is operated by the Federal Government, and all the twenty-two Federal 
Medical Centres are comparable in terms of work force and infrastructure. In their 
provision of tertiary and comprehensive care, FMCs operate within the framework 
of the law: they are expected to provide good quality, affordable, specialized/tertiary 
level hospital care to the population,  and to ultimately reduce the burden of diseases 
within their communities through provision of preventive, curative and rehabilitative 
services. Apart from providing the highest level of care, tertiary hospitals serve as 
the point of initial policy introduction.  Federal tertiary hospitals are funded through 
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the federal budgetary allocation and administered through the Federal Ministry of 
Health (FMOH). As such, they provide the highest level of care in the State, 
compared to lower-level secondary and primary health care facilities. These lower-
level facilities are the general hospitals, managed by the state management board 
and, at the local level, the primary health care services, mainly providing 
inexpensive and basic care services, as well as making referrals to either the general 
or tertiary hospital organisations. They are currently reported to offer inadequate 
medical support, and the majority of the population therefore rely on the Federal 
Medical Centres (FMOH, 2004).  
This study focuses on a Federal Medical Centre located in Umuahia (FMCU), the 
capital of the state of Abia in south-eastern Nigeria. There are similar Federal 
Medical Centres (FMCs) in each of the surrounding states of Anambra, Enugu and 
Ebonyi.  
 The vision that informed the establishment of FMCU is in line with the 
constitutional requirement of the equitable (in terms of the states) presence of the 
Federal Government in providing tertiary healthcare. The FMCU serves a population 
of over four million, has a 280-bed capacity and over 3000 employees. It started as a 
mission hospital in 1975 under the name Queen Elizabeth Hospital. On May 4
th
 
1976, it became a regional hospital in the newly created East Central State and 
acquired its position as a Federal institution on 5
th
 May 1992.   
Despite the similarities between the organisation of all the FMCs in Nigeria, each 
operate with their own location-specific challenges due to geography, political 
exigencies, poverty levels, and possibly the level of health of the population to be 
served. In terms of the policy reforms considered necessary for these tertiary-level 
organisations, the FMCU shares the same performance problems as other FMCs. 
The FMCU provides departmentalized/specialized services in areas covering but not 
limited to, Internal Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Paediatrics, 
Laboratory Medicine, Radiology, Dentistry, E.N.T, Ophthalmology and so on. This 
specialized array of services covers five departments: administrative and information, 
therapeutic, clinical and diagnostic, support services and General Out-Patients Unit.  
Policy document indicates that the main areas of focus in performance management 
is the General Out-Patient department and the administration and information 
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department (SERVICOM Book, 2006), and this is highlighted in Figure 4.1 below. 
The services at these two departments are linked to the other departments.  
In general, the services at FMCU are expected to be of high quality to meet the 
expectations of all customers, irrespective of where they come from. The services 
are also expected to be prompt and timely, efficient and affordable, and delivered in 
an environment conducive for tertiary health services, by a responsible and 
responsive, productive, courteous and highly professional personnel. The FMCU, in 
line with the provision of the current health sector reforms, is expected to:  
i. Provide clear and concise general information about the hospital to its 
patients/visitors/relatives, including monitoring and publishing arrangements. 
ii. Promote Rights and Duties of users and providers of health care services. 
iii. Provide machinery and procedures for redressing patients’ grievances and 
complaints. 
iv. Improve access to quality health care. 
v. Provide 24 hours emergency care. 
vi. Ensure that all equipment in the hospital is maintained efficiently in proper 
working conditions. 
vii. Make provision for those with special needs (FMOH, 2004) 
The organizational structure of Federal Medical Centre Umuahia (FMCU) (an 
example of a FMC in Nigeria) is detailed in Figure 4.1 below.   
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Figure 4.1 The FMCU Hospital Organogram 
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The General Outpatients Department serves each of the other departments, and is the 
first point of call for all patients. The clinical staff (doctors and nurses) at FMCU 
forms 21% of the 3000 employees.  FMCU is staffed with a variety of health care 
workers organised in hierarchy. This study focuses specifically on clinical staff who 
are directly involved in service provision. Figure 4.2 below shows the chain of 
authority of the clinical staff in relation to top-level executives and senior 
consultants, middle-level managers, and the lowest level workers.  
Since it is not possible to read off the actual way in which the FMCU hospital works 
from the official organogram (see Figure 4.1), Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 below detail 
the operational processes and interactions which shape how a hospital functions as 
an ‘organism’ rather than a discrete unit. It particularly focuses on the events within 
the General Out-Patients Departments (GOPD) where the majority of activities of 
the reform process occur.  
Figure 4.2 below demonstrates the interaction and hierarchy existing among hospital 
workers particularly the executives or top-level managers, the consultants, head of 
departments or operational managers and the frontline doctors and nurses. As noted 
in Chapter 2, a hospital organisation operates as a living organism within a system.  
Hospital activities are not about discrete events but sequences within a web of 
interactions between the different categories of workers. Thus, understanding how 
the policy process operates within FMCU is about how workers operate as groups of 
actors and how they manoeuvre, negotiate and relate with one another to provide 
services in a real life context.  
As noted, the focus of analysis in this study remains the understanding of policy 
process within a case hospital context. Therefore, it is argued that talking to these 
different categories of hospital workers will provide an insight into how such an 
agency works. This is underpinned by the understanding that organisational change 
reflects what actually happens within an organization, and not the prescriptions of 
what needs to be done. 
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Figure 4.2 Operational hierarchy and interactions between different categories of health workers  
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Figure 4.3 Operational layout of the FMCU General Out-Patients Department (GOPD) 
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and provide clinical diagnosis and other operating facilities like pharmacy and 
dispensary, health education programmes, and an emergency department (Accident 
and Emergency).  The FMCU’s GOPD also consists of a reception and waiting area, 
waiting rooms, registration and outpatient medical records, clinics, toilet facilities, 
pharmacy, and injection and dressing room. The GOPD has a separate access, and 
ensure that patient flow moves easily from enquiry to registration, and from waiting 
to examination room for diagnosis. The GOPD is also linked to the inpatient 
departments and all other diagnostic facilities such as x-ray, pathology laboratory 
and support services, including patients’ liaison office and snack bar. Overall, the 
GOPD is the visible face of the FMCU hospital.  
The core of previously mentioned SERVICOM’s activities operates within the 
FMCU’s GOPD, given that it is the hub of the hospital’s day-to-day operations, and 
serves as the door to the patients and their attendants. As part of the changes in 
hospital opening times and hours, the FMCU’s GOPD, which operated a 9am to 
2pm Monday to Friday service prior to the reforms changed to offeriong 9am to 4pm 
Monday to Saturday service.  Overall, since the GOPD offers a comprehensive range 
of services arranged into different clinical specialties, as well as administrative links 
and functions with other units or departments in FMCU, a key operational challenge 
to FMCU’s GOPD, like any other FMC, is excessive delay at the registration 
counters and at the clinics.   
In FMCU, workers see themselves as team players, or interdependent. This suggests 
that the functioning of the hospital also requires a good relationship within and 
between worker categories, and between management and frontline workers. This 
organisational dynamics and cohesion is vital, and enhances the smoothness of day-
to-day decision-making processes. As teams, there is suggestion that workers have a 
level of freedom and autonomy of function, and as front line workers, a better idea 
of how the hospital should provide healthcare services on the ground. 
 
Like any other public sector organization, the hospital has an established mechanism 
of staff structure, with bureaucratic control vested with superior over subordinate 
staff. Different staff categories belong to a range of different unions (e.g. Nigerian 
Medical Association for doctors, and Nigerian Nurses and Midwives Association for 
nurses). It is likely that union orientation could affect the way their members 
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perceive their position relative to others, and to the reforms. The staff organisation 
and orientation is characterised by differences in line of authority and power, levels 
of workers and differences in priorities and interest, status, expectations and 
negotiation ability within and between people within the organization. This is 
extremely vulnerable to differences, particularly in the way the reform will be 
perceived. This equally makes sense in terms of human behaviour, which supposes 
that people (e.g. organization and workers) respond differently to change. In order to 
capture the differences in lines of authority, workers of different levels were enlisted 
in the research, as detailed in Chapter 3. 
 
During the interviews held at FMCU, a small number of respondents indicated that 
‘things are different now’ expressing possible change in the work culture. Given that 
the current reform attempts to modernise the way public organisations operate, 
especially as this relates to organisation and management, the suggestion is that the 
operating environment of FMCU has witnessed significant change. Prior to the 
reform, for example, hospital workers reported to their line managers (who are also 
health professionals) and did their work based on their perceived professional 
knowledge. With the introduction of SERVICOM, which operates as a watchdog 
inspection agency with a set hierarchical structure, things have changed which might 
influence the way FMCU conducts its affairs. It is of note that the exact 
characteristics and distribution of power and authority between the agency and 
hospital managers are not fully spelt out. Nonetheless, there is a new form of 
accountability demand from one based on professional or expert norms to one based 
on SERVICOM’s administrative or hierarchical structure. SERVICOM appears to 
have sprung from the government’s view that it wants to enforce compliance; as 
implementation machinery, it is very likely to influence the way FMCU operates in 
order to deliver its services.  
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusions  
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the contexts and contents of the health 
sector reforms in Nigeria. In attempting to improve the performance of the public 
health service delivery system, the government of Nigeria implemented fundamental 
changes aimed at transforming the way in which hospital workers do their work. The 
reforms, which focus on effective management and leadership of public 
organisations, first puts emphasis on strengthening new work practices aimed to 
create best practice/procedure, then on setting targets and performance 
measurements based on targets. This is supposed to provide a result-oriented focus 
as well as contribute to achieving a demand-driven focus, to health care delivery. 
There is also demand for effective communication and a feedback process set out to 
enhance culture of accountability. As part of this, the government established a 
performance audit agency (SERVICOM) to steer effective implementation and to 
secure compliance to customer-led service delivery. 
 
Within the deliberate effort to change work practice and, in particular, to encourage 
health workers to change their behaviour, the second reform element revolves 
around getting the incentive right. The pay reform places emphasis on individual 
reward and recognition as a means of generating incentive to enable and encourage 
public workers to change their behaviour and work practices.  Despite the fact that 
the principle of linking rewards to individual efforts and performance is presented as 
having potential in realising the reforms’ objectives, the practice remains new in the 
Nigerian public service context. It is important to note that rewarding individual 
performance is also supposed to create healthy competition as well as enhance 
accountability of individual health worker actions towards achieving the set targets.   
What is particularly important is the fact that the underpinning philosophy of the 
above reforms has progressively been driven by claims of having the interest of the 
“people” (i.e. service users or clients) as a paramount concern of government. In 
realising this intention, there is an understanding that the government appears to 
recognise the critical role of the workers, and particularly that motivating public 
workers to change their behaviour towards the new work practices is a critical factor 
in improving healthcare. This sits within the wider context of debate about 
reforming public services especially as it relates to developing countries where 
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inadequate incentives have been outlined as critical performance challenges (Rowe 
et al, 2005; Hongoro and Normand, 2006; WHO, 2006; McCoy et al, 2008).  
 
The use of pay (i.e. reward or recognition) policy to support changing work practices 
in healthcare organisations remains an emerging trend in public health sector 
management. Since pay is a subject guaranteed to attract the attention of most, if not 
all, workers in an organisation, how the interplay of reward and recognition, and 
changes in work practice/procedures will attract the necessary efforts and 
willingness from health workers to achieve the established reform objectives 
remains an issue of interest. It is important to recognise that, the reforms also largely 
promote a business strategy of rational planning, goal setting and measuring 
performance (i.e. efforts and outputs) (Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Neely, 1999). In 
addition, the rewarding and recognition of individual effort and performance is 
highlighted as a market ideal (Propper et al, 2004) that is supposed to stimulate 
competition among health workers. 
 
There is recognition that changing health workers’ behaviour by altering the existing 
structure, procedure and process remains a key element of the reforms. This is based 
on the firm belief that health workers are major critical success elements in the 
realisation of government policy objectives. The interest of this thesis, therefore, is 
linked to uncovering the implementation structure and process of reforms operate in 
practice, and how health workers interpret them. The analysis shows that the 
introduction of SERVICOM remains a fundamental aspect, particularly in terms of 
helping to enforce the implementation of the reforms. Put in a wider context, this 
clearly represents a changing trend in the role of government and expressive 
evidence of a transfer of responsibility to a government agency to regulate activities. 
Operationally, it represents an element of power and authority exercised by 
government over public workers (Power, 2000; Hood et al, 1999). 
 
Moreover, drawing from the principal agent literature, the evolving supervision and 
auditing arrangements equally exemplify a contractual relationship in which 
government as principal treats the workers as agents (with SERVICOM as regulators) 
and expects the workers to comply and do as directed (Baker et al, 1994; Holmstrom 
and Milgrom, 1991). In this sense, the Nigerian government seems to be using the 
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reforms to set boundaries for healthcare workers, to direct what they think should be 
done and to retain ownership of hospital organisations. What is of interest to this 
study is how these conceptualisations regarding hospital organisation and 
management play out in practice. 
 
Overall, this chapter has presented the health sector reform that underpins the 
analysis carried out in this study. From all indications, the reform is presented as 
desirable, necessary and unavoidable. There is optimism that the reform will act as a 
catalyst for realising fundamental transformation of public health service work 
procedures and, in particular, contribute to generating incentives for health workers 
to change their behaviour and practices. The analysis shows that the reform contents 
revolve around changing the existing structure, procedure and process in order to 
transform the way hospital workers do their work. The reforms offer a clear 
illustration of business and market strategy based on strategic performance 
management and a demand-driven approach to hospital organisation. The underlying 
assumption about the reforms demonstrate a shift in hospital practice from one 
controlled by the clinical professionals to one driven by a paternalistic view, with set 
procedures about how work should be done as well as mechanisms to check for 
compliance. Another element of the reforms relates to rewarding individual 
performance, seeking to reinforce compliance and, most importantly, to attract the 
efforts and willingness of workers to change their work practice.  
 
While the reforms remain a sweeping effort put together by the government to 
transform the public service delivery system, the implications of the process have 
not been thought through. Nevertheless, the consensus view emanating from policy 
documents and interviews with government officials demonstrates that the reform is 
the government’s planned decisions about what should be done and how. What is 
important to the analysis is a developing understanding of how the policy intentions 
operate within the web of interrelated organisation processes and culture wherein the 
reform is orchestrated. It is also important to map out how the reform is 
communicated, the available incentives, sanctions, and rewards/recognitions that are 
in place to enforce compliance and eliminate non-compliance. Clearly, there is no 
doubt that the reform represents a mechanism for change with strong political will, 
power, interest and influence from the government. At the same time, it is 
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recognised that although the reform is presented as necessary and contained as a 
local action in response to societal needs, it nevertheless sits within the context of 
wider global reform agenda.  
 
With respect to how the reforms came about, although the above presentation did not 
intend to provide a complete analysis of how this happened, it did however show 
wide latitude of high-powered committee deliberations and recommendations which 
informed government decisions about the reforms. Regardless of committee 
recommendations, it seems clear that the reforms were part of the political agenda 
outlined by the interest of the ruling party under the Obasanjo-led administration. 
Despite committee recommendations to the Presidency, there is indication that 
decisions about reforms often happen behind closed doors, and involve overruling 
high-powered ministerial deliberations.  
 
Even if only internal drivers are considered in the policy development process, it is 
not straightforward. As evident from the interviews with key government informants, 
the idea for the reforms emerged from a variety of sources such as the public, the 
media, politicians, development policy experts and public workers. Nevertheless, the 
overriding choice of which changes to implement and in which direction remained 
the sole responsibility of the government. The ideas about the reforms thereafter 
followed formal procedure and discussions involving high-level ministerial meetings, 
select senate committees and subcommittees. Specific case studies with specific 
terms of reference were conducted. A draft report was produced, and then subjected 
to intense public consultation and debate. A White Paper was then published and 
adopted as the working document for the reforms. The description offered here of 
how the reform came about does not show the extent of involvement of the workers 
in the policy-making process. It did, however, point to how policy making follows a 
series of opinions or arguments about the scale, responsibilities, roles and level of 
government, and committees. Public involvement in the policy-making process 
remains ambiguous and the thesis returns to this in Chapter 6. What is evident is that 
the policy-making process involved different levels of deliberations and operated as 
part of the democratic process. The understanding as revealed in the policy 
documents is an overriding claim that there was series of committee and consultants 
reports, presentations, case study references and simulations presented in different 
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levels of governments, and including involvement of workers to justify the rationale 
for change.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 5) presents the structure and process of the reforms’ 
implementation. It is important to point out that, though the government’s view is 
that the reform will operate and be implemented as planned, including the 
supposition that workers will take the reform for granted and follow the rules. The 
view of this study differs and expects that the process is very unlikely to be 
straightforward.  This is driven by the fact that health workers as frontline service 
providers and primary actors in healthcare practice possess considerable discretion 
(Lipsky, 1980) and agency, and their actions are mostly embedded within the 
existing work and professional culture and practice (Long, 2001; Giddens, 1984; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Thus, it is expected that human action and behaviour to 
the reforms will be diverse and may contradict linear expectations. The health 
workers could comply as directed or not, defect or even ignore policy instructions. 
What is important is to develop a deep understanding of how the reform operates in 
practice especially within the case hospital organisation described earlier.  
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5 Policy Analysis:  Policy Processes  
 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 detailed the context and content of the recent health sector reforms in 
Nigeria, and their drivers. It also examined government expectations for initiating 
the reform. Then it described the Federal Medical Centre Umuahia (FMCU), the 
specific organisational context within which this study was undertaken. This chapter 
examines the health and pay reforms as introduced in the FMCU, seeking answers to 
the second research question, which is how health providers perceive the change 
process as it relates to their day-to-day work practices.  
The chapter details the operational changes arising from the implementation of the 
reforms, and clearly identifies the concerns of the hospital workers about these 
changes. These concerns focus substantially on the work of SERVICOM, the 
implementation agency responsible for enforcing compliance with the reforms, and 
outline the formal relationship between the agency, the clinical departments, and the 
hospital’s clinical staff, the tools it uses to measure performance, and the penalties 
imposed for poor performance at the hospital level. As indicated in Chapter 4, these 
tools and measures were laid down by the Federal Government and are not peculiar 
to SERVICOM at FMCU. They are, nevertheless, central to New Public sector 
Management (NPM) and what it appears to offer the Nigerian Government in its 
reform programme; that is, routine procedures with quantifiable and measureable 
outcomes. Evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that the introduction of 
an audit or watchdog agency (SERVICOM) represents one of the biggest changes in 
hospital procedures and clearly demonstrates how the government wants to go about 
improving healthcare services in Nigeria. 
To find out the operational practice of the changes, interviews were conducted with 
national and local staff of the inspection agency, top- and middle-level hospital 
managers as key organisation informants. Prior to these interviews, policy 
documents related to the structure, implementation of the reforms had been 
reviewed, and interviews had taken place with government policy-makers, as 
detailed in Chapter 4.  
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5.2 The Structure of Reform Implementation  
In 2004, the government of Nigeria, as part of its comprehensive reform programme, 
set up an agency, addressed as SERVICOM, under the Reform Implementation Act 
2004 (“the Act”). The role of SERVICOM is to support and lead in the 
implementation of the reforms nationally. SERVICOM works to an agreed national 
protocol, providing a similar service to all public service delivery departments or 
ministries.  
 
SERVICOM is linked with the FMCU through two offices. The first is the Abuja 
office, which is the SERVICOM headquarters, and the second is the FMCU local 
office, present in all Federal Medical Centres. The staff structure of SERVICOM 
consists of civil service administrators who are non-health professionals, appointed 
by government. According to a SERVICOM policy document, at the heart of the 
decision to establish a specific agency to implement the current policy reforms is the 
view that previous policy failure can be traced to the lack of both regulatory 
processes and political will: 
The goal of this administration is to make sure that government’s goals and 
targets are achieved to the letter. SERVICOM will provide a timely assessment 
to show how organizations are achieving the goals. From the Service Delivery 
Diagnostic Report we received the lack of ability of public organizations to 
provide information about what they do will be over as SERVICOM will 
address the information gap, and help government and our planning office to 
plan better in the future. Also, service providers will behave well and follow 
civil service rules (SERVICOM, 2004) 
 
One national SERVICOM official based in Abuja details the activities or tasks of the 
agency as being to ‘measure’, monitor’, ‘regulate’ and ‘publish performance reports’ 
and advise on who is to be rewarded for excellence based on the performance 
reports: 
Government want us to measure, monitor and regulate how service providers 
operate to ensure that quality standards are met. This will also check abuses 
of office and ensure that customers are treated with respect, fairly and timely. 
SERVICOM will also provide information on performance to guide future 
policy and even help hospital managers and their workers to know the areas 
they have done well and identify areas that require improvement. By 
regulating how public organizations and their workers operate along the lines 
of government priorities, government seek to enhance probity and 
accountability in government offices (SERVICOM Staff Abuja) 
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Part of the framework for the public sector reforms revolves around the Customer or 
Social Charter (see Chapter 4). Ideologically, this presents a market-based strategy 
which conceptualises service users (patients) as ‘customers’ who are entitled to 
expect and receive high quality healthcare services befitting their need. The logic as 
expressed in a Bureau of Public Sector Reform (BPSR) document suggests that 
SERVICOM is:  
 
Commissioned to deliver a result-oriented and customer-driven, accountable 
services based on the logic of continuous improvement of public health care 
(BPSR, 2006) 
 
In addition, customers are expected to be treated with respect and dignity, and in a 
manner that is responsive, fair and timely as detailed in the Social Charter. The 
setting up of the Social Charter, therefore, might be viewed as an affirmative act in 
favour of all citizens who have not previously been in a position to benefit from 
health improvements. Quoting a SERVICOM text, there is a supposition that the 
Social Charter reflects the government’s determination to create a service built on 
integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and patriotism in public 
service delivery (SERVICOM Book, 2006). The Social Charter was unanimously 
adopted by the President, the Vice President, Ministers and Secretary of the 
government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Head of Service of the Federation, 
Permanent Secretaries and civil servants, and promises to be responsive, fair and 
accountable in fulfilling its duty to serve the people.  
 
Interviews and discussions with national SERVICOM staff suggest that 
SERVICOM represents a top-down hierarchical structure linking government (its 
policy), the hospitals, and the people or customers. This was spelt out by one 
SERVICOM staff member as follows: 
We are here to implement what government has set out. Our work is driven by 
the drive to make sure that customers are satisfied with the services they 
receive. We work to provide performance reports to government. This is also a 
feedback to hospital managers. Customers also come to us when they want to 
complain about the services they receive. We work to make sure that hospital 
organizations reduce waiting time at the outpatient department as a way of 
improving services. This is part of the performance improvement which this 
policy seeks to achieve (SERVICOM staff Abuja) 
 
84 
 
All this makes it clear that the introduction of SERVICOM is an important step in 
the process of making each part of the health care delivery system accountable to a 
centralised and standardised unit of service delivery. The specific activities of 
SERVICOM are wide-ranging, and include providing a scorecard against which 
organisations and workers can be assessed against others in terms of set performance 
measures or targets; information management on hospital operations; and customer 
satisfaction (SERVICOM, 2006).  
 
The SERVICOM office at FMCU operates as a Ministerial Department Agency 
(MDA), which implements the policy reform. The activity of SERVICOM, 
including within FMCU, is all-embracing and covers a wide gamut of activities. 
Overall, the key responsibilities of SERVICOM with respect to patients are to:  
a) Protect patients and promote continuous improvement in the quality of 
healthcare they receive; 
b) Promote mechanism that safeguards the right and dignity of patients;  
c) Ensure that patients have fair and timely access to healthcare services; 
d) Ensure that the hospital and workers provide information in the form of 
leaflets and self-directed signs to guide customer identification of available 
services and to make choice;  
e) Facilitate a consultative process that regularly brief customers their rights 
and provides up-to-date information to workers regarding government 
expectations (SERVICOM, 2004; 2006). 
At FMCU, SERVICOM makes sure that people who use services (i.e. customers) 
get better health care services, making sure that these services meet the new 
standards and rules outlined by the reforms about quality, health and safety of 
customers.   
 
The SERVICOM unit at FMCU runs a service window (office) that ensures that 
customers are satisfied with public services. The office provides information leaflet-
broadly titled “Ask SERVICOM”-which contains specific information regarding 
SERVICOM and customers’ rights, indicating that: 
Government is here to serve you. It is your constitutional right to expect 
service from government. It is equally your constitutional right to complain 
when service delivery fails. All citizens are customers of the government. All 
citizens have the right to complain when government fail. You can register 
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your question by visiting the SERVICOM office, telephone, by writing, or by 
email (SERVICOM, 2004) 
 
More generally, it is hoped that customers will be encouraged to contribute towards 
improving government service delivery, meaning that the responsibility for change 
depends on both workers and their clients.  
 
From every indication, an interview with a policy officer suggests that the 
SERVICOM model was based on the experiences of other countries such as the UK.  
The operation of SERVICOM, therefore, seems to replicate similar agencies in other 
countries (e.g. OfCom and Ofsted in the UK). This may have been adapted to the 
specific Nigerian setting as part of the policy transfer and learning process perharps 
presented as a form of modernisation agenda (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2002; Lodge, 
2003).  
5.3 Performance measures within FMCU  
Fundamentally, performance measurement is expected to accomplish a variety of 
important objectives, which include motivating better performance and encouraging 
individuals to change their behaviour in line with what has been considered by 
government as ideal. The government argued that one aspect of best practice that 
could achieve this is by setting performance measures, referred to as targets or 
standards. Performance measurement by targets appear to be based on the 
understanding that every organisational worker has to conform, be rewarded for 
doing as directed, or face sanctions. In this context, the establishment of a 
performance measurement agency is to facilitate this agenda of ‘comply or be 
punished’.  
As noted in Chapter 4, this seems to be imbued with the ideology of New Public 
sector Management (NPM), which represents a new way of thinking about how to 
organise and manage public workers. The healthcare performance improvement 
measures (i.e. that are expected to facilitate improvement in healthcare performance) 
for all Federal Medical Centres, such as FMCU, address key aspects of worker 
behaviour (welcoming patients as valued clients, treating patients equitably, 
providing prompt service and so on) all of which are designed to satisfy clients and 
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include action to ensure conformity with these service delivery norms (complaints 
procedures on the one hand, and PRP and public recognition of good service 
procedures on the other).   
Once developed, these performance measures were communicated first through the 
Federal Ministries (e.g. Federal Ministry of Health), and subsequently to the heads 
of each Federal Medical Centre through the SERVICOM ministerial department 
agency office. As specified by the reform implementation act, all ministerial 
departments are expected to pursue the realisation of the performance measures.  
 
With respect to how the performance measures were rolled out, especially at FCMU, 
interview results show that it was not different from the procedure of policy 
dissemination through official and hierarchical channels of communication. For 
example, one FMCU hospital executive noted that the government circulated memos 
to all ministerial departments, including FMCU, indicating the following intention:  
The government has announced changes in hospital management. We were 
told that these changes are most likely to affect how we do our work as well as 
to improve our motivation to do government work. There was a significant 
increase in salaries, changes in pay process and increased accountability as 
work is now to be inspected by an agency to be established by government 
(Top-level Manager HEM2) 
 
As indicated in the policy document, the performance measures specifying the 
changes expected in the healthcare system were first announced at a ministerial 
meeting of Chief Executives and top-level officers of the Federal Ministry of Health 
(FMOH). During the interviews held at FMCU, one hospital executive stated that 
they received memos and circulars from the FMOH, National Planning Commission, 
and SERVICOM office, communicating the government’s intentions regarding the 
performance measures. It was also reported among other executives and operational 
managers that there was series of media broadcasts, including radio, television and 
newspapers promoting the reform, outlining what the government was about to do 
and the expected results. At the FMCU, it was also reported by managers that 
SERVICOM also conducted sensitisation and awareness seminars as part of the 
mechanism to popularise the reform, and the performance measures in particular.   
 
87 
 
One of the most important functions of SERVICOM has to do with performance 
appraisals based on the prescribed national performance measures. This is an 
altogether new development for clinical staff and one of the most obvious signs of 
change. Although one of the hospital line managers indicated that while frontline 
staff were previously appraised for promotion purposes, this was never based on set 
targets. Rather it was based on a manager’s subjective assessment of staff 
performance, and the years of experience of the different staff members. Under the 
new measures, two sources of information are used for staff assessment: 
SERVICOM observations and inspections, and client reports. 
 
As evident in the agency’s operational manual and illustrated in the policy 
documents, SERVICOM’s performance assessment mainly covers activities at the 
General Out-Patients Department (GOPD). There are two kinds of supervision 
carried out by SERVICOM at FMCU: regular/routine supervision and unannounced 
supervision. The aim of the regular/routine supervision is to reinforce the reform 
objective of measuring how workers are doing their work. With regard to 
inspections, the unannounced inspection is not usually regular. It is carried out by 
National SERVICOM staff from Abuja and is mainly used to check out or follow up 
issues.  The announced inspection is often followed by an unannounced inspection 
(undercover inspection) in which national agency staff could visit a hospital to see 
things for themselves. A SERVICOM staff member at FMCU concurred with this, 
stating that: 
We often have our colleague from the national office come for inspection. We 
ourselves did not even know about their visit. For example, we have had 
sometimes a visit during which a head of department was demoted because of 
indecent behaviour (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
The above incident was confirmed by a hospital operational manager, who said that: 
I do not really think that the head of department was as bad as they reported, 
but the incident was very serious although many feel it was unfair. In any 
case, the report that the head of department embarrassed a national staff 
member thinking that he was a patient shows how some workers may be 
treating patients (Operational Manager HOM11) 
 
Although the inspection procedure may not be thorough or robust, there are 
indications that it is perceived as a driver of change. A local SERVICOM staff 
member at FMCU noted that: 
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What people should know is that we did not manufacture the performance 
indicators. All our assessment is based on the laid out performance evaluation 
form. We score workers, units and the hospital based on what we watch and in 
line with the requirement specified in the evaluation form (SERVICOM staff 
FMCU) 
 
Ideally, routine supervision is conducted by the FMCU SERVICOM staff only. In 
this case, everyone knows that SERVICOM is around in a ward or GOPD. During a 
routine inspection, SERVICOM staff discuss with service users what the reform 
gave them reason to expect from the hospital. The focus is to make sure that 
customers get better health care services, so it is the job of SERVICOM to regularly 
check and ensure that services provided meet the national targets. They also verify 
whether the hospital and its workers provide service users with the necessary 
information leaflets and self-directed signs to guide them.  
 
As part of its routine activities, SERVICOM conducts a quarterly seminar where 
customers are invited and reminded of what they should expect from a public 
hospital. Customers are encouraged to be involved in decisions about the care they 
receive. They are also encouraged to make complaints, contacting the SERVICOM 
office either by phone, email or letter, or by visiting the office and making a verbal 
report. As evident in the interview texts, customers are encouraged to do the 
following:  
Tell us what you think. You can help us decide if your hospital (i.e. FMCU) 
gives good and safe care. Please tell us about things they are good at, as well 
as things they need to do better. Telephone or email us, we treat your views 
confidentially. Tell us also any worker who you think has done well and any 
experience that you feel was inappropriate. It is your right.  You can also 
contact a SERVICOM staff or your local group to make your complaint 
(SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
The presence of SERVICOM at FMCU means that things are different from before. 
A SERVICOM staff member noted that: 
In our regular inspection at the wards and GOPD, we look at the services or 
care customers get. We do encourage customers to share their experiences by 
providing feedback to us. We also do check using the evaluation form from 
Abuja how FMCU workers are meeting the standard. We also check the 
reception area to see how customers are received and facilities provided while 
they are waiting for their treatment. We also inspect the facilities to make sure 
that the hospital is clean and safe or free from infection. We are supposed to 
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do many things, but now, we are not able to cover everything because of 
inadequate staff (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
As reported by many other FMCU SERVICOM staff, it is expected that customers 
be involved in decisions regarding the care they receive. The SERVICOM staff 
claimed that during the inspections and interviews with customers, customers are 
asked how well they think their privacy, dignity and independence were respected, 
or whether before they received any examinations, care, treatment or support the 
worker asked them for their views or if they agree to whatever the event was. During 
the interviews with SERVICOM staff at FMCU, a number of focus issues were 
raised. These relate to how well customers feel that their service needs have been 
met, their perception of the cleanliness of the hospital, and so on. A SERVICOM 
staff member also said that their work includes handling of non-compliance.  
We can do many things if a worker does not meet the performance measures 
or standard. We can query the worker and the line manager. Those involved 
will be summoned in a SERVICOM court. Depending on the outcome, they 
could be asked to report to Abuja. The end of each case will either be a 
warning, suspension of salary, recommendation for transfer or in extreme 
dismissal (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
Improving access to health care services is widely documented as an important 
objective of the health sector. As outlined by the recent reforms, smooth information 
flow in public hospital organisations is considered a critical strategy to improving 
access to services. Thus, SERVICOM at FMCU, as in other FMCs, operate to 
facilitate information flow, first to guide customers to identify and access services 
they need. A key SERVICOM staff member at Abuja commented:  
Having adequate and rich information about the activities of the hospital is 
will contribute to improving hospital performance. Available information on 
hospital activities is perceived to be critical because it is expected to 
facilitates easy identification of available services; enhances customer access 
and choice to services and reveals to government what works and how 
(SERVICOM staff Abuja) 
 
The general view about the drive for improved information flow seems to suggest 
that the government wants to know what is happening in the hospital and ensure that 
customers have information to facilitate choice and access to available services. 
Improving information is also considered a means of enhancing the mechanisation 
of hospital activities. A local SERVICOM staff member reiterated this:  
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We make sure that hospital organisation provide customer with varied 
information about their activities. The information must be provided in the 
form of posters, leaflets, signs and directions. The leaflets must be written in 
three Nigerian languages (Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba). The information leaflets 
or signs provide direction and instruction customers on how to identify, access 
and pay for services and demand for receipt afterward, make complaints if 
they felt dissatisfied with the services they receive. The self-directed signs 
facilitate hospital organisation (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
Most important in the work of SERVICOM with FMCU is the enforcement and 
management of the information system. As reported by SERVICOM staff, the idea 
behind improved management of the hospital service’s information system is to 
facilitate customer awareness of available services, enhance choice, and improve 
access to services, and promote operational efficiency by reducing crowding around 
the hospital. As part of the information system management, SERVICOM carries 
out documentary evidence related to workers’ attitudes and behaviour regarding 
work. For example, one member of the SERVICOM staff explained that one of the 
changes in work practice is in terms of attitudes to work (i.e. attendance, absence or 
lateness).  
As spell out in the reform, public workers are expected to report to duty at 
assigned time and place and to remain on duty during scheduled work hours. 
We provide appropriate documentation about worker attitude to work. 
Workers who report to work 10 minutes but less than 1 hour after start of 
scheduled work. When a worker is late more than 1 hour after start of a 
scheduled work shift, s/he is considered absence to work. We keep attendance 
registers at the gate, which workers are supposed to sign, and we keep 
movement register at the ward to track worker movement within the hospital 
(SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
Another change in work practice relates to providing information to service users. A 
SERVICOM staff member commented on this, saying: 
We monitor hospital activities to make sure that workers and their managers 
provide detailed leaflets to first inform customers what to expect from the 
hospital, changes to ways of accessing healthcare services, which services are 
available and from where. The information format has to be self-explanatory 
with self-directed signs to guide customers around the hospital (SERVICOM 
staff FMCU) 
 
At FMCU, SERVICOM staff claimed that their activities also involve the 
observation of individual worker’s punctuality to work, as well as work-related 
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behaviour such as responsiveness to customers, cleanliness of wards and reception 
areas. A local SERVICOM staff member noted: 
We observe individual worker performance by checking their attendance and 
punctuality. At the hospital gate, workers are expected to sign in and out. Yes, 
things are different now because days are gone when workers hardly come to 
work and expect to be paid. Customers are encouraged to report any 
unacceptable behaviour displayed by workers. Customer complaints are 
followed up with appropriate queries. Customers also report good behaviour 
and such is further investigated. A worker with outstanding behaviour is 
recommended for awards while those with bad behaviour could be sanctioned 
e.g. by recommending a suspension of their salaries. While good behaviour 
could also earn a worker instant promotion, queries could retard promotion to 
the next level (SERVICOM Staff FMCU)  
 
Another noted: 
We visit wards and units to find out if the hospital provided self-directed 
direction signs and posters, information on leaflets about available services 
and time they can be accessed, how much that need to be paid and at which 
service window, opening times and how payment should be made. We also 
look at the infrastructures at the general outpatient department for example. 
Next, we would look at the reception area to find out if customers are provided 
with chair and water etc. as they wait for services, we monitor that patients 
are treated on first come first served basis. We do so many things and observe 
so many things, we observe and ok that work is done properly to meet 
customer satisfaction (SERVICOM Staff FMCU) 
 
Further evidence provided by another SERVICOM staff member demonstrates that 
the information mechanism also relates to payment of fees for services.  This agency 
staff member said: 
“As part of the effort to make sure that hospital workers comply with the due 
process with regard to fee payment, collection and documentation, we make 
sure that all payments are well documented. During our interaction with 
customers, we instruct them not to pay any fee to the doctors or nurses. And 
we also instruct them to demand receipt for all payment made and to report 
any payment that is not receipted to our office” (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
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5.4 Reform implementation processes in FMCU 
 
5.4.1 Rewarding Performance  
Managing people (both workers and customers) is a vital part of the activities of 
SERVICOM within FMCU. As evident in the policy document, this is supposed to 
enhance improvement in the reward system, and in the management of staff 
innovativeness (talents) to enhance overall productivity, organisational culture (i.e. 
the way work is done at FMCU) and general public service work ethics. Therefore, 
as part of the second element of the changes, SERVICOM is also interested in 
worker incentive management by identifying performance differences among 
workers rewarding and providing sanctions for compliance and non-compliance 
respectively to enhance motivation and discipline among workers at FMCU. This is 
drawn from the supposition that a vital root to improving performance is rewarding 
individual effort and performance through the introduction of performance-related 
pay mechanisms. Evidence from interviews demonstrates that a merit system 
emphasises a core facet of individual effort and competition, and links worker 
commitment, promotion and performance to reward.  
A SERVICOM staff member commented the following:  
Government has introduced a merit system to create a competitive public 
service. We identify, recommend and reward good performers. Sometimes, we 
recommend them for salary increase or promotion, display their photograph 
at the reception areas and wards, and issue a certificate of merit. This is a 
positive reinforcement for better performance improvement. We also 
recommend workers with inappropriate work-related behaviour to different 
types of punishments. This includes verbal and written warnings, queries, 
suspension of salaries, requesting them to report to Abuja for further 
interrogation and demotion depending on the nature of behaviour 
(SERVICOM staff FMCU). 
 
The above statement indicates that SERVICOM activities facilitate a ‘carrot and 
stick’ incentive mechanism supposed to enforce compliance to government policy 
plans, enhance worker motivation and productivity. When asked about the process 
of identifying good performers, the view of a local SERVICOM staff member at 
FMCU suggests that the process is relative: 
Customers are encouraged to recommend any staff who they feel deliver 
quality and responsive service. In addition, managers recommend workers 
and workers recommend colleague but do not recommend themselves. We 
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follow up recommendations and make final selection in consultation with 
management. We maintain confidentiality of actions and in the final process of 
choosing good performers (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
This statement does not give clear detail of the process, but it suggests a significant 
level of subjectivity based mainly on what customers say and SERVICOM’s own 
assessment. This seems to intimate that the process of performance measurement 
culture might be problematic and open to abuse.  Besides, the claims among the 
health workers that SERVICOM staff are not well trained to exercise such 
judgements provide further evidence. A local SERVICOM staff member noted the 
following: 
A worker is classified as a good performer if s/he is well motivated and 
committed to government work, responsive to attending to customers, follow 
the rule and targets, has good testimony from customers and colleagues, 
punctual and do not absent from work, facilitate customer rights and 
respect...the list is many (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
Another staff member identified a good performing ward or organisation as being 
complicated because: 
We look for a lot of things outlined in the evaluation form. This include issues 
related to management and personnel (e.g. organisation of work and including 
clear line of accountability, workers wear named badge), complaint and 
redress system (e.g. customers have access to complaint process and receive 
information about how to make a complaint, number of complaints and how 
they were treated), premises and facilities (cleanliness and receptiveness of 
the reception areas, safety of the hospital, information and signs to guide 
identification and accessing services and ward/hospital responsiveness to 
customer needs...so many things (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
The operationalization of the above changes within FMCU is reported as part of the 
idea of naming (i.e. identification and rewarding of good worker) and shaming bad 
workers (i.e. sanctions to be imposed on defaulting workers), a central element of 
the performance measurement protocol. As outlined by a senior SERVICOM staff 
member at FMCU: 
Government put the merit system in place as a transparent and fair way of 
motivating the workers and a way of creating a public service work 
environment that will make individual health workers respond to 
opportunities, work in line with set targets, work to the best of their abilities 
and maximise their talents, act as their own source of discipline, take 
responsibility for improving healthcare services, and take pride in their 
achievement (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
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As a means of recognising excellence in public services, personnel management by 
merit is a means of recognition and appreciation of the extra efforts of individual 
workers, and a source of gaining promotion and enhanced status.  
 
SERVICOM solicits nominations for outstanding workers status from frontline staff 
(but workers do not nominate themselves), customers and managers. Following such 
a nomination, supplementary information about the individual is sought from the 
operating managers and management. The outcome of such a collaborative 
consultation results in a recommendation to Abuja and to the hospital management 
promotion committee. The climax of the process is an open recognition during the 
monthly award ceremony which is held with hospital stakeholders (i.e. customers, 
workers, and the public) in attendance. The photograph of the winning worker is 
placed in strategic locations (e.g. GOPD, wards and administrative offices) within 
the hospital. Following this, a certificate of merit is issued. It is important to note 
that, although the instant cash award is not large (10% of the individual worker’s 
salary), the worker could also receive household items (e.g. fridges, electronics and 
cooking utensils). More important, workers who win these awards also receive 
recommendations that they have the potential to be promoted. In general, the 
responses demonstrate that, as part of the change, SERVICOM is implementing the 
reform which links pay to performance and emphasises individual worker 
recognition as an important incentive mechanism that is supposed to stimulate 
healthy competition among workers. Although the operation of performance-related 
pay, as outlined by the policy document remains elementary, it is supposed that its 
operation will likely give workers something to think about.  
 
Conversely, SERVICOM also imposes sanctions for non-compliance. SERVICOM 
operates a special complaints unit which deals with grievances from customers about 
perceived unsatisfactory service experiences within FMCU. Apart from the 
identification of good performers, another SERVICOM staff member remarked that 
they do issue sanctions to enforce compliance and punish bad behaviour:  
Our work is not only about identifying good performers, we also work to deter 
people from engaging in acts that are considered derogatory or that 
undermine customer satisfaction. As a result, we tell customers to report to 
our office any feeling of dissatisfaction. Furthermore, we follow-up all 
complaints and depending on the nature of the offence, we could be issued 
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queries, suspend salary or even terminate appointments. Sometimes a worker 
or manager could be asked to report to Abuja for further interrogation 
(SERVICOM Staff FMCU) 
 
Based on the interview statements, and as outlined in the SERVICOM documents 
(SERVICOM, 2006; 2008), the following are the sanctions that can be imposed on a 
public worker observed to have performed poorly:  
 Query (written request for explanation),  sometimes requesting the worker to 
come to Abuja for the case during the deliberation period; 
 A written warning; 
 Delayed payment for upward of 3-6 months; 
 Demotion;  
 A combination of the above   
Commenting on the potential impact of the process referred to as naming and 
shaming, a local staff member stated:  
So far, what people should know is that the policy i.e. measuring performance 
is a national initiative. It is a good policy and we have been receiving good 
testimonies from customers. However, to be frank, monitoring a Nigerian is 
challenging; a lot of people always think you are not doing a good job or that 
you are biased. To be frank, we have been witnessing significant improvement 
in hospital organisation because of the on-going hospital inspection. The 
priority of government is to make hospital organisation and workers focus on 
improving customer access to quality services (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
It is important to note that the issue of naming and shaming is new, but could have 
varied implications. A key concern is not only about the claimed transparency of the 
process, but also about how the process could drive change, behaviour and changing 
relationships between, and within, worker categories. Ideologically, the process 
prompts a culture of competition and self-interested individual behaviour. Whenever 
reports are received about a worker or unit, the SERVICOM office at FMCU issues 
a query to the respective line manager, who then questions the individual worker 
concerned. SERVICOM expects the line manager to report back within twenty-four 
hours. All cases are examined by the SERVICOM complaints unit (called the 
SERVICOM court), and further enquiries may be made if found necessary. In some 
circumstances, both the line manager and the individual worker may be summoned 
to report for further questioning, either in the FMCU SERVICOM office or at the 
headquarters at Abuja.  
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At the end of the case, and depending on the severity of the issue involved, a worker 
or manager, could be dismissed or demoted. The salary of the affected worker could 
also be delayed, or the worker could be transferred to another unit. During the 
interviews, a SERVICOM staff said that there has been no evidence of dismissal yet, 
but the other sanctions have been effectively used on different occasions. Clearly, 
the activities of SERVICOM in the way it handles non-compliance suggest a 
management-by-threat mechanism. It is important to note that SERVICOM also 
assesses hospital performance in comparison with other hospitals. The overall 
hospital performance is compared against the national and specific key targets, and 
this is drawn from the aggregate of SERVICOM’s assessment of individual worker 
performance. Based on the performance measured, SERVICOM comes up with an 
aggregate score ranking ranging from zero to four. The overall assessment of FMCU 
and other FMCs is made public on the SERVICOM website, servenigeria.com. 
Interestingly, however, there is indication that the assessment reported remain 
useless. 
 
The above analysis demonstrates that, although SERVICOM has in principle been 
given the power to sack any worker that fails to comply with the new work 
procedures, in practice, there is no indication that SERVICOM has the capacity to 
actually do this because of possible legal constraints involved. What is evident, 
however, is the fact that SERVICOM does administer other sanctions, and this 
demonstrates that they are somewhat powerful and, thus, very likely to influence 
work behaviour.  In general, SERVICOM’s activities (i.e. as they relate to 
performance-related rewards) suppose increased awareness and emphasis on results, 
competitiveness and customer satisfaction as the key determinants of productivity, 
especially in healthcare service delivery.  
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5.4.2 Enforcing due process and accountability  
The idea of due process as outlined by the reform process is twofold. The first is 
about strengthening the mechanism for improving operational effectiveness such as 
reducing waiting time and improving equity of access by making sure that patients 
are treated on a first-come-first-served basis. The second relate to the introduction of 
a centralised mechanism for payment and collection of user fees.  
A SERVICOM staff member commented that:  
In this hospital we monitor due process now. We go ward to ward and 
particularly at the general outpatient unit, our staff are positioned to make 
sure that patients are treated as they come. Everybody has equal right and 
there is no more room for patients receiving treatment based on who they do 
which makes the operation process unfair. In this hospital, we also monitor 
payment and collection procedure for user fees. We inform customers were to 
pay for services. There is now a centralised point for all payments and we tell 
customers to demand receipt for all payments made and to report any payment 
that is not receipted (SERVICOM staff FMCU).  
 
Cross-examination of the concept of due process demonstrates existing dichotomy 
between SERVICOM’s view and the professional view of the workers. For instance, 
the study interviews suggest that following targets and the first-come-first-served 
rule, as well as the centralisation of fee payment and receipting within the hospital 
organisation collection points, are all examples of due process expressed by 
SERVICOM staff. As noted by one member of the SERVICOM staff, there is a 
supposition that training has been provided to SERVICOM staff to monitor these 
variables, how well the training has been done in this light remains another issue.  
Nevertheless, the initiative of due process as outlined in FMCU remains promising. 
Commenting on the overall outcome of SERVICOM activities, a national staff 
member stated:   
From what we are seeing, things are different now. Our record shows that 
there has been an improvement in timeliness as people now access services 
quickly. Because of the information provided, patients identify and access 
services easily, people no longer cluster in one place just to ask for direction 
from a nurse or doctor. There is no more room for favouritism. However, 
based on our recent published performance report, a lot of hospital 
organisations need to improve. Government is looking at revisiting the 
sanction mechanism to make it a bit tighter and to improve the performance 
rewards to attract better performance in the future. In general, things are no 
longer the same (SERVICOM staff Abuja) 
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Despite the claimed success, the presence of SERVICOM at FMCU could mean a 
great deal to the operational relationship, particularly since they are making 
judgements about how health workers do their work and even issuing out sanctions 
to those they consider to have performed poorly. At the same time, their activities in 
terms of linking performance to rewards remain a nuanced development in the 
hospital management and incentive system. Nevertheless, given that the complaints 
and disciplinary procedure remains discrete and anonymous, and lacks an objective 
means of verifying the results, it is difficult to say precisely how health workers will 
perceive the change.  
 
5.4.3 SERVICOM data Collection and Collation process at FMCU 
In general, to operationalize the above activities, SERVICOM uses a combination of 
methods to collect data from different sources. This includes customer satisfaction 
interviews and surveys, interviews with health workers, SERVICOM observations, 
research into organizational activities and then analysis. First, SERVICOM 
organizes hospital-based workshops and seminars for management and service 
provider and a stakeholder forum for members of the public (customers) in and 
around the vicinity of the hospital. The purpose is to ensure that hospital 
stakeholders understand the existing national performance targets and target 
expectations. These also serve to inform customers what they should expect, their 
rights, the complaints and redress procedures and other information related to access 
to government services.  
 
Second, SERVICOM conducts entry and exit customer interviews and surveys. The 
purpose is to assess customer service expectations and evaluate their service 
experiences respectively. For the exit interviews, customers provide feedback on 
their service experiences based on the performance measures, and can either rank 
their service experience as good, efficient, very efficient, satisfactory or inadequate.  
Another important focus of SERVICOM’s assessment is the assessment of customer 
satisfaction level with the way the hospital workers respond to their needs, the 
reception they were given, and the attitude or responsiveness of the doctors and 
nurses towards them, or to other customers. Furthermore, SERVICOM conducts 
radio and television phone-ins to enable customers to air their views, positive and 
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negative, about the services provided by government hospital organizations. Further 
feedback is provided in face-to-face meetings or by phone, mail or email. This 
method identifies the value customers place on the service outcomes of hospital 
organizations and measures their experiences and satisfaction levels. The use of such 
surveys to assess the worth and performance of public organizations seeks to 
generate a quantifiable estimate of satisfaction, based on the general assumption that 
customers will provide reliable information about their level of satisfaction. There 
are however some studies that suggest that patient satisfaction is very unreliable 
indicator of quality of clinical care (Propper et al, 2008; Bevan and Hood, 2006a/b). 
 
Finally, SERVICOM gathers raw data from the hospital organization through 
meetings and interviews with executive and operational managers and frontline 
service providers, evaluation of existing operational reports including attendance 
registers and health records, and an inspection of the working environment and 
workers’ behaviour and attitudes to work. The above views suggest that 
SERVICOM’s performance appear to focus on non-clinical outcomes. The 
arguments that emerged from interviews with frontline workers and managers 
suggest that SERVICOM lacks the cognitive ability to assess clinical effectiveness.   
 
Commenting on the data collation process, a member of SERVICOM’s hospital-
based staff stated:  
We explain to the workers what government expects from them and how their 
performance is measured. Then we collect the data using the form format sent 
to us from Abuja (head office), we total the scores and then our officer takes it 
to Abuja for final computation (SERVICOM staff FMCU)  
 
The result of the examination of how performance data were analysed indicates that 
it followed a weighting appraisal system involving ranking and aggregation to 
develop a composite performance score. The interviews with SERVICOM staff and 
analysis of the policy documents show that this activity involves data-ranking, 
aggregation and adding-up processes. The claim by a senior SERVICOM staff 
member that the “field staff are doing their work well” seems spurious, since there is 
no objective evidence to support it. As evident in the interviews, SERVICOM’s 
activities appeared to be plagued by a lack of any triangulation mechanism. This was 
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an inherent problem in the performance report. One of the senior officers for 
example claimed that they are doing their “best” to collect reliable information:  
We are doing our best. We make sure that our field staffs attend seminars 
where they learn about how to relate to customers and attend to their 
complaints (SERVICOM staff FMCU) 
 
This statement, however, is rather based on trust rather than on objective evidence 
and there is no indication that all is well, as captured by another member of staff: 
While it is important to verify the data we collect, so far we are not doing it 
due to inadequate staff and equipment to perform this task (SERVICOM staff 
FMCU) 
 
As noted by one SERVICOM staff member, the overall performance from the 
evaluation modalities is scored and summed up for SERVICOM compliance.  
 
5.4.4 How did SERVICOM relate to the hospital managers? 
 
Prior to the introduction of SERVICOM, the hospital management was under the 
control of executive and operational managers. As noted previously, the presence of 
SERVICOM tends to suggest a shift in hospital management. An executive manager 
summed up the development in the following words:  
Things are different now; things are no longer the same since government 
introduced SERVICOM. Government want us to report to SERVICOM on how 
we serve customers (Top-level Manager HEM2) 
 
In recognition of the fact that a shift in power mirrors changing perceptions about 
public administration, an operational manager alluded to the new management 
structure, stating that: 
“They” (government) are using “them” (SERVICOM) to direct “us” (hospital 
managers) how to manage the hospital (Operational Manager HOM9) 
 
Many operational managers complained that SERVICOM operated as a top-down 
management structure with differing values and culture, which is thus not providing 
constructive feedback to guide clinical practice. Moreover, the perception by 
frontline workers of SERVICOM as a regulatory and controlling agency has 
impacted negatively on their motivation. Apart from the hinted role-conflict 
experience, frontline workers and hospital managers were gravely concerned that 
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they are often queried by SERVICOM about the way they do their job. One manager 
said: “We have often been queried by SERVICOM. This is an embarrassment to our 
profession” (Operational Manager HOM8). This view, which was also, echoed by 
six other managers, and many frontline workers, points to the understanding that 
SERVICOM is seen as a threat to hospital workers. One manager noted that, before 
SERVICOM was introduced, they carried out informal performance appraisals for 
promotion. Assessing the evidence indicates that this relied entirely on the subjective 
assessments of line managers and not on any standards. Thus, the introduction of 
SERVICOM in this regard represents a significant shift in performance management 
procedures, with formalised standards for performance management. As will be seen 
in next chapter, this study also considered the way in which workers and their 
managers view SERVICOM. Without going into detail here, it is worth noting that 
there was considerable distrust about the activities of SERVICOM.  
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions  
This chapter has presented the reforms implementation structure and processes 
within the case hospital organisation. The analysis shows that the implementation 
focused on bringing about change in organisational culture and work attitude and 
behaviour and responsiveness to customer needs. Clearly, the process revolves 
around changing existing formal and informal ways of doing things, with emphasis 
on information and feedback processes to facilitate effective control and 
accountability. The role of SERVICOM as a performance inspection agency is 
supposed to help enhance compliance, and alignment of workers’ interest and 
efforts, in order to realise government policy plans. In pursuing the overall policy 
objective, the government highlighted its commitment to improving the incentive 
system by enhancing individual recognition and rewards for doing as directed. 
Evidently, the use of merit or performance rewards for health workers showing 
improvement in overall effectiveness remains a strategic human resource 
management approach, set out to manage individual behaviour, motivation and 
performance. However, the appropriateness, validity and importance of rewarding 
performance in a public sector setting warrant empirical investigation. It is important 
to recognise that this involves a shift in concept about public service work culture as 
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it relates to promotion; i.e. from promotion based on seniority and status to one 
based on individual performance.   
 
Indeed, this represents a widely recognised approach in the new public sector 
management (Christensen and Laegreid; 2002; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; 
Newman, 2005). The operation represents an amalgamate of neo-liberal business 
principles into public service management which, for example, presupposes a 
language of ‘customers’ (i.e. service users as active and sovereign whose priority is 
first) which replaces the traditional view of service users as ‘patients’ (i.e. as passive 
recipients of government facilities who have no voice). In the first instance, the 
approach supports the emerging view of ‘business culture’ in public sector 
management (Newman, 2005: 45); secondly, it emphasises the claim that patients’ 
involvement as a form of power relations is key to achieving quality care.  
 
Another important issue, as evident in the implementation process, is the 
introduction of the language of ‘measurement’, ‘monitoring’, and ‘audit’ and 
‘regulation’ into public health sector management. Conceptually, this seems to 
reflect a business strategy and an official ideology driven by politics, power, and 
institutions (Freidson, 2001; Scott, 2001; Greenwood et al, 2002; Saltman, 2002). 
While this remains novel in the political economy of health sector management in 
Nigeria, it correlates past studies (e.g. Friedson, 2001; Davies, 2004) which 
demonstrate that the approach is a deliberate attempt to put a grip on professional 
power in an attempt to govern, or have control over, public organisations. To some 
extent, the premise of the implementation process seems to pre-suppose a 
mechanical sequence of events, and that hospital workers will follow the rules on a 
taken-for-granted basis. Nevertheless, to understand the functional aspect of the 
implementation process within the case hospital, it is important to recognise that the 
hospital organisation operates as a system involving notable agency and discretion 
of health workers. Therefore, while it remains believable that the interaction of the 
reform structures underpinning the implementation process will affect the discretion 
and agency of the workers, the nature and pattern of the effects remain uncertain.  
 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that SERVICOM operations within FMCU 
could have several notable implications for hospital operations, management and 
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organisation. There is a clear evident indication of a shift in power relations arising 
from new forms of leadership and management based on information systems rooted 
in feedback and accountability demands, rather than bureaucratic hierarchy. This 
development is not different from events in other country contexts (e.g. the UK 
health service before the current coalition government) (Blackler, 2006; Bevan and 
Hood, 2006b), where health and education (Newman, 2001; Steer et al, 2007) were 
targets and regulation was the fad in public service management. There is no doubt 
that the implementation structure and process in place is supposed to provide 
corporate direction (indication of strategic leadership and political will) towards the 
realization of the Nigerian vision and mission of a ‘New public service’, as well as 
provide and guarantee quality service performance in a timely, fair, honest, effective 
and transparent manner. Within the domain of organisational (or individual worker) 
effectiveness the relationship between good planning, organisation and management 
(e.g. by setting national targets and regulation including inspection of how work is 
done and performance measurement) and performance remains inconclusive. 
 
Nevertheless, within the broader conceptualisation of the reform which includes 
emphases on target and measurement, there is a widely held view that strict 
inspection will deliver. The analysis seems to suggest that the conceptualisation 
appears narrow. This is because the conceptualisation of SERVICOM activities 
suppose a linear and objective procedure of hospital activities (e.g. as in industrial 
production), focusing more on results than on the actual conduct of process of 
healthcare work.  
 
While the establishment of SERVICOM remains a fundamental change, there are 
concerns about the procedural and distributional transparency of its activities. 
Overall, it is important to recognise that SERVICOM operates in a challenging 
context. For instance, in a work environment such as the Nigerian public sector, 
there are many comments suggesting that ‘accountability’ in public service activities 
is confusing and untidy, particularly because of inadequate data. It is, therefore, not 
known how, and to what extent, SERVICOM will be responsible, consistent or 
thorough in its activities. Furthermore, the competence of SERVICOM as non-health 
professionals, particular in observing what health professionals do, could remain 
uncertain in their assessment. Most important, is the fact that there seems to be lack 
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of clarity about the prescribed performance measures with reference to geographical 
preciseness, and this is suggestive of the suspicion that exist about the capacity of 
SERVICOM to deliver. Hence, while the implementation structure and 
implementation process remain promising, the operation seems to lack 
methodological rigour and leaves the question of how well relying on customer 
satisfaction will deliver quality care open to debate. It is interesting to note that 
SERVICOM’s profiling, reporting, rewarding and sanctioning of performance 
remain a nuanced approach to change. Further empirical analysis is needed to 
explore the influence on work, relationships, human behaviour and performance in a 
public sector context.  The implications of these changes, especially as they relate to 
work practice, role, position, and status of health workers, and social structure and 
work culture within the hospital are explored in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
This chapter has presented the reform implementation structure and process.  The 
analysis has demonstrated the relevance of leadership and management of 
professionals as a way of making them more effective and efficient. In fact, it would 
appear, at least from the perspective of government that changing work practices and 
putting in place the right incentive with adequate control and regulation of individual 
activities, are outlined at enforcing compliance. Operationally, the reforms revolve 
around the interplay of changing structures and processes in shaping the agency or 
discretion of workers. There is no doubt that these changes could have significant 
implications on how workers do their work. There are grounds to believe that 
SERVICOM (as an audit agency) remains a fundamental change to government 
intentions and the way it wants to go about improving services. In fact, the emphasis 
on targets and performance management and a system of management through 
information protocol remain clear. Having looked at what is actually happening at 
the hospital level as outlined in this chapter, it is expected that the operations will 
very likely impact significantly on the workers. The analysis however, demonstrates 
that there is no clarity about the practicality of measuring the targets. It is important 
to point out that the fact that the targets were drawn up in Abuja, and SERVICOM 
oversaw their implementation, suggests that the reform and its implementation are 
enforced on the workers.  
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While it is supposed that SERVICOM will adequately monitor what health workers 
do, it is not very clear whether SERVICOM has the capacity to implement the 
reforms as prescribed. There is no doubt that the way the reforms are implemented 
so that the use of audit agencies appears prominent is imbued as part of the new 
public sector management (Power, 2000; Hood et al, 1999). The analysis 
demonstrates that given that SERVICOM staff are appointed by the central 
government, there is no guarantee that their activities will be totally independent or 
incorruptible, or free from political interference. 
 
The analysis also demonstrates a clear shift in power from medical professionals to 
the administrative managers and clients. This ambitious plan is expected to 
contribute to overhauling the public service delivery services system.  The evident 
change in work culture remains prescriptive, with emphasis on rules and procedures 
which suppose that workers are expected to do as directed, rather than doing their 
work based on their own professional orientation. The analysis also suggest that, 
compared to hospital organisation and management before the reform, “things have 
changed” and the presence of SERVICOM seems to represent a form of power used 
as a coercive strategy to change management. At the same time, despite the 
pervasiveness and perceived critical importance of setting rules, measuring and 
rewarding compliance, the analysis indicates that, so far, the implementation process 
tends to lack substantive clarity. Even SERVICOM agency appreciated the fact that 
there are potential challenges. However, there is no denying the fact that the 
recommendation and operation of SERVICOM remains persuasive and promising, 
and a critical factor to its success or failure will depend somewhat on a wide range 
of actions and reactions from the health workers, as they are the reform policy 
targets and are engaged in day-to-day healthcare decision-making processes and 
practice.  
 
The following chapters 6 and 7 provide insights into the results regarding how health 
workers perceive the reform process (Chapter 6), and the effects on their work and 
performance (Chapter 7). 
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6 Health Workers’ Perception of 
the Reform Process 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyses how health providers perceive the reform process from its 
design to its implementation. The chapter directly answers the research question: 
how do frontline health providers perceive the change process and its effects as it 
relates to their day-to-day work practices?  In doing that, the analysis and discussion 
of findings is undertaken simultaneously. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. Part 1 presents the different perceptions 
about the reform. It focuses specifically on how frontline workers and their 
managers perceive the changes that have actually occurred in their day-to-day work 
and in the terms of their employment. Part 1 consists of three main sections which 
follow a distinction in all the texts. This distinction is that, at times, hospital workers 
spoke of their perceived understanding of the reform development, mainly regarding 
its design; their perception of the implementation process; and their perception of the 
logic and operation of the reform contents which workers expressed as benefits 
(advantages) and costs (disadvantages). 
Part 2 examines how health providers perceive the effects of the changes with 
respect to their work, hospital and practice. This part presents empirical evidence of 
the perceived effects, and consists of four principal themes, namely: (i) incentive, 
behaviour and motivation; (ii) workload, efficiency and balance of duties (between 
clinical and administrative); (iii) quality and quantity performance variables; and (iv) 
managers’ and workers’ resistance, that is non-compliance with the policy.  
The analysis conceptualises the reform process as involving interaction and 
relationship between actors, interweaved with varied evidence of implicit and 
explicit features of power relations and trust constructs. For the first part, there is 
demonstrable evidence of a power struggle between professional health workers and 
their autonomy, and non-clinical or bureaucratic managers, especially with respect to 
the reform design and implementation. Similarly, for the second part, trust emerges 
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as another important theme of the content of the reform, particularly, with respect to 
the perceived effectiveness of the performance targets, performance measurement 
and implementation of performance-related incentives. 
This analysis sheds light on the need to develop a more effective mechanism for 
developing an in-depth understanding of the reform process which brings out the 
inherent complexity often associated with policy-making and implementation 
process. Most importantly, the notions of power and trust contribute to highlighting 
how the psychological aspect of individual workers particularly their professional 
culture, attitude, beliefs, and perceptions has been shaped because of a shifting 
conceptualisation of power and trust in the implementation of the reform. 
The issues presented in this chapter are of particular interest to research into policy 
process. Given the importance of these themes (power relations and trust) in 
understanding the reform process, it is important to provide a concise 
conceptualisation of these themes in relation to the analysis in this study. First, 
power is a complex construct construed as a relational and perceptual concept 
associated with negotiation processes, both in policy and discursive terms, as a result 
of the inherent contestation among different policy actors. Often, an actor who has 
power could have access to information or resources, and could influence the reform 
choices and the overall policy process in their interest. On the other hand, a shift in 
power from one actor to another could mean loss of control and influence, as well as 
loss of the capacity to negotiate and influence the reform and the organisational 
process.   
The analysis in this chapter concerns how differential power relations among policy 
actors, i.e. reformers, implementers or SERVICOM, managers, workers (doctors and 
nurses) and patients, negotiate their agency within the policy process. In his 
discourse on power as a relational construct, Luke (1974) outlines the claim that the 
main rationale of power is that it suggests how one actor has ‘power over’ the other, 
and how power revolves around three dimensional elements. The main power 
questions surrounding Luke’s categorisation relate, first, to power as a concrete and 
observable behaviour among actors, which could lead to a potential conflict of 
interest among actors.  The second question relates to power as a pattern of 
exploitation or control, and finally to power as an ideology. In the second aspect, A 
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has power over B because A influences and determines the activities of B. The view 
of Luke, which is supported by other related literature (e.g. Cleg, 1989; Knight, 
1992), suggests that power relations serve as a mediating mechanism between 
human expectations and behaviour in organisational relationships and, depending on 
its asymmetric nature, a power arena could create a potential for conflict among 
actors. It also suggests that the circus of power influences actors’ position and status, 
access to and ability to use available resources, engagement and participation in 
decision-making. In line with this, Knight (1992) expresses the idea that the exercise 
of ‘power over’ someone or some group is a mechanism for controlling one’s space, 
resources, and choices (Knight, 1992: 41). This conceptualisation of power offers a 
number of pertinent features of the policy-making process. It allows for a wide range 
of views about how different actors, with different interests and positions influence 
the policy choice, tools and instruments. In addition, it embodies the principle of 
politics, i.e. the way by which government achieves its objectives, which could 
include or exclude [an] actor (s) based on perceived legitimacy, often judged by the 
dominant actors or interest.  
With respect to how the workers to which this study refers perceive the policy 
development, the results suggest how the operating dynamics of power relations, 
intertwined within the reform, shape the power circle of the reformers, implementers 
or SERVICOM, managers, workers (i.e. doctors and nurses) and patients. It suggests 
how subjective perception of asymmetric power relations results in a shift in how 
individuals evaluate or re-evaluate their position/status, and their voice in the policy 
process, and which the workers believe poses a restriction to their professional 
discretion. Bloomfield et al (1998) found that power relations in this regard “set 
procedures and command based on what is considered as ‘correct or best’ practice, 
and often is driven by dominant interest or political judgement” (Bloomfield et al, 
1998:5).  
As noted by Cleg (1989: 236), the above ideas of patient empowerment and frontline 
worker disempowerment occur within the ‘circuit of power’, which lead to gains or 
losses of power in organisational relationships. This has also been demonstrated by 
past studies (Chambers, 1997; Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Sabatier, 2007) which 
found that empowerment and disempowerment show the extent of inclusion and 
exclusion in the policy process. In line with Foucault (1980), the interest of this 
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research with respect to the discourse of power within the reform process focuses 
more on how power operates within a given system (Foucault, 1980:145).  
 
In addition to power, and especially with respect to the relationship and operation of 
the reform contents, i.e. performance targets, performance measurement and 
performance incentives, ‘trust’ was another important theme. Numerous researchers 
from various disciplines seem to agree that trust [and distrust] is widely 
acknowledged as an important construct and enabler in human actions and 
interpersonal relationships within an organisation (Hosmer, 1995; Kramer, 1999; 
Dirks and Ferrin, 2001). As highlighted by Kramer (1999: 569), trust has an 
important benefit for organisations and their members in terms of maintaining a 
healthy working environment. This is particularly important in healthcare settings 
because health workers largely depend on each other; thus a good trusting 
relationship between workers and managers, and between worker and patients, is 
crucial to corporate effectiveness. Without going into the complexity in the 
definition and dynamics of trust, research suggests that trust is often understood as a 
belief, behaviour, attitude, confidence, expectancy and an interpersonal variable 
between organisational actors engaged in a given relationship, and can easily be 
created, and broken (Fox, 1974; Dunn, 1988; Luhmann, 1991). The implied views of 
these researchers suggest that trust as a dynamic construct is person-, or 
situation/context-, specific. It follows from this premise that trust, as described by 
Hosmer (1995), is the reliance by an actor on the part of another actor, that is to say 
that A trusting B suggests that A expects B to have the capacity to perform to the 
best interests of A, and will do so in a fair and morally correct manner (Hosmer, 
1995: 383).  
 
In relation to the analysis in this study, Meyer et al (1995) identify three trust-related 
issues, namely: perceived ability or capacity, benevolence and integrity/fairness. For 
instance, capacity refers to the perceived capability of SERVICOM to perform or 
undertake a given task; benevolence is the extent to which one worker acts in the 
interest of another and it connotes a positive attitude and commitment to one 
another. Finally, integrity relates to the perception that a worker or manager will 
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adhere to a set of principles that is considered professionally worthy and fair. Based 
on the view of Bachmann (2001), the consensus is that workers’ subjective 
perception of trust could be based on their personal experiences (personal trust), the 
functioning and reliability of the reform process within the public sector system and 
underlying social structures (system trust) and trust between different categories of 
workers within the organisation e.g. between workers and their colleagues, and 
workers and managers (institutional or organisational trust). 
In general, this chapter applies the constructions of power relations and trust in the 
analysis of the way workers view the reform process, including the dynamics of 
interactions and relationships. Throughout this thesis, distinctions of power are also 
evident with respect to how different actors express their views (e.g. 
bureaucratic/administrative and professional views), and the way different actors 
construe their views (e.g. as in the use of “them” and “us” mentality). This was 
found to be most appropriate given the relational nature of the policy process, and 
the discourse and bargaining process often engaged in by different actors, which 
shape both their understanding of the policy reform and its effects. This provides 
micro-level empirical evidence drawn from the policy recipients, who are the 
primary policy target group and are involved in healthcare service delivery.  
It should be pointed out, however, that there are, inevitably, ways in which health 
workers’ psychological attitudes and perceptions about the reform and its effects 
overlap. For instance, commenting that the reform has introduced new power 
relations in hospital operations, and that they experience a sense of being under 
control and a loss of professional discretion, have ideas in common. After studying 
the texts at length, this study presents an interesting difference, and it is therefore 
useful to divide the analysis in this way.  Nonetheless, this study also recognises the 
difficulty in disentangling the extent to which it is possible to separate workers 
views of the reform process and its effects.  
A number of specific and important findings emerge. Overall, there was a measure 
of agreement between these different worker categories with some differences of 
opinion between top-level executives and the rest. Firstly, with respect to the policy 
design, all the respondents except the top-level managers expressed their view that 
they had been, and were being “left out” in the design of the new policies and 
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fabrication of the performance measures. Secondly, with respect to the reform 
implementation, the frontline workers and their managers perceived the activities of 
the implementation agency as bossy and autocratic, and thus often questioning their 
professional integrity. In addition, making workers work under structurally imposed 
targets suggests to them that they are no longer in control of their professional work. 
Thirdly, there was a widespread indication of perceived unfairness arising from how 
workers perceive the performance measurement process, and the distribution of 
individual performance awards. Finally, results presented in this chapter also suggest 
that hospital staff had a lot of fear and anxiety about the changing nature of their 
work and they perceived the reform process as threatening to their job security and 
professional practice. This chapter also indicates that the workers do suggest positive 
perceptions towards the reform. For example, workers perceived the reform as good 
in that it has helped them to know what is expected of them. Moreover, there is an 
indication that the reform has contributed towards improving operational efficiency 
in terms of reducing waiting times, improving the speed of operations, and 
increasing the number of patients seen on a daily basis. 
 
6.2 Health Workers’ Perceptions of the Policy Reform Process-Its 
Design and Implementation 
 
This section consists of two parts. Section 6.2.1 examines the reform development or 
design process, while Section 6.2.2 presents an analysis of workers’ views of the 
reform implementation structure. 
 
6.2.1 Reform Design  
As noted earlier, the creation of the reform involved many actors and processes. As 
health workers attempt to make sense of their non-involvement in the policy design, 
they presented their own understanding of how they feel they should be engaged in 
decision-making processes affecting their work.  
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The following extracts from the interviews held with one nurse and one doctor give 
indications of the way in which hospital staff perceived the design having taken 
place. 
 Foreign consultants put together the policy for government. They did not 
involve us; don’t mind what they are saying. When we attended the seminar, 
nobody asked questions because some of us did not know what they were 
talking about. Besides, nobody wanted to be anti-government since 
government has already made up its mind to implement the policy. At the end, 
they provided us with biscuits and water. I have been in this service for 28 
years, forget it, government has never involved our views in policy making in 
this country (Female nurse HWN19) 
There were so many public speaking events such as seminars and workshops, 
about the reform. They told us that the reform was patterned on the experience 
of other countries like UK, even our neighbours like South Africa have 
adopted similar reforms, and that it is working. What really happened was 
that government used the events to tell us what they have decided to do. I do 
not think that it was for us to contribute (Male doctor HWD12) 
A senior nurse voiced that: 
There has never been a time where government in this country has involved us 
whenever they are making policy. They do it alone; we only receive circulars 
informing us what we are to do (Nurse HWN4) 
The claim of being ‘left out’ by the frontline doctors and nurses  in the reform design 
process, especially in the planning of the performance measures was supported by 
ten of the sixteen operational managers interviewed. Furthermore, the view of the 
doctors’ union representatives reaffirm this sense of alienation and reveal that, 
despite the official claim that there has been reasonable consultation with and 
participation of the stakeholders, including the health workers, the government 
instead used foreign consultants and experts to drive the reform design.  
Government remains frantic about the reform. It is government policy not 
ours. While the idea to reform how we do our work seems profound, it has not 
been tested. They just told us that it is working elsewhere like UK and South 
Africa. The foothold of our argument then and even now has been that buying 
a cap because it fits another person could result in devastating experiences. 
This was exactly our experience with the structural adjustment programmes of 
the 1980s and the 1990s. During the seminars, we submitted a communiqué to 
government. However, none of our perspectives was integrated into the 
reform. It is ridiculous to say that we were involved (Doctors’ Union 
representative) 
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However, one operational manager provides a rather different perspective on the 
reform and on the reaction of his colleagues to the reform: 
 Really, it is difficult to say, but at the time government was talking about this 
reform there were many other things in the news such as a plan to reduce the 
civil service. People were being very careful; nobody wanted to be a 
scapegoat or to suffer for criticising government. Besides the consultants as 
we were told are experts in the reforms (Male Operational Manager HOM9) 
All the six top-level managers interviewed, together with half (eight out of the 
sixteen) of the operational managers suggested a sense of policy ownership. One 
top-level manager, for example, said that: 
We welcome the whole reform process and we are optimistic that it is just 
what our country and health system need. This policy has come to stay and 
our commitment is that we all are involved and should be involved to make 
our services better (Top-Level Manager HEM3) 
One operational manager adds support to the above comment: 
Yes, ‘they’ told ‘us’ and we see the whole process as our national commitment 
to changing the public sector. What we found embarrassing is the way 
government has singlehandedly decided for us how we should do our jobs 
(Top-Level Manager HOM7) 
A comment by one doctor (supported by many others) suggests that the workers 
were reasonably aware that the nature of the information exchange, consultation, and 
engagement in the reform process did not suggest any ‘true’ form of active 
participation:   
They told us the reform is good and that it has worked in other countries.  
They talked to us, we listen to them, but they did not give us opportunity to 
speak our minds and they did not consider our situations (Doctor HWD10) 
Overall, while half of the operational managers consented to the reform and even 
recognised it as a national objective, the main issue that run through the interview is 
that they did not seem to welcome the way the reform process was handled. 
Moreover, the union representatives who spoke on behalf of their profession 
particularly dislike their lack of participation. During the interviews, it became clear 
that, top-level executives, and even some operational managers, seem to have had 
more information about the reform process. Nevertheless, they may not have felt that 
they were in a position, as government ambassadors at the organisation level, to 
question the proposed policy. 
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Interestingly, all the workers believed there was an overwhelming variety of media 
publicity sponsored by government as well as organised seminars and workshops 
which they were mandated to attend. The emerging view of the workers contradicts 
government claims that the policy arena provided opportunities for public debate 
and cross-fertilisation of ideas between different actors. The general view of the 
frontline workers suggest that these so-called consultation fora were laden with 
technical ideas and preoccupied with political interests, and therefore served as a 
strategy used by government to get across their message and intentions about the 
reform. Further analysis of interview texts, however, suggests that top-level FMCU 
hospital managers were supportive of the policy process, and in fact acted more as 
the “public face” of government, speaking in defence of the reform and being more 
optimistic about the delivery of the expected reform outcomes than others.  
The construction of the experiences and the reported interaction between the 
frontline workers, including the operational managers, and the speaker during the 
workshops and seminars suggests that there may have been an unequal balance of 
power between the policy experts and other speakers and themselves. The frontline 
workers believed that the policy arena was monopolised by government bureaucrats 
and their contracted policy consultants [policy experts] who now and then told them 
the reform was the best thing that could ever happen because it had worked in other 
countries. The reform design process gives an indication of unequal power relations 
rather than an open forum, for policy dialogue. Most of the workers perceive that it 
was a ‘classroom’ which gave the contracted policy consultants or experts an 
opportunity to popularise the policy idea. 
The results of this study suggest that workers believed that they were excluded from 
the decision-making processes, especially with regard to identification and definition 
of the policy choice, goals and strategy. From the analysis findings, besides the 
concern of lack of participation, another key issue is the belief that the reform was 
inconsistent with their expectations that change should be based on clinical practice.  
A core emergent concern arising from analysis conducted is that the workers claim 
that the government monopolised the policy-making process. They argued that 
government snubbed their union representatives. While workers strongly argued 
their claims, making generalisation based on this is problematic. This ‘problematic’ 
conclusion adds support to the literature already flagged in Chapter 4: harmonising 
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the views of different actors in a policy process is arguably challenging. 
Nevertheless, research evidence drawn from other cases (Haas, 1992; Hall, 1997; 
Hill and Hupe, 2002) does confirm government dominance, and the use of policy 
experts in designing policy recipes. Evidence of lack of participation of policy 
recipients in policy processes especially across developing countries policy contexts, 
has been well outlined in policy process literature (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; 
Sabatier, 2007).  
The results regarding workers’ exclusion from the policy process also correlate with 
findings of Taylor (2003), which particularly shed light on how ‘claimed’ public 
participation in government policy activities is inherently marred by asymmetric 
power relations. A similar criticism of ‘fake’ public participation in government 
policy-making processes has been reported in the policy context of other developing 
countries. For example,  Williams et al (2006), in their study of policy-making in 
South Africa, demonstrated clearly that “interactive and in-depth policy discussions 
have often been sacrificed for fast and easily organised presentations 
bureaucratically arranged using policy experts who flood the policy dialogue with 
technocratic information” (Williams et al, 2006: 17).  The same authors found that 
such arrangements allow little opportunity for meaningful dialogue and contribution 
to the pre-set policy intention. The results on government’s influences in policy-
making also correlate with Foucault (1982) in his discourse on governmentality. 
Foucault is of the view that governments often adopt a ‘paternalistic approach’ to 
policy-making, which emphasises that governments know what is right and good for 
the public interest. In so doing, governments deliberately monopolise the policy 
arena, setting out a rational and strategic procedure in an attempt to govern ‘others’ 
and make them comply with their political interests (Foucault, 1982: 220). Similarly, 
Hood (1998) recognises this logic as a strategic configuration of power apparatus 
and an “art” which modern states use to exert influence.  
The point, in sum, is that evidence of power relations in the policy process creates a 
platform of unequal access to policy information and dialogue. Clearly, differential 
power among actors within the policy process is an elitist ideology which has often 
been the root of frequent conflict and contestation among actors with those with 
lesser power often alienated by dominant interest and ideas (Keeley and Scoones, 
2003). This study observed that while it seems reasonable that health workers should 
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be involved in policy design, how to achieve this in practice may not be a 
straightforward process.   
 
6.2.2 Implementation Structure-SERVICOM agency  
This section presents and discusses health workers’ perceptions of the 
implementation agency and its appropriateness in facilitating good working 
environment. There was a consensus among the operational managers indicating that 
SERVICOM operates as a form of “power over” the existing status quo. The sense 
here is that hospital operational managers could be feeling loss of status and control 
over the hospital they manage.  
The view of a female operational manager, which also found support from many 
other managers, suggests that: “SERVICOM is perceived as a power window used 
by government to regulate how managers manage and how frontline workers do 
government work” (Operational Manager HOM7). The discourse of ‘power’ was 
also widely acknowledged by frontline workers who also perceived it as a form of 
political interference and hegemony over their profession. Many frontline workers 
reported that SERVICOM operates as a disciplinary instrument put in place to 
ensure that workers and their managers comply with government directives.  
The frontline workers perceived SERVICOM as a questionable agency. Hospital 
staff expressed concern that SERVICOM is made up of non-health professionals, 
and thus, lacks clinical capacity regarding how a hospital operates. There was 
consensus among hospital staff in expressing significant discontentment because the 
government is using ‘them’ (SERVICOM) to direct how ‘they’ (health workers) do 
their work. In general, the results demonstrate that the majority of the workers, 
including operational managers, were rather peeved by this arrangement, as evident 
in the following quotes:  
SERVICOM query both frontline workers and even us manager. The other 
time a line manager was replaced because of reported case of sluggishness 
towards customers. We have also had cases were a manager and staff were 
summoned to Abuja for further interrogation concerning a case that was 
treated locally but the local SERVICOM office claimed that it was not well 
treated (Operational Manager HOM9)  
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 ‘They’ (government) are using ‘them’ (SERVICOM) to tell ‘us’ (health 
workers) what to do as if we no longer know our jobs (Doctor HWD8) 
Everybody knows that SERVICOM is watching. You cannot ignore ‘them’ 
because they can recommend people for award, others have been 
recommended for sanctions including delay of salaries, and others have 
received query and warning. I just think that there is too much politics 
influencing our jobs. Although they do not know everything we do, yet, they 
are still using what they think to challenge the way we do our work (Doctor 
HWD12) 
The above statements from different categories of hospital workers reveal that 
SERVICOM is perceived by hospital staff as an administrative control mechanism 
and has, thus, created a new form of power relations. The view among the health 
workers was that SERVICOM operates as a mechanism that seeks to [dis]organise 
their professional knowledge and profession. The workers see their profession as 
having come under severe control, consequently, being far less autonomous. Many 
other frontline workers, as reflected by HWD12 for example, offered their views 
which, overall, suggest that they see the way government is using SERVICOM to 
oversee their work as a form of control. This study’s results indicate that there is a 
clear sense of uneasiness among the frontline hospital workers and their operational 
managers. The hospital workers in general expressed fear of having their 
professional power and agency weakened, which influences their decision about 
how to provide healthcare services. The results suggest that the perceived dislocation 
of the professional power of the frontline workers has often resulted in tension and 
dichotomy, as expressed by the construct of the “they”, “them” and “us” culture.  
One of the senior consultants said:  
I think it has not been easy for both professional and administrative views to 
coexist regarding how healthcare should be provided. While there could be 
common ground, healthcare remains a professional issue. The state of affairs 
as we have seen suggest a general lack of openness. I do not think that 
SERVICOM is open enough to appreciate our professional views. They are 
just following government orders. Frankly, it is hard work to pursue 
government rules and sometimes contradict our professional ethics (Doctor 
HWD3) 
Continuing, the same informant said SERVICOM has less capacity to direct how 
healthcare should be organised because ‘they’ (SERVICOM) are not professional 
health workers.  
118 
 
Another manager, highlighting the language of regulation, control and sanction 
noted that:  
I think that SERVICOM’s objective i.e. making sure that customers receive 
timely, fair, and quality services in an honest, effective and transparent 
manner is a good one, but the way they are going about it raises doubt on our 
competence to manage. For example, we have an incident in which a head of 
unit was removed because of SERVICOM inspection. It happened that a health 
worker was queried following a customer complaint. As usual, SERVICOM 
sent in a memo and requested that the matter be investigated. After interview 
with the worker, the manager felt that the case lacked clinical evidence and so 
was dismissed. But SERVICOM staff was not satisfied, both the manager and 
the health worker was summoned to Abuja for further interrogation. Although 
at the end the worker’s salary was suspended for a month and the manager 
received a written warning, the way it was handled suggest expression of 
power in practice. They are challenging our capacity to manage our workers 
and patients (Operational Manager HOM8)   
 
Concurring with the above incident, a hospital executive commented: 
I do think that the relationship between managers and SERVICOM need to be 
improved. The expression of some managers has been that SERVICOM as 
non-health professionals are assuming superiority over how customers should 
be treated. There is no protection for managers and even health workers at the 
frontline, any identified mistake you could be out. The other time, we heard in 
the news and in our meeting of how the government removed two executives of 
a federal hospital organisations because SERVICOM reported that the 
hospital performance was shameful. Everybody is feeling the pressure but I 
feel the intention of government is not to undermine us but sometimes, 
situations emerge that appear anti-productive (Top-level Manager HEM3) 
 
Another doctor commented on the audit function of SERVICOM as lacking power 
in observing what they do: 
I just think that we are been watched as if we no longer know our jobs. 
Government is indirectly claiming to be telling us what to do. I do not think 
that asking SERVICOM to watch us will make us do better, after all 
SERVICOM may not see everything we do since they are not doctors and 
nurses (Female Doctor HWD21) 
In general, doctors and nurses interviewed were of the view that SERVICOM lacks 
the professional capacity to ‘observe and measure’ what they do. One operational 
manager (a doctor) said: 
Our work has come under severe criticism due to too many rules and 
regulations coming from the top. As we have been experiencing, sometimes the 
activities of SERVICOM are not in congruence with our professional ideas. 
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For example, SERVICOM staff just feels we are resisting change when we try 
to bring out what an action means clinically. There is too much talk about 
targets and customers (rather than patients) as if we are in the market place. 
Nobody is suggesting concern about clinical quality which has always been 
our concern. Government is wasting too much money on SERVICOM while we 
do not have the facilities we need to do our work (Male Operational Manager 
HOM9)  
In addition, a union representative said: 
 We have made it clear to government that our Medical Council branch based 
here at FMCU hospital does not subscribe to the use of non-professionals with 
minimal or no knowledge of medical affairs to measure and monitor our work. 
This is unprofessional. Despite the numerous complaints we have made to 
government nothing has changed.  SERVICOM operates as a teacher, telling 
us how to do our job and this is raising a lot of discontentment among our 
professional colleagues. SERVICOM is not about clinical quality and 
procedure because their staffs do not understand this aspect of our work. They 
are just filling registers based on the mandate given to them by government 
(Doctors’ Union representative) 
The results suggest the operation of SERVICOM is perceived as a source of 
demotivation. Clinicians believed that SERVICOM operates as a form of ‘control’ 
which has introduced a rigid work mechanism, and a restriction to their professional 
autonomy. One doctor said:  
They are telling us what to do as if we no longer know our jobs and this is 
frustrating. I do not think we are progressing. Yes, they imposed on us the 
targets. Targets are not everything. We just will want to do our jobs as clinical 
staff and not pushed here and there as factory workers. The target is too rigid, 
some of us no longer do private practice as we want (Doctor HWD7)  
The above statement, which was welcomed by the majority of the other doctors, in 
particular paint a picture that the operations of SERVICOM have restricted their 
freedom. The doctors complained that they are overmonitored; therefore, their 
freedom to engage in private practice has been infringed upon. Although this 
appears to be a negative perception of the reform, it still stands out as a success story 
or achievement of the reform. This is because one of the major performance 
challenges of many developing countries’ health delivery systems is the criticism 
that public health workers (especially doctors) use government time and resources 
working in their private hospitals rather than focusing on the public hospital 
organisations (see McPake et al, 1999; Ferrinho et al, 2004a/b). These past studies 
found that public health workers, in particular doctors, are often accused of showing 
up for a few hours only in the state hospital where they are fully employed, and 
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spending most of their time in their private clinics. It is also often rumoured that 
doctors do divert patients from government hospitals to their private practices. This 
negative perception of the reform with respect to infringement on the freedom of the 
clinicians is akin to the perceived effects highlighted in in Chapter 7 (Section 
7.2.5.2), in which workers complained that the reform has affected their ability to 
exercise their socio-cultural duties to their friends and family members in that they 
are no longer in a position to influence their family’s and friends’ access to 
government services.  
In general, the results suggest that different people have a difference sense of what is 
right and wrong, in relation to what they feel is the explicit and implicit professional 
and social culture. Indicated earlier, clinicians seem to perceive their professional 
culture or freedom to do what they seem right as a divine right. Hence, reducing 
their opportunities to do private practice, or attend to their friends and family 
members, is perceived as an infringement on this culture.  Thus, the results suggest 
that the operation of the reform seems to have generated a shift in cultural 
orientation with respect to professional and social relations. This indeed seems to be 
in line with the aim of the reform, which is about changing the way the government 
functions or how public workers do their work.  
The above texts point to existing tension between SERVICOM staff and hospital 
workers. This resonates in the regular expression of the ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
mind-set. All the workers expressed the view that using administrative managers, 
described by one of the doctors as ‘outsiders’, to ‘tell workers what to do and to 
monitor how we do it’ is not appropriate.   
Following on from the views expressed above, ten out of the sixteen operational 
managers interviewed noted how the operation of SERVICOM has led to shifts in 
the balance of power, changing roles, and a sense of alienation and dissatisfaction. 
One of them for example said: 
Often it seems that we are no longer in charge, if it is not SERVICOM that is 
pressuring you, it will be customers that will be reporting you to SERVICOM. 
It is also deeply evidenced by one of the SERVICOM leaflets that ‘customers 
should Ask SERVICOM if they are not satisfied with services’ as if 
SERVICOM will treat them (Operational Manager HOM6)  
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Another manager was of the view that their work has come under pressure because 
of how SERVICOM operates as a new form of power structure:  
 “We are always under pressure from SERVICOM to provide information, 
address complaints and improve service. Yet, SERVICOM has no say about 
the inadequate hospital facilities in this hospital. Yes, providing this 
information represents an improvement in hospital leadership, but, the 
approach is too bureaucratic. We spend too much time redressing query and 
filling out the paperwork” (Operational Manager HOM3) 
 
Another concern regarding the way hospital staff perceived SERVICOM relates to 
the consensus among the hospital staff that SERVICOM lacks the capacity and 
cognitive ability to effectively measure their performance. Several reasons were 
linked to this. First, hospital staff claimed that their work is indivisible and difficult 
to observe or measure, and is not as discrete and measurable as presented by 
SERVICOM. The second is related to the fact that SERVICOM workers are not 
health professionals, and thus lack the training and cognition to know and/or observe 
what the workers do. The background of SERVICOM workers has been highlighted 
earlier, in Section 5.2. Finally, there was a unanimous view among the frontline 
workers in particular that SERVICOM relies on the use of customer statements and 
complaints, and national targets operating as a generalised best practice, to gauge 
individual workers’ performance. The perception of the hospital workers suggests 
that this represents reductionist assessment, which is subjective and lacks adequate 
coverage of clinical matters. 
 
Another related issue that shaped the way hospital staff perceived SERVICOM has 
to do with the operational methodology used by SERVICOM for performance data 
collection and analysis. As outlined above, it remained largely subjective and cannot 
be said to be robust. More so, despite much discourse about performance data 
collection and measures, there was a lack of hard data to support the claims made by 
SERVICOM. However, whether SERVICOM is making the right decision about 
worker or hospital performance is one thing, the fact that their presence signals the 
evolution of an audit mechanism is perhaps the most important issue in terms of 
likely implications for human behaviour and change. The indication that the 
observation and scoring process involves using the present SERVICOM evaluation 
form and is based on the discretion of SERVICOM staff indicates a potential source 
of serious error. During the research, there was no objective evidence that such 
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errors as claimed by frontline workers have occurred. Nevertheless, there were 
consistent rumours and suppositions among frontline workers, and even a few 
managers, that given the way SERVICOM staff operate and the fact that details of 
their data analysis is not easily available, indicates potential problems. For instance, 
SERVICOM staff at FMCU relied on the national evaluation forms in their research 
and observation procedures. The use of this universal form implies first a 
generalisation of activities across all public hospital organisations, and second that 
the scoring process relies on box ticking activities and the subjective assessment of 
the assessor. A sample of the SERVICOM evaluation form is provided in Appendix 
2. Overall, workers seem to perceive the activities of SERVICOM as far from 
perfect, and inappropriate, because they fail to capture a holistic view of their work.  
 
Most importantly, hospital staff regularly complained about SERVICOM’s 
leadership style, stating that they are too officious, bossy and top-down.  The 
perceptions of the workers did suggest that although they recognised that some form 
of audit was necessary in their work, they did not consider the way the government 
was going about it as appropriate. The results suggest that the use of SERVICOM to 
implement the reform represent, yet, another medium of power through regulation 
and control. The subject of the regulation and control of healthcare professionals has 
emerged in recent times as a universally aesthetic feature of health policy agenda 
designed with a view to modernising public service (Hood et al, 1998; Power, 2004). 
While this represents an evolving shift in the role of the state in managing public 
organisations, it seems, in turn, to be leading to a new pattern of human interactions 
which health workers believe do not necessarily conform to their operating practice, 
or is considered appropriate. The focus of control and regulation, as evident in this 
study, reflects the trajectory of the new public sector management characteristics of 
modern democracies pushed forward as a way of encouraging the modernisation of 
developing economies.   
The main question relating to the perception of the use of SERVICOM relates again 
to the recurring dichotomy between non-clinical and clinical ideas as expressed 
consistently by the workers with the language of “them” and “us”, inherently 
suggesting a form of power struggle in organisational relationship.  Most overtly, the 
presence of SERVICOM has a direct power consequence on the workers and their 
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managers. For example, there were steady complaints from the workers and 
operational managers that they are losing their professional power and autonomy, 
their identity and self-worth.  
As evident in Section 6.2.1, the workers clearly did not welcome the use of non-
clinical administrative managers in the development, as well as the implementation 
of the reform. Two-out-of-every three frontline workers interviewed see the 
arrangement as inappropriate because it operates as a form of control. In particular, 
three-in-five managers interviewed described the presence of SERVICOM over their 
work as repressing and unsuitable to their management practice. The managers 
alleged that the said shift of management power to SERVICOM triggered a sense of 
subordination, and threat to their professional capacity to manage. The workers 
believe that the use of SERVICOM is too mechanistic and technocratic for their 
professional work culture. However, though the literature prescribes potential 
benefits of regulations and control for public organisations and workers in terms of 
contributing to aligning interest to set goals (Latham, 2004; Latham and Locke, 
2006) and providing information (Symon, 1993, Heinrich, 1999), the effectiveness 
of the operation of this goal-directed initiative in particular, as perceived by the 
workers, remains particularly limited.   
Section 6.2 has offered a useful analysis of workers’ view of the reform design and 
implementation process. The ambiguities in the use of the language of “them” and 
“us” suggest a clear dichotomy in ideas and class struggle between clinical workers 
and non-clinical managers. It also suggests that workers refer to the reform as not 
being their idea or simply that it is “government policy” which has been “borrowed” 
or driven by expert advice. The workers believe that a lack of participation in the 
reform process tends to widen the gap between policy-makers and policy recipients 
which may have contributed to a perceived ineffectiveness of the reform. The 
concern of the workers, which found expression in much of the texts correlates with 
the assertion highlighted by other policy researchers particularly across many 
developing countries’ policy contexts (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Sabatier, 2007). 
The workers raised concerns about the way government used non-clinical managers 
to set and implement performance measures which clearly signal a shift of power in 
hospital organisation. There is an indication that the ideology of public health sector 
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regulation originates from developed countries, and reflects the domineering 
evidence of modernisation ideology, seen as a form of governance arrangement, and 
characteristic of the new public sector management (Hood, 1991; Power, 2000), 
which is supposed to facilitate compliance to the reform’s goals. Nevertheless, the 
reform has been seen as undermining the professional autonomy of the workers 
because, as noted by past studies (Luke, 1974; Ouchi, 1980; Power, 2004), the 
operation of SERVICOM suggests a form of control structures with evident 
elements of ‘power over’ health organisations and its workers. Although it is 
understood that regulating how workers do their work will check their operational 
agency and discretion, and help to align interests to government corporate interest, 
the idea of control, as noted by Barley and Kunda (1992), reflects the dominance of 
a positivist and rational thought in business management discourse which is based 
on a widespread functionalist approach to change and apply institutionalised 
procedures, measures and targets. The result, as outlined by the workers’ views, is 
that this has contributed to a sense of powerlessness in healthcare professional 
culture and clearly demonstrates the main reason for the discontentment expressed 
by the workers.  
While the rationale for regulation remains rife in policy debates, its operational 
relevance seem inconclusive. What emerges strongly from the workers’ views is that 
their subjective perception of asymmetric power relations in the policy process 
creates a sense of subordination, powerlessness, and disenfranchisement. The results 
correlate with sociological schools of thought (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 1992; Long, 2001), which suggest that 
perceived control could weaken workers’ agency and position and their capacity to 
negotiate their interest within the reform process and social context of their work.  
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6.2.3 Power to Patients    
Concerning the issues of power relations discussed above in Section 6.2.2 another 
theme that emerged from the reform elements relates to how the reform has given 
power to patients. Power to patients has emerged in recent times as a doctrine 
operating as a supposed way of holding frontline workers to account and enhancing 
their capacity to provide improved services (Blakeman et al, 2006; Fox et al, 2005; 
Filmer et al, 2002).  
The underpinning rationale as captured in the current reform is that it will enable 
patients to query, or seeks redress for, perceived poor performance through the 
Grievance and Complaint redress system. As reported by the managers, power to 
patients is one of the core elements of the Social Charter. Six out of sixteen 
managers interviewed suggested that it has had positive effects, especially in 
providing feedback and driving customer focused care. The following extract from 
the interviews with these operational manager interviews (HOM2 and HOM6) notes 
this:   
The introduction of a complaint procedure means that we now get feedback 
from patients. Before the reform, this hardly occurred. Patients now provide 
us reports of how they feel. This is treated officially and any worker found 
wanting is reprimanded (Operational Manager HOM16) 
Before the reform, public workers were often accused of not suggesting a 
sense of respect to patients. They treated patients as they liked and had no 
respect for their rights and dignity. Now things have changed. We are here to 
serve the patients as our customers. They are the reason why we are here. If 
you misbehave in front of customers, they can report you and it can earn the 
worker a query and damage reputations (Operational Manager HOM2) 
These comments suggest that giving power to patients has enhanced the value of 
patients’ voice, and this is regarded as important because it is seen to be the driver of 
improved performance. However, as is evident from the opposing thoughts detailed 
below (see the comments of Nurse HWN19 and Doctor HWD11 in the next page), 
patients’ voices can easily be viewed as problematic where they are interpreted as 
questioning professional conduct.  
The frontline workers in particular argued that giving power to patients is 
detrimental to healthcare practice. Half of the frontline doctors and nurses involved 
in the present study perceive that this reversal of power – power to patient - has 
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resulted in increased verbal abuse on their person. Nurses, who seem to report more 
on the construct of an increase in verbal abuse, possibly because they interact more 
with patients, asserted that they are reluctant to report their experiences because their 
operational managers and SERVICOM staff hardly listen to them.  
The first time I was verbally abused by a patient my manager did not do 
anything; I was only told that SERVICOM would take the matter up. 
Sometimes you feel you are not safe because patients can talk to you anyhow. I 
think that we have lost our professional status.  We are blamed, reported and 
queried for every little thing that goes wrong (Nurse HWN19) 
“Sometimes you feel very sad to just sit and allow yourself to be insulted by a 
patient. The last time a male colleague tried to defend himself he was almost 
immediately suspended from work for one week, and given a query even 
though everybody knows that the patient was wrong.” (Doctor HWD11) 
Five of the sixteen managers confirmed this increase in verbal abuse on workers 
especially nurses in the outpatient department. One of the managers said:  
I think that the customers often go too far and even insult our staff. There is a 
need for more awareness of how customers can politely make complaints. 
When a worker feels verbally insulted they are de-motivated. We have had 
more verbal abuse on the nurses than doctors, particularly at the General 
Out-patient Department (Operational Manager HOM7) 
The doctors and nurses claimed that patient power interfered with clinical decision-
making. The perceived negative outcomes of ‘power to patient’ are very clear from 
these summaries. Both doctors and nurses claimed to have suffered different kinds 
of sanctions such as a query, suspension and even demotion as a result of complaints 
from patients. About a third of the managers expressed negative feelings and 
complained that the redress process resulting from the patients’ complaints is a 
threat to their jobs.  For example, one operational manager narrated an incident in 
which a ward manager was demoted following a patient’s report to SERVICOM. 
His report simply states:  
One of our heads of unit was demoted two steps after a report made by a 
customer to Abuja (Operational Manager HOM11) 
The view of HOM11 was echoed by a top-level manager (Male HEM2), who 
commented that, even in other federal hospitals, patient’s power has been 
significantly threatening:  
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Two top-level managers of a federal hospital in Nigeria were removed all 
because of statements of dissatisfaction were received from customers (Male 
HEM2) 
These reports suggest that patient’s power has been affecting all workers 
irrespective of their status, and in fact, is seen as challenging to the traditional 
understanding of healthcare knowledge as reserved for clinicians only. Interesting 
discussions drawn from Section 6.2.2 indicate that, theoretically, SERVICOM was 
about empowering the patients. As highlighted above, health workers perceived this 
empowerment as defective and inappropriate to their practice. In addition, the 
understanding that patients could report poor performance, or a frontline worker in 
particular, to SERVICOM for disciplinary action suggests that, for the workers, 
there is another form of asymmetric power relations, control and regulation in their 
work, hospital and profession. The views of the workers, as demonstrated by 
majority frontline workers and managers interviewed indicate that they did not see 
the arrangement as good, arguing that it is undermining their authority and 
operational discretion.  
The results of this study, nevertheless, did not seem to suggest that workers prefer to 
be left alone to do as they like, but what has emerged is that the whistle-blowing job 
of patients seems to introduce a new work culture that questions the sovereignty of 
medical knowledge. Drawing lessons from medical sociology, it can be deduced that 
power to patients relate to the argument that patients should not be treated as 
‘passive’ but should be seen as elements who can actively influence medical 
decisions. This correlates with relatively to old literature (Parsons, 1951; Illich, 
1975), which could be seen to a have link with global health policy in the 1990s and 
now, in the 21
st
 century. Illich (1975), a strong supporter of patient empowerment, 
argues that integrating the “sick role” of patients is relevant to understanding a 
patient’s illness and perspective about their health and social contexts (p.5). The 
view of the workers, on the contrary, suggests that involving patients in deciding 
healthcare is an oversimplification of the clinician-patient relationship, and a 
challenge to the fundamental ethos of their professional knowledge with respect to 
the content, values, context and outcome of their clinical decisions. Critiques to 
power to patients, which support the views of the frontline workers, demonstrate that 
it poses a threat to these workers. For example, Johnston (1999); Blakeman et al 
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(2006), and Fox et al, (2005) point to the understanding that power to patient is 
problematic because it interfere with clinical decision-making process.   
According to WHO (2002), strengthening patient (citizen) power policies and action 
is expected to enhance quality and accessibility to healthcare services. The World 
Bank (2004) outlined that amplifying patients’ voices in healthcare delivery 
decisions provides some hope to improving performance because of the supposed 
role in providing information that links together performance, rewards and sanctions. 
The patient rights approach to service delivery has also been advocated in other 
developing countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Brazil and South Africa. Despite the 
fact that the issue of patient power and rights in service delivery in health and 
education has, in recent years, been rife, and increasingly seen as an important 
component of international development and specifically social or health policy 
(Filmer et al, 2000), there are no clear parameters regarding the practice. For 
example, Gauri (2003) found that the operation of patient power remains vague, 
impractical, or self-defeating because of imperfect structural rigidities in many 
developing countries that make assurance of patient power problematic. The 
conclusion based on the above results suggests that, in spite of the ambitious 
potentials of patient power, there is no certainty that it is a quick fix for healthcare 
delivery performance challenges in Nigeria. The views of frontline workers and their 
operational managers suggest that it contradicts their professional knowledge and 
decisions and leads to tensions, thus, its effectiveness remains inconclusive and open 
to debate. 
In general, all workers except the top-level managers believed that they are losing 
their status and professional identity in decision-making processes that shape their 
work. Giddens (1991: 53) highlighted in his discourse that self-identify is a reflexive 
construction of agents (i.e. workers) based on their perceived position, space, control 
of, and access to, resources. While the issue of reform effects on motivation will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7, the results point out here that workers’ views and 
construction about their professional identity, arising from the perception of being 
under control and regulation, suggest a feeling of [de]motivation. It is, however, 
important to emphasise that one positive perception of the reform design and 
implementation structure is that it provided the mechanisms for aligning interest and 
motive for compliance. This has had a positive effect in terms of holding workers to 
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account and ensuring that they follow the rules and, in particular, provide 
information to their clients.  
The results as presented in this section have provided evidence which suggests how 
workers’ narrative and conceptualisation of power relationships contribute to 
providing a nuanced account of their endemic psychological attitude, behaviour and 
perception of the reform. The results indicate that workers believe that the operation 
of SERVICOM exerts control over their healthcare practice. Of course, workers 
cannot effectively practice without a form of control, but the results of this study 
point to the suggestion that the perceived lack of participation and control of 
professional activities by non-clinical, bureaucratic managers weakens the 
effectiveness of health providers. It is hoped that these results will serve as a focal 
point that could drive a rethink and debate by examining issues raised about the 
policy design and implementation.  
This section has offered some useful insights on workers’ perceptions and responses 
to the reform process, with particular focus on the reform design and implementation 
structure. It draws from the first theme that emerges in the analysis (i.e. power 
relations). The next section (Section 6.3) focuses on the operation of the reform 
contents and especially draws from the construct of trust as the second important 
theme.  
 
6.3 The Reform Contents and Relationship among Organisational 
Actors  
 
Section 6.2 presented an account of how different categories of health workers 
perceive the reform with respect to its design and implementation. The section 
related to how ‘elitist power relations’ (Lukes, 2005; Sutton, 1999) associated with 
the reform design and implementation excluded the workers from active 
involvement and decision-making processes that shaped the reform. This section 
provides a more detailed and micro-level analysis of the reform process. 
Specifically, it analyses and discusses doctors’, nurses’, and managers’ views of the 
operation of the reform elements such as performance targets, performance 
measurement, and performance-related-pay incentives. It also examines interactions 
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and relationships between policy implementers (i.e. SERVICOM) and hospital 
workers. The approach is discursive in that attempts are repeatedly made to place the 
texts and issues within the context in which the workers articulate their views.  
 
Unlike Section 6.2, which focuses mainly on the theme of power relations, this 
section draws from the concept of trust which emerges as the second important 
theme.  As noted in Section 6.1, trust relates to the reliance of one actor (trustor) on 
the part of another actor (trustee) that the trustee will act on the best interests of the 
trustor (Hosmer, 1995). Drawing from past studies, (e.g. Meyer et al, 2002; Meyer 
and Allen, 1997; Meyer et al, 1995), trust influences, and very likely, enhances an 
individual’s perception of commitment, fairness and behaviour within the 
organisation where they work. There are different dimension of trust that emerge. 
This relates to the trust workers have among themselves and their managers, and the 
trust they and their managers have in the reformers and the implementers (i.e. 
SERVICOM). Kramer (1999) found that trust in organisations and social 
interactions increases the likelihood of achieving shared goals, and is, thus, very 
important in achieving organisational or reform effectiveness.  
 
This section consists of three main subsections. Section 6.3.1 examines how the 
workers perceive the operation of the reform elements. The workers’ views are 
expressed in terms of benefits (advantages) and costs (disadvantages). Section 6.3.2 
presents an analysis of workers’ views of the associated interpersonal relationship 
and interactions inherent in the operation of the reform elements. Section 6.3.3 
presents the discussions and conclusions.  
6.3.1 The Content of the Reform 
This section presents the analysis of the reform content focusing on performance 
target culture (Section 6.3.1.1); performance measurement, including its associated 
elements such as performance ranking and public disclosure of performance reports 
(Section 6.3.1.2); performance-related-pay (PRP) (Section 6.3.1.3); and Section 
6.3.1.4 presents the discussions and conclusions. 
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6.3.1.1 Performance Target Culture  
Extensive literature, particularly from business accounting management, has been 
concerned with setting performance targets or measures to facilitate the 
measurement and monitoring of activities and behaviour of workers and 
organisational activities (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Neely, 1999). There is, however, 
little evidence to demonstrate the practice in public health settings especially in a 
developing country context like Nigeria.  
During the interviews held with regard to this study, it was understood that the 
introduction of performance is perceived by the frontline workers and their 
managers to present both benefits and costs of targets, to themselves, to their 
profession and to the hospital, these benefits and costs are referred to below as 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Advantages  
All the hospital personnel including hospital top-level managers, operational 
managers, and clinical staff interviewed talked about a range of advantages arising 
from the operation of the targets. Four main themes emerged and are presented in 
Table 6.1 below, using extracts from individual interviews to exemplify the themes.  
Table 6.1 Advantages  of performance targets (PT) 
Strategic management 
and leadership tool 
Where there is no vision, there is no direction.  PT is good because 
they provide us with a vision, direction and mission which guide us to 
knowing and doing what government want (Male Operational Manager 
HOM3) 
Align workers’ interest 
to government 
corporate objective  
A target culture has helped to know the demands placed on us and the 
expectations from our patients (now clients) and this help us to 
maximise benefits for patients (Doctor HWD2 
Provide focus on 
customers 
A lot has improved because of the waiting time target. For example the 
timeliness of access to healthcare services has improved (Doctor 
HWD2) 
 
All eyes are on the targets and how they can be achieved. This has 
helped us to see our work clearly and to make sure that workers are 
doing the right thing to service customers (Female Operational 
Manager HOM4) 
Yardstick for 
measuring performance  
Targets are touchstones used to measure our performance. Nowadays 
we use targets to assess workers for promotion purposes (Male 
Operational Manager HOM3) 
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While these extracts demonstrate a general agreement on each of the themes, in 
practice, it was possible to distinguish the perspectives of each category of 
personnel.  All the managers, including top-level, demonstrated in the interviews an 
appreciation of the strategic position of a target culture in the health reform. They 
were more likely, therefore, to talk about the role of targets in providing direction 
and vision than anything else. Operational staff, including the lower-level managers 
were especially interested in the value of targets for facilitating effective 
coordination of work practices. Operational managers spoke more about targets 
providing a yardstick against which worker performance and assessment could be 
measured, whereas, among the frontline doctors and nurses, half indicate that targets 
are regarded as signalling movement towards meeting government objectives. On 
the contrary, the interview results suggested that frontline doctors and nurses were 
less likely to mention the advantages. 
Disadvantages   
Frontline doctors and nurses, including operational managers were more ambivalent 
about the benefits of a target culture in spite of their ability to point to the 
advantages. Table 6.2 summarises the range of views of the disadvantages of 
performance targets to healthcare practice.  
Table 6.2 Disadvantages of  performance targets (PT) 
Reductionist view of 
complex process procedure  
Our work is complex. At times when you are in the clinic room, you do 
not know what to expect because most of our patients do not have 
appointments before they come. Targets suggest that service provision 
is more straightforward. This is problematic for our work (Doctor 
HWD21) 
 
We are not factory workers. Our outputs are not generated 
automatically. There are a lot of processes and interactions involved in 
our work. In this new culture, we are pushed here and there to see 
customers and turn them out as fast as possible.  Delivering care is not 
like fixing a car; it involves a series of processes and diagnosis. 
SERVICOM as the implementing agency is obviously only interested in 
outcomes (Doctor HWD26) 
Incomplete and inaccurate 
picture of hospital work 
process 
Government just selected the targets based on what they think we do 
and therefore many things we do are not covered. They talk about 
waiting time and nothing about facilities, clinical processes and quality 
(Operational Manager HOM11)  
 
PTs neglect important areas of work (e.g. quality and relationships) 
and there is paucity of data to measure even those outlined targets 
(Doctor HWD1) 
 
Our activities are wide-ranging but the targets do not cover all we do. 
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We nurses no longer spend enough time interacting and engaging with 
patients. This is not good for a caring profession like nursing (Nurse 
HWN28) 
 
There is a general view amongst doctors and nurses that a target culture is 
deterministic and does not provide the ‘whole or big picture’ of what healthcare 
practice is. Thus, the recurring negative perception of the workers suggests that a 
target culture undermines ‘holistic or comprehensive care’. Contrary to the 
indication that a target culture is about results, workers (e.g. Female Doctor 
HWD26) are of the view that targets treat their practice as if it were a machine or 
factory operation where causes and effects can be readily identified. In their view, 
health care practice is a complex process that involves identifying possible causes, 
often from unclear symptoms being experienced by people who are anxious about 
their health and who need to have confidence in the skills of the services providers 
but also need assurance of their caring interest i.e. the process components of health 
care. Another widely held reported disadvantage of performance targets is that it 
prioritises and standardises healthcare work: the conceptualisation of performance 
targets demonstrates a structurally-imposed rule and a mechanical approach to 
change which did not recognise the dynamic nature of healthcare work. Informants 
articulated this as a strong limitation entrenched in the target culture.  
 
6.3.1.2 Performance Measurement  
Performance measurement emerged as a key element of the performance 
management process (Adair et al, 2006; Epstein, 2009; Smith et al, 2009). The 
workers interviewed expressed differing views about the concept, process, 
appropriateness and relevance of this process to healthcare practice. A very 
experienced operational manager summed up the objective of performance 
measurement thus:    
This government introduced a mechanism for measuring performance and 
ensuring that workers and the hospital organisation comply with the national 
targets. By measuring performance, government wants to provide information 
to guide its operations and to facilitate timely and fair access to quality health 
care services (Operational Manager HOM5) 
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Advantages  
All respondents recognised the value of the information and communication 
feedback provided by performance measurement in that this information enhances 
accountability and, therefore, provides a means of recognising good and bad 
performance. The frontline workers, as well as their operational managers, suggested 
that performance information facilitates individual promotion in addition to 
providing a means of addressing grievances and complaints from patients (clients or 
customers) as summarised in Table 6.3 below.  
 Table 6.3 Advantages of  performance measurement (PM) 
Recognises good and bad 
performers and facilitates 
good management  
Through PM, management can see what is working and what is not 
working. The process helps us to identify future leaders or managers. It 
also enhances our capacity to effectively manage the hospital because it 
help us to direct workers toward the achievement of government 
corporate objective (Male top-level Manager HEM6)  
Provides information Because of PM, we are now providing information to customers such as 
leaflets, self-directed signs to facilitate identification, access to and 
choice of services. It assists patient understanding of what we do and 
how to access our services( Operational Manager HOM6) 
Enhances operational 
accountability 
Since this PM started, workers, managers and the hospital organisation 
as a whole are competing to perform well because everybody knows that 
they are being watched. So the public service is no longer a place where 
you do as you like. People have to suggest results for the money they 
earn (Operational Manager HOM4) 
 
They (government) are using them (SERVICOM) to monitor our work. 
People are now conscious of that they do and say (Male doctor HWD8) 
Facilitate assessment for 
individual promotion 
Things have changed. If you do well, you are rewarded or shamed or 
even shown the door. In fact promotion is no longer only based on 
seniority and length of services. People now earn promotion by results 
that are visible to everyone (Operational Manager HOM8)  
 
One of my colleagues was promoted two steps because the PM report 
identified her as a good worker. A lot of people are working hard to be 
promoted. This merit award is also creating an incentive to guide 
managers’ decisions about promotion of staff working under them 
(Nurse HWN18) 
Addresses complaints and 
grievances 
Because of PM, customers can now make complaints about the services 
they receive, and even make recommendations on how services can be 
improved. All cases are treated promptly and bad behaviour is punished 
by query, written warning, and even demotion or suspension of salary 
(Operational Manager HOM2) 
 
For managers at all levels, PM reports provide a gauge that suggests how, and to 
what extent, they have achieved their targets. The claim that the process facilitates 
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information and communication between workers and patients indicates an 
improvement in operational efficiency. One operational manager noted:   
Before the reform, people were always crowded at the Outpatient Unit but 
since information has been provided, patients follow the signs to points where 
they will receive attention (Operational Manager HOM7)  
One nurse (HWN4) stated that because of performance measurement, “We are now 
providing information to customers to guide their access to and choice of services”. 
Other frontline doctors and nurses consistently reported that information to 
customers has improved. While workers consider this important, yet, they equally 
think that information to customers needs to be well guided and relevant to customer 
needs. All the six top-level managers interviewed confirmed this and noted that 
providing information is in line with the Social Charter more informed customers 
mean enhanced timely, fair and honest services. The responses reported here suggest 
that the operation of PM has introduced changes in the reward system with rewards 
being attached to individuals and in theory reflecting individual efforts and 
performance. On the subject of rewards, details of the perceptions of the informants 
about performance related pay are presented in Section 6.7.  
Disadvantages of performance measurement  
As evident in the reported texts presented earlier, views were also expressed as to 
why performance measurement is detrimental to healthcare practice. These views 
are categorised and presented in three themes in Table 6.4 below. 
Table 6.4 Disadvantages of performance measurement (PM) 
Undermines professional 
autonomy and discretion  
We no longer do this work as we know it. “They” (government) set 
the targets and use “them” (SERVICOM) to enforce it on us 
(Doctor HWD19) 
 
Patients now take us for granted. This is because they feel that the 
policy has empowered them to query what we do (Nurse HWN29) 
Costly and time-consuming  Government has been spending a lot on SERVICOM. We believe 
that this money would have been more effectively used in improving 
our facilities and providing better drugs and medical supplies.  
Besides, the PM process is too administrative and is time 
consuming (Union representative)  
Reduces time with patients There are a lot of deadlines to our work. Yet we are now wasting 
appreciable time – sometimes when I calculate it is just like we 
spend 30-40% of our time - filling forms and these forms are very 
boring. I do not think we are doing well in reaching out to, and 
discussing with patients in the wards because there is inadequate 
time to spend with patients. Everything has to be done very fast 
nowadays (Nurse HWN14) 
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Our staff members do not have enough time to consult with patients 
and engage them in a meaningful dialogue to fully dig out and 
know their problems (Operational Manager HOM1) 
 
The interviews suggest that the costs or disadvantages of performance measurement 
were widespread, especially among frontline doctors and nurses. Among the 
common concerns about the reform is that performance measurement operates as a 
‘control and regulatory’ measure and undermines professional autonomy and 
decision-making processes in healthcare.  
As already noted, the primary goal of performance measurement is to improve 
health service delivery. Worker ranking and public disclosure of individual 
performance information is described in the reform as a ‘naming and shaming’ 
process. During the interviews, the respondents articulated the advantages and 
disadvantages of this process. The results suggest that performance ranking, as noted 
by ten out of sixteen managers interviewed said it encourages individual initiative 
and talents. For example, one of the operational managers said:  
What this reform has done is that it categorises workers into good and bad 
performers, and this provides a means of identifying workers that merit 
reward and even promotion. This is a smart idea compared to how we 
recommended workers for promotion before the reform. This was based on the 
personal recommendation of managers and was often fraught with the human 
factor and even bias. It is no longer enough reason to say that a worker 
should be promoted based on length of service and seniority. The worker 
performance status has to be evident (Operational Manager HOM9) 
One of the top-level managers also said: 
The system as outlined by government is providing a straightforward 
comparison of workers. This is encouraging workers not to be lazy but to work 
hard (Top-level Manager HEM5) 
The responses demonstrate that operational managers view naming and shaming as a 
critical human resource management strategy for talent management. It signals to 
managers and management how workers are doing, and serves as an information 
feedback loop to guide managers in making promotion decisions. One senior doctor 
spoke in support of naming and shaming and noted: ‘I think that the process is not 
too bad because it communicates our performance back to us’ (Doctor HWD9).  
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The results of analysis also show that the naming and shaming process were related 
to public disclosure of performance reports and ranking. More doctors than nurses 
referred to this practice as exposing their profession to public view, which is one of 
the objectives of the health sector reform. The way managers spoke about the public 
disclosure of performance reports reinforces the earlier claim that performance 
measurement generally has had a positive contribution towards enhancing 
accountability and transparency. The following statements of a top-level manager 
and an operational manager are evidence of this:   
 The publication of performance information has been important in many 
ways. It provides us with a report card of our work where we have done well 
and where we need improvement. We are learning from our performance 
reports - we want to identify our shortcomings and to maximise our results 
(Top-level Manager HEM2) 
Our stakeholders (government and customers) want to know how we are 
performing. This is also an indication of how well we are using government 
resources and optimising government objectives. For our workers, the public 
disclosure of those who did well is a means of telling everybody what they do 
and encouraging better performance (Operational Manager HOM2) 
A third of the frontline workers interviewed spoke about the process as encouraging 
individual efforts, and facilitate the provision of information to patients.  
I think that disclosing information about our work has made workers to be 
more careful of what they do. People no longer hang their dirty washing in 
public. Everybody is working hard, and being careful in the way they do their 
work, particularly in relating to patients or clients (Nurse HWN21)   
It is not only about information regarding who has performed well. Public 
reporting of information means that we are now expected, and we are 
providing, information to guide patients (Doctor HWD5) 
The frontline doctors and nurses and their managers also spoke extensively about 
some operational effects of the reform elements discussed above. These are 
discussed in Section 6.3.2 and Section 6.4. 
 
 6.3.1.3 Performance-Related Pay (PRP) 
The wider literature on performance-related pay (PRP) suggests that it is an 
emerging issue particularly presented to service organisations as a way of enhancing 
the motivation and effectiveness of frontline workers (Richardson, 1999; Lazear, 
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2000; Chamberlin et al, 2002). During the interviews, both workers and their 
managers expressed their views on the advantages and disadvantages of PRP with 
respect to healthcare practice: PRP is regarded as the climax of the performance 
measurement, ranking, and disclosure process.  
Advantages of PRP   
During the interviews, respondents, and particularly the managers, expressed a 
consistent view regarding PRP as an incentive system based on merit (Table 6.5).  
Table 6.5 Advantages  of performance-related pay (PRP) 
Incentive based on individual 
merit 
Before the reform, people were hardly encouraged to go the extra 
mile in their work because there was no extra reward for doing this. 
This government has introduced this performance- related pay to 
compensate for hard work. Days are gone when few are doing the 
work and many are sitting on the fence and still receiving their 
salaries. Performance-related pay motivates people to perform 
better. In addition to this financial incentive/ reward, they are also 
compensated by improved status and promotion. It has introduced a 
culture of meritocracy (Top-level Manager HEM6) 
 
In the public service, pay, status and promotion is very important to 
every worker. The performance-related-pay (i.e. PRP) is making 
workers more responsive. It gives one a peace of mind to work hard 
since good performance is rewarded, and there is drive among 
workers to perform. Workers are paying attention to doing what 
they think  will earn them an award (Doctor HWD2) 
 
Strategic incentive for 
effective human resource 
management 
PRP is purposeful because it focuses on improving performance. 
For us managers, it is not only about identifying outstanding 
performers and rewarding them, it is also about identifying future 
managers (Operational Manager HOM2) 
 
It has introduced an incentive system based on performance to 
replace long experience and status as criteria for promotion 
(Operational Manager HOM6) 
Organisation aims/goals 
become the priority of the 
workers  
PRP encourages individual focus on the goals of the organisation. 
As we focus on wining an award, it means also that one is 
committed to achieving the targets. This also means that one is more 
productive and more efficient (Operational Manager HOM11) 
 
Hospital managers (HOM2 and HOM6) perceive PRP as a strategic management 
approach set out to encourage individual innovativeness. Frontline workers also 
perceive PRP as an incentive. For example, one of the nurses reported:  
When you think about the PRP in terms of the immediate monetary reward 
attached, it is not a big deal. What is making people talk is the fact that when 
you win an award, you could get instant promotion. Promotion matters 
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because in the end, your salary, your position, and your status will change 
(Nurse HWN27) 
The operational evidence of the relationship between PRP and health worker 
motivation is presented in Section 6.4. Here, the individual worker and manager 
reports indicate concerns about PRP and suggest that it has resulted in practice 
which is detrimental to good health care. The details of these disadvantages are 
presented below in Table 6.6.  
 
Disadvantages of PRP 
Table 6.6 Disadvantages of Performance Related Pay (PRP) 
Undermines ‘traditional’ 
public service ethos  
I came into this job because I wanted to serve, but from what I am 
seeing, somebody can be cherry-picked for coming early to work for 
example, and be given double promotion over others. This is not good. 
While you are there serving and doing your best, others who may be 
lucky to be seen, or who blow their trumpet will be promoted. When you 
are not recognised, commitment to serve is nonsense since we are told 
that this will not be rewarded. I feel really bad about this (Nurse 
HWN13)  
Strengthens individualism 
which undermines 
cooperation and teamwork 
In this work, we need each other. Doctors need nurses. But this reform is 
bringing in an individual focus. People hardly help each other especially 
if it does not contribute to their immediate gain (Doctor HWD9) 
 
I think that PRP is encouraging individual effort and thus undermining 
teamwork. Those who did not win an award often become envious and 
jealous, and this reduces their willingness to cooperate with colleagues 
and even makes them see us managers as their enemies (Operational 
Manager HOM5) 
 
The responses here firstly suggest a possible link between the operation of PRP and 
individual worker performance. The way the workers spoke about PRP suggests a 
disagreement about whether differential pay for performance should be for 
individual workers or for groups of workers.  Two thirds of the frontline doctors and 
nurses interviewed advocate group rewards arguing that healthcare work is rarely 
due to the effort of a single worker, but depends upon all workers. This, therefore, 
strengthens the argument that it is inappropriate to single out one worker for reward 
and leave out the others. The other third of the workers who were rather more in 
support of individual rewards said that if rewards are based on group effort, there is 
a possibility of ‘free rider effect’ in which some workers may slack off while others 
do the work, and yet all reap the benefits.  
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Overall, the results suggest that a number of thoughtful oppositions to PRP were 
presented by the workers and they were very articulate in their argument against the 
initiative. While the issues remain inconclusive and complicated, in some cases 
assumptions underlying the stated disadvantages of PRP relate to the perceived 
implications such an initiative has brought into healthcare work practice. The results 
suggest that the majority of those who spoke against the initiatives claim that they 
have worked hard, and were disappointed because their names have not been 
recommended for award. This frustration raises questions about the procedural and 
distributional mechanism of PRP.  
6.3.2 Interpersonal relationships and trust among organisational 
actors 
 
It is widely recognised that ‘good’ relationships and trust are essential for efficient 
delivery of healthcare services (Gilson, 2003; Gilson et al, 2005; Gerekick and 
Fagin, 2005). The focus of interest is on relationships between the reform 
implementers (i.e. SERVICOM) and health workers, worker and worker or manager, 
and worker and patients. This section presents an account of how workers perceive 
the operation of the reform elements based on analysis and discussion that relates to 
issues of trust as the second important theme of analysis, as noted in Section 6.1. 
 
Despite the growing conceptualisation of policy as a change process, the true 
operations with respect to interactions and relationship among organisational actors 
remain largely unknown. The main trust-related issue surrounding the perception of 
the workers about the operation of the reform contents has to do, first, with their 
view of the lack of reliability and confidence in the capacity and honesty of the 
performance measurement process and distribution of performance-related 
incentives. When talking about SERVICOM, as noted in Section 6.2.2, hospital 
workers express doubt about performance measurement and the extent to which it 
could be said to be honest. Although it was difficult to find specific examples of 
dishonesty or corruption, it was widely acknowledged by the frontline hospital staff 
(doctors, nurses and managers) that the performance measurement operation is far 
from perfect. One operational manager was of the view that concern for 
trustworthiness and honesty is a systemic issue:    
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There are so many rumours that government institutions are not easily trusted. 
Sometimes they are viewed as being under external influence, or it is argued 
that they watch but cannot see, or that they see but cannot understand, or that 
they understand but are corrupt. Overall, our institutions are not always 
reliable (Male Operational Manager HOM1) 
Commenting on the lack of trust in the performance reports for example, a senior 
doctor said: 
I do not think the reports say much about the clinical quality of our work. For 
me the best thing about healthcare practice is for a report to tell us whether 
the clinical procedures have been improved to enhance quality care. They 
[SERVICOM] just computed their reports based on what the customers told 
them. These data are not available for verification. It is bad that the 
benchmarking is not about our healthcare process and procedure (Doctor 
HWD3) 
 
The results suggest that there are believable rumours that the operation of the reform 
elements lacks procedural transparency. Commenting on the issue, two operational 
managers provided supplementary information to these claims and asserted:  
It is hard to make workers believe that the rating judgement which classify 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ worker is sound and unbiased. Yet, the fact that the 
judgement determines who gets rewarded and who does not means a lot. I 
realised that whenever a worker feels that a colleague has been judged to 
have performed better, and has as a result received an award, a feeling of 
being cheated sets in. The workers see the manager as wicked and corrupt 
(Operational Manager HOM16) 
 We also find it difficult to accept that the performance assessment is as simple 
as presented. As a manager, I think that the fundamental problem is in the 
development of good standards based on our clinical experience. Many people 
do not trust that the performance measures truly represent our work. There is 
problem of developing yardstick that will capture what “we” think make up a 
good worker and not what “they” think (Female Operational Manager 
HOM10) 
One senior (experienced) doctor express the view that the process of measuring 
performance cannot be trusted because it is a “secret”. This doctor explained how 
government activities are often categorised as secret, in many ways precipitating 
doubt and rumours of dishonesty. This senior doctor said: 
The central issue is that our work is not as segregated as presented. It is 
difficult to separate one activity from another. You cannot measure the efforts 
of the nurse in the ward or the doctor in the consulting room. They do so many 
things which are not in the targets and which outsiders do not know. I think 
that it is just inappropriate to treat us as if we are industrial workers. Clearly, 
it would have been good to do so if data is available (Doctor HWD3) 
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Five other doctors said that, if given the opportunity, they would have liked to query 
the process. This is because, as one of the doctors stated, the reform assessment and 
ranking is not representative of our efforts; I cannot trust it (Doctor HWD39). 
Overall, the issue of lack of trust in the process was widely supported by frontline 
doctors and nurses. During the analysis, there was a growing sense that performance 
target culture is a selective process which does not provide a ‘big picture’ of their 
work. Related to this is the acceptance that performance targets did not take account 
of the practical aspect of their work, especially as it relates to clinical procedures, 
standards and practice. The results raise significant questions about how to develop 
performance measures, including how to measure the performance of individual 
workers in order to develop a long-lasting and effective measurement that will 
enhance healthcare delivery. It significantly suggests that the performance 
measurement initiative did not realistically reflect the reality of healthcare work. It 
also indicates that the measured effectiveness of all the workers is not exact; thus, 
the process is seen by the workers as unreliable. The results did not in any way say 
that the principle is bad, but largely demonstrated an existing gap between the 
prescription of policy and the functioning. 
 
The results also suggest that the validity of performance measurement is an issue 
that is open to debate. This is widely highlighted in literature (Propper et al, 
2008a/b; Bevan and Hood, 2006a/b; Andrew et al, 2006). For example, Andrew et al 
(2006) found that performance measurement issues are often controversial because 
of its subjective nature. With respect to validity, this study’s analysis draws from 
Potter and Wetherrel (1987) to gain more insight into the interpretations of the 
workers. Potter and Wetherrel (1987) provide four useful and concise summaries of 
the ways in which validity of interpretation could be considered in the context of the 
present analysis. The first refers to the extent to which the performance 
measurement process is believed by the workers to be suitable to their practice. The 
second relates to the extent to which the performance measurement process is 
believed to have engaged their views and captured what it seeks to do, and in 
particular what the workers do. This also relates to the third idea, which is about the 
perception of comprehensiveness of the performance measurement process in 
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revealing or providing believable evidence about the ‘big picture’ of what the 
workers actually do in their work.  
 
Finally, there is another interpretation of validity which has to do with the extent to 
which it can be said that the reform has solved problems or created new problems of 
its own. There is consensus among the workers that performance measurement and 
its elements cannot be trusted because there is no convincing evidence to 
demonstrate that it has actually solved the problem of improving healthcare service 
delivery. This is primarily because of the belief among frontline workers that it fails 
to provide accounts for clinical issues, skill development, and infrastructural 
improvement which the frontline workers construe as critical factors to their success.  
The results suggest that issues about the operation of the reform elements have 
certainly raised questions about how bureaucratic ideas attempt to shape the actions 
of clinical workers and work practice, which could be interesting to pursue.  
 
In general, and considering the above, the results did not provide convincing 
evidence to demonstrate that the workers trust that the performance measurement 
process and its associated elements provide a valid assessment of healthcare work 
practice. The results suggest that the way in which the workers outlined their lack of 
trust in the validity of the performance measurement and the believed difficulty in 
measuring the performance of healthcare workers, present a powerful message to 
policy-makers. The results also indicate that the clinicians perceived the process to 
be inaccurate, and inconsistent with the circumstances of their work practice. 
Although operational managers were somewhat reserved and reluctant to accept the 
issues of distrust and validity ten out of the sixteen managers who commented said 
that the process was not perfect, suggesting room for improvement. The results 
imply that central to the issue of trust is the relationship between hospital workers, 
and external policy implementers (i.e. SERVICOM) of the reform.  
 
Overall, the above results suggest that erosion of trust associated with the reform 
process seem to have had a negative impact on the performance of the health 
workers in the hospital. The results suggest that mistrust strengthens individualism, 
which undermines team spirit and professional ethics of community service. The 
results correlate with the view of other studies (Spence et al, 2001; Gilson, 2003; 
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Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003; and Gilson et al, 2005; Rowe and Calnan, 2006) 
and conclude that perceived mistrust in organisational relationships very likely has 
implications for the effectiveness and performance of the hospital. Akindele et al 
(2005), providing a macro assessment of the political economy of Nigeria, found 
that breakdown of trust results in increased transaction cost. This has also been 
reported by Collier (2008), and Gore and Pratton (2003), who found that increased 
transaction cost creates room for hidden actions and rent-seeking behaviour in public 
transactions. The negative implications of mistrust have also been reported in other 
context, as being destructive to public and social transactions (Greif, 2000; O’Neil, 
2002). Other studies, such as Lindenberg (2000), Putnam (2000) and Haque (2001), 
found that mistrust in service-oriented organisations contribute to the breakdown of 
altruistic behaviour, which is a valued ethic of public service. This implies that 
mistrust could have potential negative implications for the performance of the 
hospital. 
 
In terms of the similarities and diffrences in how different categories of workers 
responded tio the reform, managers were more positive about PM than frontline 
workers. Among the frontline workers, doctors were less positive than nurses. Also, 
male workers (doctor or nurse or among the managers) were more vocal in their 
views than female workers.  
 
6.4 Workers’ Resistance and Non-Compliance with the Reform  
This section presents an account of workers’ and managers’ resistance and non-
compliance with the policy. During the interviews, all the top-level managers 
expressed significant support for the reform, and were very optimistic about the 
policy changes, describing them as desirable and appropriate. One of them 
characterised workers who attempt to resist the policy changes as old-fashioned and 
not having foresight.  
You see, whenever a good thing is about to happen, many who want to remain 
they way they are will always drag their feet and sometimes speak about it. 
This government has showed its preparedness to bring about this reform and 
we are optimistic that it will bring about lasting solution to the way people do 
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government and particularly address the problem of poor performance in the 
public service (Top-level Manager HEM3).  
From every indication, the top-level managers seem to have more information about 
government interests and showed a more positive attitude towards the policy 
changes than the operational managers and frontline doctors and nurses. Besides, 
during the interviews, many doctors and nurses referred to them (top-level managers 
or executives) as part of government.  
Meanwhile, although the operational managers and frontline doctors and nurses did 
express support for change; largely, they treated the way government went about it 
with scepticism. There was a great deal of emphasis among the frontline doctors and 
nurses, and their union representatives in particular, that the reform contradicts their 
practice and professional culture, or the way they do things in the hospital to provide 
services. One of the doctors echoed that saying: 
We did tell government through the communiqué our union sent in that the 
proposed change element contradict how we operate and what we think 
should be done to improve services, yet, they imposed it on us. We knew it was 
not going to be easy with us once the reform was implemented and we never 
felt that the way the outlined the reform will ever benefit our work, patient and 
hospital. They and their contracted consultants were very chauvinistic about 
the reform and did claim that they were right. That was why we went on strike 
to defend our views (Doctor HWD9)  
Evidences from interview with frontline nurses support the above statement and 
suggest that they did not support the practice of the reform on the argument that it 
contradicts their professional practice. 
As noted in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3, the other reason behind inadequate support 
for the reform by frontline doctors and nurses was the claim of exclusion in the 
development of the reform especially with respect to the creation of the performance 
measures and implementation process. During interviews with the doctors’ and 
nurses’ union representatives, there was an indication of resistance to the policy 
changes. For example, the union did mobilise their members to embark on strike 
action on two occasions to express their discontentment. A member of the doctors’ 
union representative said:  
 We did express our annoyance. Our union members voted and embarked on a 
sit-down strike but government went on with the reform. We have had two 
rounds of strike. What government did was to go ahead with the reform and 
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even refused to pay our salary for the month we went on strike (Doctors’ 
Union representative)  
The nurses’ union representative also acknowledged their active resistance to the 
reform. Apart from the fear of the unknown, another reason given for expressions of 
resistance to the policy changes was the general feeling of being “left out” during the 
design of the performance measures used to direct and assess performance. Possibly 
even more important was the sense that the targets were being imposed by 
“outsiders” (both international and national consultants in addition to government 
bureaucrats). According to the union representative of the nurses:   
Politicians set targets based on what they claimed to know but in fact using 
consultants from abroad. They are not involving us and yet everyone is 
blaming us. You cannot use the same targets for all federal hospitals and 
hospitals are not the same as many other government bodies. Even patients 
suffer from different diseases requiring different care. We think that the whole 
process is a mismatch to our practice. These were part of the reasons we went 
on strike to protest against the reform (Nurses’ Union representative) 
Unlike doctors, who went on strike on two occasions, the nurses said they only went 
on strike once. The implication is that through the strikes, doctors and nurses openly 
resisted and questioned the rationale of the reform, particularly expressing their lack 
of support for the way the government went about the reform. One of the nurses 
said: 
I must confess, I feel somewhat demoralized when we realised that the reform 
was just about effort by government to take over our work and hand us over to 
non-clinicians or administrators. That is why some of us openly supported and 
voted for the strike. During our union meeting, everybody was pissed off about 
the whole arrangement. Yes, despite the strike they still implemented the 
reform (Nurse HWN 10) 
A doctor also reiterated this sentiment saying:  
A number of things concern us…I mean the way government decided not to 
involve us, they excommunicated us from negotiation the changes in the way 
we do out work, and about our pay. There are many assumptions made by the 
politicians and the reformers. Well I just do not buy into the idea that was why 
we embarked on strike. There is no doubt they did not listen to us, yet we made 
our views clear. In fact, the whole reform is wrapped up in politics, and 
politicians hardly listen to professionals. They just do not know what we are 
talking about, because they are not part of us (Doctor HWD7) 
The above statements constitute a form of resistance, a gentle and invisible fight of 
ideology and mind-set between clinicians and non-clinicians or politicians.  During 
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the interviews, apart from the visible forms of active resistance reported above, there 
were also elements of passive resistance, though these were more difficult to detect. 
However, the analysis shows that other forms of lack of support run through the 
texts and relate to workers’ expressions made manifest in the tone of their voice, 
body language, and in the way they often use rumours and gossip to say negative 
things about the reform. As noted in Section 6.2, the fact that workers regularly 
address the reform as ‘government policy’ and the expression of the ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
mind-set provides indications of passive resistance. While the reform as a change 
process remains inevitable, the clinicians argue that the operation of the reform was 
not in the best interests of the patients, clinicians and the public hospitals.  
The operational managers reinforced the views of the doctors and nurses, and 
acknowledged that fear of the unknown also contributed to the strike action.  One 
senior manager said: 
Apart from the understanding that the reform proposal was top-down, people 
were disoriented about reform and were always making reference to similar 
reforms implemented under the structural adjustment programme in the 1980s 
impacted negatively on public service work culture, incentive and our welfare. 
I just think that many people were afraid and then we did not even have 
enough information about what the reform seeks to do (Operational Manager 
HOM6) 
Another manager was of the view that the reform process seem too radical and 
structural, and was being introduced too quickly.  
The results show that while change is inevitable, the fear of the unknown and 
uncertainty about the operation and outcome of change were primary reasons behind 
the expression of resistance to the reform. As noted by Cumming and Worley (2005) 
change involves moving from the known to the unknown, and because the future is 
always uncertain and may adversely affect people’s competence, worth and coping 
abilities, resistance is inevitable. So, readiness to accept the change and to make 
workers comply will depend on how well they are carried along or how they 
understand the change with respect to their work and wellbeing. As noted by 
Armenakis et al (1993), readiness to accept change or resistance influences the 
effectiveness of realising the change goals. The results show that frontline doctors 
and nurses, and including their managers and union, resisted the reform because of 
perceived inconsistencies with existing work culture and healthcare practice. This 
148 
 
result correlates with the work of Kotter (1996), which found that people resist 
change because of fear and believe that it contradicts the way they do things in their 
organisations. The claims that frontline workers and their managers, seem not to 
have had a clear vision and understanding of the reform reiterates the implication of 
their exclusion in the development of the reform. Kotter (1996) also found how 
inadequate communication of change proposal across different categories of 
organisational actors results in resistance, and could even undermine or block the 
effectiveness of organisational change.  
The results gleaned from additional interviews with managers and frontline doctors 
and nurses suggest that despite the fact that they did not give their full support to the 
reform and even resisted it, they had no option but to comply since they have no 
other jobs and remain government employees. A quote from one of the frontline 
doctors is suggestive of this:  
Traditionally, we are like a married woman in a house, you just have to follow 
your husband or you go back to your parents. The reform is government 
policy, and we are government employees. Besides, individuals are winning 
awards or receiving sanctions (e.g.as a result of a query) based on an 
assessment of how well they comply with the targets. People are making 
efforts whether they like the policy or not, to behave well. The problem is that 
following the rule is not everything (Doctor HWD20) 
A senior manager said: 
Government has said that there is no going back to the reform. People were 
afraid of losing their jobs, even during the strike, the fact that after the first 
strike people were not paid their salary for embarking on strike against 
government plan was enough warning not to avoid the reform. Besides 
government at that time was also talking about downsizing the public 
workforce and even privatising other public sectors as it has done in 
telecommunications and power sector as part of cost-saving measures 
(Operational Manager HOM10) 
 
During the interviews, it was evident that all workers acknowledged the need for 
change, they seem uninformed about the policy development process, arguing that 
they were not involved. They also complained that the development process was not 
properly communicated to them, and they did not express their thoughts, 
professional meaning and decisions about the reform, thus leading to either 
information distortion or misinterpretation of the vision and goals of the change as 
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presented by the policy reformers. These issues of non-involvement are well 
outlined in Section 6.2.  
Another main source of resistance deals with experiences which leaves a pessimistic 
image of reform, and in which many treat the reform with scepticism. The evidence 
of a reactive mind-set, and inclination that the reform will not provide an add-on 
positive effect to clinical practice and professional improvement of the workers 
posed an inevitable obstacle and provided reasons for expressed resistance. The 
workers did express pessimistic views about the reform and argued that it is not 
consistent with their professional values, and they fear that it challenges the status 
quo embedded in their professional practice and work routines. The results of this 
study correlate with past studies (e.g. Goldstein and Burke, 1991; Kruger, 1996; 
Klein and Sorra, 1996), which found that fear that proposed change initiatives will 
pose challenges to existing status quo provide evidence that support the reasons why 
organisational actors resist change, which consequently undermine the realisation of 
change objectives.   
Further analysis shows that doctors, who are mainly male, showed more expressions 
of resistance towards the reform than nurses, who are mainly female. Even male 
managers were more forceful in their expressions of lack of support than their 
female counterparts. One doctor provided useful information relating to why doctors 
seem to be more concerned and said, “Yes, we should be more affected by the reform 
because the demands associated with the reform do restrict or reduce the chances of 
doing private practice” (Doctor HDW30). It is, however, important to point out that 
inadequate forcefulness in the way nurses express their views comparative to their 
doctor colleagues did not in any way suggest that their voice about the reform has no 
weight. Although this study did not uncover the reasons, further information 
provided by three doctors and five nurses demonstrated that this seems to relate to 
wider narratives regarding gender differences, professional identity- in which 
doctors for example seem to command more power than nurses, and culture -in 
which women are construed as less aggressive than men. This seems to demonstrate 
another important form of power structure in the hospital.  
In addition, with respect to differences in culture and tradition, it would have been 
out of place to see a female nurse speaking more forcefully than a male nurses or 
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doctor who may have been her husband working in the same hospital. During the 
interviews, and particularly with respect to an interview with a senior doctor 
conducted at his home and also with another senior female nurse working in the 
same hospital who happens to be the wife of the doctor, it was observed that though 
the nurse voiced her views, she was rather subtle in her expressions. The tone of 
voice and body language of the nurse did suggest that she was not feeling open to 
speaking out in the presence of her husband. These issues are complicated and need 
further research, but the results show that there was a greater resistance to 
government reform amongst doctors compared to nurses. While the results seem 
patchy and perhaps highly inaccurate, there is an established dominant narrative that 
men are more vocal in public space than women (Rose, 1999; Garber, 2000; Ranade, 
2007).  
Although the reform was construed by the government as a considerable structural 
change set out to transform the way workers do their work, there were still signs of 
resistance, and non-compliance. The results identified four issues found to receive 
attention in this regard: (i) clinicians understood the reform as a top-down and 
imposed plan over their jobs and hospital organisation, thus creating tensions and 
dilemmas; (ii) hospital workers felt threatened about their professional identity and 
positions;  (iii) hospital workers did not see the reform elements as compatible with 
both the purpose of healthcare and the daily clinical decisions and work culture; (iv) 
many are sceptical about the reform process arguing that it was imported from 
abroad, and express conflict between their own professional views and those of 
policy reformers. Overall, the clinicians treated the reform with scepticism and 
claimed that its design and implementation did not actually capture what they think 
is the best practical way to bring about change in their work. 
In line with the earlier work of Luke (1974) and Foucault (1980) states that 
expressions of power and power relations seem to shape workers’ perceptions of, 
and resistance to, the reform. Jermier et al (1994) also found that expression of 
resistance to change represents a reactive process in which workers express 
discontentment because they did not want change to be imposed on them. The 
central message that drove worker resistance relates to perceived ambivalence, 
tension and dilemmas associated with the reform, which then was not properly 
understood or communicated. Drawing from sociological literature such as 
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DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977, the expression of resistance 
is a consequence of policy reform operating as a prevailing and rationalised 
conducts, and a form of formalised structure which challenges the existing status 
quo of the workers.  Townley (2002) found that change introduces competing 
rationalities which shift health workers’ understanding of their organisation, work 
and professional practice. There is a strong belief among frontline workers and 
managers that the reform process is inconsistent and not a useful way of 
transforming their professional culture especially as it relates to how they do their 
work and their clinical practice.  
Section 6.4 has provided an understanding of the issues surrounding managers’ and 
workers’ responses to the reform in terms of implicit and explicit expressions of 
resistance and non-compliance with the policy. The responses reveal that, despite the 
parliamentary support for the reform, frontline doctors and nurses explicitly or 
implicitly treated the reform with huge suspicion. The understanding that the public 
health workers did express their own rationality about the reform by engaging in 
strike action and even spoke about the reform as ‘government policy’ suggest an 
explicit and implicit form of non-compliance. Given that as public employees, 
government has an overriding legitimacy with respect to them. However, during the 
interviews frontline doctors and nurses did show obvious wry attitudes to the reform 
especially in the way they communicate their clinical ideas and the non-clinical 
perspectives of the reformers and implementers.  
The issue of worker resistance to change is not new. Yet when reviewed in the 
context of this study, there is an indication that the underlying argument surrounding 
worker resistance provides an arena that could shape further discourse and debate 
especially as it relates to how the perceived differences in interest and power 
asymmetry which run through the texts encourages resistance or non-compliance 
with policy.  
The results show how professional identify and differentiation in work culture 
influence individual perception of inclusion and exclusion in policy debate, relative 
position, and asymmetric relations in social power structure, and perhaps negotiating 
and coping mechanisms during change. The results have implications for public 
policy and suggest that, no matter how well policy may have been considered, it can 
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still be resisted. Therefore, there is a need to anticipate resistance to any change 
efforts, prepare for it, and make special plans to assess and deal with the resistance. 
This conclusion leads to the suggestion that how workers perceive change in the 
context of their individual position is a significant issue that reformers, implementers 
and managers should be aware of. While these issues remain interesting, this study 
did not explore them in detail. Nevertheless, the results add valuable insights that 
can contribute to our knowledge of understanding change and change management, 
especially in an organisation with differentiated work categorisations such as a 
service organisation or public hospital.   
The next chapter presents part two of the empirical data. It examines and discusses 
how health providers perceive the effects of the changes with respect to healthcare 
work, hospitals and practice. It presents empirical evidence and understanding of the 
perceived effects and consists of two principal themes, namely: (i) workload, 
efficiency and balance of duties (between clinical and administrative); and (ii) 
quality and quantity performance variables.  
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7 The Effects of the Reform on 
Health Workers 
 
7.1 Introduction  
While Chapters 5 detailed the way in which the policy reform was implemented in 
the case hospital organisation, FMCU, and Chapter 6 provided an account of how 
different categories of health workers perceive and respond to the reform process. 
The present chapter addresses part of the third research question of this thesis: how 
are different categories of workers in the hospital perceived the effects of the change 
processes?  It is argued in this thesis that since the health reforms relate directly to 
the behaviour or work practices of health workers, the way in which these workers 
experience the reforms in a specific work context is especially important for 
understanding policy processes. Although this chapter is also based on the 
perceptions of the workers, and sometimes overlap with issues presented in Chapter 
6, specifically, this chapter examines how health providers perceive the effects of the 
changes with respect to their health work, hospital and practice. It presents empirical 
evidence and understanding of the perceived effects, and consists of two principal 
themes, namely: (i) workload, efficiency and balance of duties (between clinical and 
administrative); (ii) quality and quantity performance variables.  
The results are briefly summarised as follows: First, despite the perceived theoretical 
importance of performance measurement and performance related pay incentives, 
the outcome is not always clear and did not seem to have provided a robust incentive 
to attract ‘good’ behaviour and motivation of the frontline workers. The operation of 
the reform incentive element is believed to have created division, tension and 
dysfunctional behaviour among frontline workers. For example, cherry-picking a 
worker for reward introduces a winner and loser mentality, which encourages some 
and discourages the majority who are not rewarded. This also resulted in ineffective 
work behaviour such as jealousies, envy and blame culture, as well as lack of 
openness and cooperation among colleagues.  
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Second, while the reform is supposed to provide strong incentives for workers to 
pursue organisational goals, there is no convincing evidence in this study to suggest 
that it has achieved this objective, and, thus it does not seem to have provided any 
solutions to the problem of how to motivate frontline workers. The results also 
conclude that rewarding workers based on their previous performance creates 
adverse incentive and individualistic behaviour, and this is potentially destructive to 
developing and maintaining healthy working relationships. In fact, this study 
suggests that the incentive system did not provide convincing evidence to the 
workers about why their colleagues receive awards and they do not, or what they can 
do in objective terms to be given an award. In addition, the results indicate that the 
imprecise and segregated nature of healthcare work did not guarantee fair 
assessment and allocation of individual rewards. Consequently, this provided little 
incentive to the workers to change their behaviour as they feel that they are very 
unlikely to be rewarded if they work hard because of inherent evaluation problems. 
As noted, the feelings of unfairness and lack of trust in the reform incentive 
arrangement was not able to motivate the workers to change their behaviour and 
perform better.  
 
Finally, although there are positive efficiency gains such as improved timeliness in 
access to healthcare services, and increase in the number of people that are treated in 
quantitative terms, there is no convincing evidence to suggest that the reform has 
actually improved the capacity of health workers to provide quality healthcare 
services.  
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7.2 Effects of Changes in Work Practice  
Based on the claims made by the informants, the results suggest that the changes in 
work practice with respect to the operation of performance measurement has had 
significant positive (e.g. attitude to work and absenteeism) and negative effects on 
the health workers (e.g. blame culture, envy, jealousy, and opportunistic behaviour 
among workers).  
7.2.1 Health workers’ attitude to work  
Health workers’ attitude to work across developing countries including Nigeria is 
often described as sluggish and lazy (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008; Dieleman and 
Harnmeijer, 2006). The results of the present study suggest that the reform has had 
positive effects on health workers’ attitude to work. All the six top-level managers 
said that many things have changed in terms of health workers’ attitudes to 
government work. One top-level manager said: “The days are gone when public 
health workers could be found loafing around and leaving the patients unattended” 
(Top-level Manager HEM4). Half of the operational managers were of the view that 
there has been modest improvement in health worker behaviour. This was 
particularly related to the claim that frontline workers no longer engage in corrupt 
practices, such as charging informal or unapproved fees:   
Since this reform started, all loopholes that facilitate workers collecting or 
asking for informal charges have been blocked. The workers know that they 
are under watch, and that a customer can report them which could affect their 
jobs or promotion. Nowadays, all fees are paid, receipted, and collected at a 
central point. Patients are told to report any payment that is not receipted. 
Our workers are also responding to the new directive which is part of the due 
process instituted by the reform (Operational Manager HOM5) 
Although the frontline doctors and nurses supported the positive behaviourial effects 
mentioned above, this does not in any way suggest that ‘bad behaviour’ has been 
wiped out completely. Another manager, referring to the advantages of performance 
measurement (detailed in Section 6.3.1.2), said there has been some improvement in 
worker accountability. Another operational manager said:  
Before the reform, we had cases in which drugs and supplies would just 
disappear from the store. This has not happened since the reform. Our 
workers have repented. I can say that government workers are now born 
again. This is what the social charter is about. People have to be accountable. 
Before the reform, bad behaviour was often not exposed, but now, bad 
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behaviour is exposed and sanctioned, so the reform is making workers follow 
the rule (Operational Manager HOM7) 
All the six executive managers interviewed corroborated the claim that 
accountability among health workers has improved.  
7.2.2 Absenteeism  
The results of this study suggest that another significant positive effect of the reform 
relates to absenteeism at work. For the top-level and operational managers high 
levels of absenteeism among workers were an operational and performance 
challenge. The evidence of reduced absenteeism was echoed by all categories of 
hospital workers, as is clear from the texts below:  
 Every day our workers are now at their duty post on time and remain until 
close of work. I think that the monitoring operation of SERVICOM is yielding 
good results (Top-Level Manager HEM4) 
We used to have so many workers reporting sick to work and yet you now find 
them in their business. Sometimes a worker would tell you he/she is on a break 
and from there they would go home. Since this policy started, things have 
changed. Workers are expected to sign in and out. There are no longer 
unregulated breaks. Even when a worker reports sick, he/she has to follow due 
process; they have to provide a medical certificate. Absenteeism has reduced 
significantly (Operational Manager HOM4) 
The doctors and nurses also acknowledged that the reported improved performance 
was due in part to a reduction in absenteeism. One doctor (HWD31) and one nurse 
(HWN27) reported respectively:   
 It is now a serious offence to be late to work or to leave before close of work. 
Sometimes it is very challenging to keep to this because some of us now live 
very far away from this hospital since housing benefits were monetized under 
the reform. We no longer live in government quarters as it used to be before 
the reform. Sometimes the managers understand, sometimes they do not. 
Moreover, sometimes you just ask a colleague to cover (Doctor HWD31) 
Before this reform started, we had been having many problems handing over 
because the nurse that was supposed to take over arrived late. Since this 
reform started, I have never in my shift experienced this problem. This means 
that the problem such as starting clinics late which is often associated with 
lateness, has been removed (Nurse HWN27) 
The fact that the reform is operating as a disciplinary and control mechanism seem 
to have paid off. Another nurse said: 
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 Nowadays, everybody is aware of the implications of being reported for not 
following targets or satisfying customers. We are more careful to avoid being 
caught. However, sometimes it is obvious that some of the claims about our 
work are unfounded, yet, we have been made to follow the customer charter 
and to see everybody equally. We have also seen a lot of customers lodging 
complaints over what they feel are unfair or unacceptable. Sometimes, you 
just feel that we are being witch-hunted just so that someone can be blamed 
for something (Male Nurse HWN20) 
 
An operational manager also reiterated that: 
Everyone is under watch, both managers and frontline workers. They 
(SERVICOM) act as if the hospital is just like a factory. Making everybody 
follow the rules is good but our work is not about rules, particularly if those 
rules have no clinical relevance. If you fail to follow their directive though, 
you could be punished or sanctioned. There is no sacred cow to this. People 
feel that their job is at risk (Operational Manager HOM7) 
 
Another doctor stated that:   
You see, nobody likes a query in the public service because it could delay your 
promotion. SERVICOM is just issuing queries here and there. I have received 
two because I came late three times in a week. I live very far away and even 
though I leave my house by 6am to start work by 9am, sometimes I get here 30 
minutes to 1 hour late because of traffic and sometimes fuel crisis (Doctor 
HWD4) 
The view of HWD4, which correlates that of others, suggests on the one hand, 
workers feel stressed and unhappy about the reform’s demands on them. On the 
other, they supposed that the reform has been effective in improving timeliness, thus 
addressing worker inefficiency. Therefore, as pointed out by HWD4, the fact that 
workers arrive late to work suggests a genuine reason for them to be sanctioned. The 
result suggests a degree of ambivalence in health workers’ attitude to the issue of 
reducing absenteeism and improved efficiency. Nevertheless, by implication, the 
results might suggest that the reform has been effective. However, the pooled views 
of the workers suggest that the results should be interpreted with caution. This is 
because the “signing in and out” mechanism, which SERVICOM uses to judge 
absenteeism, is in no way perfect. The candid view of one nurse that: “sometimes 
workers ask their colleague to cover for them” (HWN13) highlights a potential 
difficulty in measuring and observing what the workers do. This result, which 
correlates with past studies particularly the principal agent studies (such as Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Baker et al, 1994; 1998), supposes how potential hidden action 
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of health care workers, arising from asymmetric information between agents and 
principal or policy implementers (i.e. SERVICOM) create doubt about the potential 
practice of performance measurement in a professional organisation. The implication 
of the results is that a common practice could be that workers might be using their 
agency to engage in cheating or dysfunctional behaviour and work attitude even 
though SERVICOM claims to be monitoring and observing them.  
 
7.2.3 Blame culture, envy, jealousy and conflict at work 
Examining the views of the health workers, many frontline doctors and nurses seem 
to argue that performance related pay initiatives, in particular, are incongruent with 
healthcare work because they have encouraged competitive pressure, which creates 
an unhealthy working relationship and rivalry among workers. Specifically, workers 
resent one another, and are unhappy that despite their efforts, they feel disappointed 
that they do not get recommendation for rewards. 
Speaking about their concerns, and as highlighted in Section 6.3.2.1 frontline 
workers did not seem to trust the reform process to encourage friendly competition 
and, as noted in Section 6.3.2.2, the subjective perception of unfairness in the 
process added to the perception of blame culture, envy and jealousy.  
One doctor said:  
I am not praising myself, but God knows that I work hard. Yet, the other 
colleague was given an award and promotion for coming early to work. There 
is no difference between those who are professionally sound and those who 
are strategically competing to win awards without concern for our overall 
commitment to this work (Doctor HWD15)  
One nurse had this to say:  
“We are all public servants; we are here to serve and even to serve together 
and not to strive among ourselves. I am not happy about it because it has 
introduced competition as if we are in the market place.” (Nurse HWN21) 
An operational manager acknowledged that unfriendly competition breeds envy and 
jealousy at work, and has often resulted in significant quarrelling, backbiting, and an 
overall lack of trust in the system:  
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There are people who have gained in the system, while majority are losers. 
The problem is that that people do not like to see their colleagues who 
everybody sees as ‘good’ to be rewarded. Our problem is that there is high-
level distrust in the system. As managers, we do not see everything that 
happens in the ward, sometimes, the workers may know better. Therefore, 
because people hardly accept the feedback they receive, I think that is the 
main reason for envy. The problem is that this system is creating a lot of 
rivalry which it was not intended to do. I do understand the fears of the 
workers. I believe that anywhere there is scepticism and feeling of unfairness, 
envy, and resentment is bound to be there. We are doing our best (Operational 
Manager HOM8) 
A senior nurse also commented:  
Everybody is under pressure to perform. There is too much tension and fear 
nowadays. There is a lot of finger pointing here and there. This is not the 
public service I know. People spend more time looking for whom to blame. 
Work is no more about commitment and devotion. There is too much 
competition and strive among workers (Nurse HWN1) 
Another nurse also commented:  
Although I am not moved by the reward, I am here because I want to serve, 
but the way they are presenting the process is derogatory. During the award 
ceremony, unless you win an award, you are indirectly blamed and perceived 
as ineffective. This is not good; there are some who have done more that those 
who were given an award (Nurse HWN5) 
Another doctor said the following:  
If you are not selected, there is nothing you can do. You just have to move on. 
Naming one worker as good and another (the majority) as bad performers is 
creating envy and jealousy in this place. Since I was given an award, a lot of 
people just look at me with suspicion and are envious of me (Doctor HWD24) 
Further examination of the respondents’ comments suggest that seven out of sixteen 
managers interviewed noted that public disclosure of results and photo displays of 
outstanding workers have indeed affected relations amongst colleagues. This is 
because it creates a winner and loser mentality with the losers often displaying signs 
of envy. There is significant evidence suggesting that ineffective work behaviour 
including blame culture, envy and jealousy, has implications for individual workers’ 
performance. The results might also suggest that, in the above conditions, the 
workers did not think that their motivation and overall performance had improved. 
These results correlate with Bies and Trip (2005); Cohen-Charash and Mueller 
(2007); and Smith and Kim (2007), who found that envy and jealousy amongst 
individual workers undermine performance. 
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Overall, the results suggest that the reform might have resulted in unhealthy 
relationships among workers. The results also indicate that the operation of 
competition in work relationships has had negative effects on behaviour and quality 
of outcome. This supports the findings of Propper et al (2008a; 2004); Besley and 
Ghatak (2005); and Gaynor (2004), who found that despite the clamour for increased 
competition in hospital organisations, there is no convincing evidence to suggest that 
competition in hospital operations has the potential to improve individual workers’ 
performance in terms of the quality of services they provide.  
 
7.2.4 Workload, efficiency and balance of duties (between clinical 
and administrative)  
 
The analysis of the present study reflects an indication that the operation of the 
reform is perceived to have affected workers’ workload and efficiency, and shifted 
the balance of duties between clinical and administrative workers. While it seems 
that the claim of workload is common in healthcare practice (Kawada and Ooya, 
2005; Surani et al, 2007), the perceived increase in workload was widely reported 
among doctors and nurses and their managers.  
One nurse for example said: 
This week I have done 3 long shifts even though I am supposed to be on shift 
duty off. My managers refused to deal with the problem because there is 
nobody to cover. We are only 3 nurses in this ward attending to 25 patients, 
and now we are reduced to two because the other nurse called in sick. She too 
did 3 long shifts last week (Female Nurse HWN27) 
 
A doctor who reported experiencing an increase in workload also said: 
Look, I now see between 60-80 patients every day. Before the reform, I saw 
between 30-35 patients. Yet they expect me to be effective. Sometimes I do not 
take my break. Sometimes I feel very tired. There is too much paperwork 
(Male doctor HWD15) 
 
Doctors and nurses also reported that they have been under tremendous pressure to 
meet targets and complete necessary paperwork, and this means a disruption and 
diversion of their professional work patterns and consumes an inordinate amount of 
time. Overall, the majority of the frontline workers and managers said they are de-
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motivated at work because increasing workloads lead to increased stress, tiredness 
and burnout, and this is telling on the health of workers. The following are 
comments from an operational manager and a senior consultant:  
 It is not only that pressure could lead a worker to make mistakes, but also 
that the health of workers is not safe. For example, because of increased 
workloads, some of our workers after long hours report sick. Last month, one 
of our staff was rushed to an emergency unit because of accumulated stress 
arising from the intensity of work (Operational Manager HOM3) 
Stress is a silent killer. It is even more worrying among junior workers who 
lack experience. We have been having more sick calls. It is understandable 
because we are understaffed and some of the staff do more covers than they 
should (Male Senior Doctor HWD1)  
One doctor (junior) suggests that the reform has often resulted in a mismatch of roles 
as some of them do work they are not trained for, and sometimes they do not receive 
adequate support from their seniors. This is because their seniors report that they are 
busy. This doctor said:  
Many of us are left to do what we may not yet have adequate experience to do. 
Even when you contact your supervisor or senior for support, they are busy. 
You just do as much as you can until they come, yet the patient will be asking 
all kinds of questions (Doctor HWD37) 
Interviews with the managers supported the above claims that increase in workloads, 
shifting roles, and work patterns may have resulted to junior workers taking on roles 
they lack clinical competence. Commenting that this could result to serious medical 
problems for patients (customers), one junior doctor said:  
Look, the problem is that some of us do not yet have experience, yet we are 
often posted to cover because there is not enough staff. Yet, you do this extra 
work and have nothing to suggest for it. Sometimes, you just refer the patient 
to come another day, or to attend a private hospital because you do not want 
to make mistakes (Male Doctor HWD30)  
While the workers asserted that the reform has contributed to inadequate staff, there 
is inadequate evidence to suggest that staff shortages are mainly caused by the 
reform. The statement made by HWD37, supported by five other junior workers and 
even three senior staff and two managers suggests that not receiving adequate 
support and mentoring because of increased workloads on senior workers reduces 
the junior staff’s ability to provide good service, and limits the development of 
clinical skills through on-the-job training. The majority of frontline staff declared 
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they would rather learn and do their best to adjust. When asked about their coping 
strategies, one doctor stated:  
“I have made up my mind not to overwork myself since I am not paid for it, yet 
some people are picked and rewarded for their willingness to overwork as if 
another is not doing work here. I will rather do private work with my extra 
time, and be paid for it.” (Doctor HWD12) 
The statement made by HWD12, which was repeated by a number of other doctors, 
suggests that increasing workloads can be unproductive in hospital environments 
where there are already staff shortages.  Providing further information, one of the 
managers said that, “We do not have options, we are short staffed and we are now 
subjected to do a lot of things, sometimes junior workers do cover clinics. We just 
have to move on” (Operational Manager HOM4). Another senior manager, however, 
pointed out that the way they are functioning in the context of the reform is not 
professional and highlighted how increased pressure and workload may have 
resulted in avoidable incidents and accidents at work.  
Everybody is under pressure. This is not the public service I knew 30 years 
ago. Look, we cannot guarantee that all the workers are working perfectly 
especially the junior ones who may not have much experience. People are 
bound to make mistakes and error when under pressure. In this profession, 
error is not good because we are dealing with people’s health (Operational 
Manager HOM9) 
Although healthcare work is conventionally labour intensive, overall the results 
suggest there has been an increased workload experienced by all the hospital 
personnel. For example, there is indication of increase in number of hours worked 
arising from the extension of opening hours and days for consultation (the specific 
details of the changes were highlighted in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 (p. 74). This is 
coupled with increase in speed of operation and the widely reported increase in work 
done compared to before the introduction of the reform. Operational managers also 
acknowledge increased pressure, workload, and administrative paperwork. Both 
doctors and nurses, as well as their managers, consistently reported that the 
government’s target of ensuring a 24-hour service in tertiary hospitals has meant 
longer shifts (the term used for nurse duty hours) and or longer call duties (the terms 
used for doctors’ duty hours). Ten out of sixteen operational managers said that 
frontline doctors and nurses now do more ‘long day duties’ than previously, 
particularly because of the need to cover the longer opening days and times 
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introduced by the reform. Thus, they claimed that time-off between shift/call duties 
had reduced drastically.  
The health care managers also confirm that the new form of power and command in 
hospital management means that they are under fire to perform better. The following 
quotes from two managers are indicative of this:  
This government has outlined that it will no longer condone irresponsibility 
and has put in place a mechanism to identify bad behaviour and work 
attitudes. This government will sanction or even remove any worker who is 
found wanting (Male top-level manager HEM2)  
The reform has put enormous demand on us and our workers. Anyone who 
reports late to work is sanctioned, and can even have his or her salary 
withheld. We also have had cases in which workers are queried because 
customers reported them to SERVICOM. Making workers do their work is part 
of the effort put in place to address inefficiency in service provision. What we 
have been observing is that workers have not been finding it easy to adjust to 
the new rules and regulations, and are even afraid of being sacked or demoted 
(Operational Manager HOM10)  
The results also point to evidence of conflict of roles between clinicians and policy 
implementers. A manager and a nurse narrated how power asymmetry (detailed in 
Section 6.2) leads to conflict in their work operations. The nurse said:   
They are telling us that we cannot make decisions for ourselves. I felt bad 
receiving a query the other time from SERVICOM because they said a 
customer had complained that I did not follow the queue and it was rumoured 
that I used my position to help my sister. It was very worrying because my 
salary was stopped until the case was settled. My report on the incident was 
not initially accepted by SERVICOM but after a series of investigations and 
interrogations, it was clear that the patient was not my relation. This is very 
discouraging; we no longer do our work as we know it (Nurse HWN22) 
The operational manager made this comment:   
Although nobody will want to condone poor performance e.g. lateness to 
work, what we are seeing that annoys workers is that sometimes SERVICOM 
staff appear to exceed their limit of authority. There was a situation for 
example in which a line manager investigated a query and then dropped the 
matter. Thereafter he was arraigned before a SERVICOM disciplinary 
hearing at Abuja for not instituting appropriate disciplinary action against the 
worker involved (Operational Manager HOM4) 
The results suggest that increases in workload, pressure and stress associated with 
the reform may have had negative implications for the workers and the way they do 
their work. On the other hand, the increase in workload could be seen as an 
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improvement in operational efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, as evident in 
the interviews, frontline workers claimed that reform has had a detrimental effect on 
their work by contributing to an increased clinical and administrative workload. 
There is suggestion that the increased workload seems to have had implications on 
frontline workers’ performance capacity to deliver quality services. More details are 
outlined in Section 7.2.5 below.    
 
7.2.5 Quality and Quantity Performance  
This final part of the analysis of the effects of the reform consists of two sections. 
The first relates to quantity (Section 7.2.5.1), and the second relates to quality 
performance (Section 7.2.5.2), as both remains an issue in health care delivery 
(Gronroos, 2001; Donabedian, 2005). However, while it may be that quantity 
performance is somewhat straightforward, assessing quality performance is 
challenging.  
 
7.2.5.1 Quantity of Care  
During the interviews, and as noted earlier, all categories of health workers reported 
that their work activities (workloads) increased after the reform was implemented. 
The managers in particular noted that, because of the increase in the numbers of 
patients seen on any one day, frontline staff no longer have to start each day’s work 
with a backlog of untreated cases from the day before, as was the case previously. 
One of the managers characterises the changes acknowledged by others: 
 Workers now see patients very quickly. People no longer wait ages before 
they see a doctor. Because the time a patient waits before receiving attention 
has reduced, more people now have access to healthcare and on time too. We 
no longer have unattended overflows of patients to next day clinics, as it were 
before the reform (Operational Manager HOM8) 
Despite the negative effects hinted earlier, frontline doctors and nurses did 
acknowledge that quantity of output has increased: 
 Patients are no longer delayed and we are seeing many people daily since the 
reform started. There is no more waste of time and delays during consultation 
(Doctor HWD31) 
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Now we see that there is improvement in the number of people that come and 
go in this hospital. We no longer delay patients before they are discharged 
from the ward. However, I do not think that rushing patients in and out is 
good to patients’ health (Nurse HWN15) 
These results suggest that, since frontline workers now attend to more patients daily 
than before the reform, this can be seen as an improvement in efficiency in the use 
of resources, and especially time. However, frontline doctors and nurses, and their 
managers, reported that despite the achievement in terms of quantity, all is not well 
because they did not think that quality had improved. In fact, the results suggest an 
existing tension between quantity and quality performance, and this indication 
correlates with past studies. For example, Peabody et al, (2006) and Silimper et al, 
(2002) found that, across health system contexts in developing countries, quality 
rather than quantity matters mosts especially because it influences patient health and 
safety more than quantity elements.  
7.2.5.2 Quality of Care   
Quality of healthcare is an important issue in all setting where healthcare is 
provided, and across developing countries, perceptions of declining healthcare 
quality have been a concern to health policy (Akin et al, 1995; Andaleeb, 2001; 
Rowe et al, 2005; Al-Qutob and Nasir, 2008). Even in developed countries, recent 
studies (e.g. Atkinson et al, 2010; Raleigh and Foot, 2010) indicate realisation that 
healthcare quality is at the heart of the global healthcare policy agenda. Major, and 
widely discussed, elements of healthcare quality often vary between individual, 
organisation and context. However, it may, not be surprising that the quality domain 
which emerged from this study, and is discussed therein, is particularly related to the 
reform context and goals, though somewhat similar to other contexts (Arah et al, 
2006; Audet et al, 2005; Donabedian, 2005; Derose et al, 2002). Of importance is 
the fact that it draws from in-depth interaction and discussion with the professional 
views of those involved in healthcare delivery. The elements which are discussed 
here include equity of access to care, staff responsiveness and patient-centeredness, 
time spent with patients by service providers, providers’ interpersonal interaction 
with patients, and timeliness or waiting time.    
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Equity of access to healthcare services   
Access to healthcare services is a valued quality attribute in healthcare delivery 
(Goddard and Smith, 2001; Donabedian, 2005). During the interviews, managers 
and frontline workers recognised that good access to healthcare services makes 
people feel better. All the workers were of the view that the reform had had a 
significant positive effect on their ability to deliver quality healthcare, particularly in 
terms of improving ‘customer’ access to healthcare. Everyone interviewed said that 
access to services has improved. One manager said that, in line with the reform 
protocol, frontline workers now treat patients based on a first-come-first-served 
basis. However, a doctor said that this has created a concern regarding family bias, 
concern which means that they are no longer able to use their position to help their 
family, friends or those they know: 
It is no longer fashionable that a patient should receive express attention 
because his/her brother is a doctor or sister is a nurse in this hospital. People 
have to wait for their turn. My people seem not to understand that things have 
changed. The other day our chief visited this hospital and they just ran to me. I 
asked them to sit and wait for their turn. This was hard to say but it finally 
turned out that the Chief went back home and confronted my father that I was 
insensitive and could not care and that I am not a good ambassador. It is 
difficult to tell people that things have changed; they will not understand 
(Doctor HWD11) 
The above statement, which ten of the forty doctors and fifteen of the forty-five 
frontline nurses interviewed mentioned, suggests that few workers were concerned 
that the reform had restricted their social and family commitments. 
On the part of the managers, the reform is doing well in this regard, and commented 
that the idea of first-come-first-served basis is in line with the “Social Charter”, 
which is about ensuring fairness of access as a means of enhancing patients’ respect 
and dignity.  
Before the reform, patients often used their connections to manoeuvre their 
way through, and/or workers hardly treated patients as they come. Since the 
reform started, our workers have been doing well in attending to patients as 
they come. There is a queue and patients are treated on a first-come-first-
served basis (Operational Manager HOM8) 
All the doctors and nurses interviewed asserted that they are now treating patients 
fairly as a way of enhancing patient access to healthcare services. Nevertheless, 
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frontline doctors and nurses also argued that this practice has a cost to it. The 
workers believed that the reform processs introduced a rigid system which restricts 
their professional discretion in determining who should be given care based on triage 
assessment. This may have serious negative effects on the health and safety of 
patients. For example, as one senior doctor explained:  
The other time a patient was waiting for her turn, and because the doctor on 
duty was following the targets and could not give her immediate care she 
slumped and fainted. All effort to resuscitate her failed. It is difficult to blame 
the doctors and nurses on duty because they were following the rule (Doctor 
HWD3) 
This reflects the fact that although equity of access is a key element of healthcare 
service utilisation, there is recognition among frontline health workers that a rigid 
work culture may not be best for all because it does not consider the particular needs 
of specific clients. The frontline workers also argued that having equal access to 
services does not guarantee gaining access to, or utilisation of, quality services, or 
appropriateness of access in terms of meeting individual patient’s needs.  
With respect to healthcare service coverage, one senior doctor was of the view that 
sometimes, following rules did not give room to provide comprehensive or holistic 
care:   
The government targets do not cover everything that we do. When we focus on 
the targets, we neglect other things that although they are important they are 
not part of the targets. For example, we are focusing on seeing patients very 
quickly, but nothing is said about clinical procedure and clinical quality. 
SERVICOM does not talk about this (Doctor HWD9) 
Twenty-seven of the forty-five nurses interviewed mentioned that many basic 
clinical rules are not often followed. One senior nurse said: 
This is not what we as nurses were trained to do. We should be allowed to do 
our work as we know it. In addition, every aspect of our work should be a 
focus of any reform because all aspects are important. Whether it is about 
washing your hands before you enter the wards or treating a patient on time, 
or following the set clinical procedures or providing bandages, they are all 
important and should not be neglected (Nurse HWN2) 
Other frontline doctors and managers supported the view that the target culture 
operates simply as a prioritisation process that excludes adequate allowance for 
comprehensive care. The analysis of the interviews clearly indicate that doctors and 
nurses, as well as their managers, were unhappy because the policy changes restrict 
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their discretional knowledge in doing what they think is professionally correct. The 
perceptions of the workers, however, suggest significant ambivalence. For example, 
the workers also recognised that some of their colleagues had abused this discretion 
in the past to favour their family and friends. A constant theme running through the 
interview texts is that narrowing healthcare practice because of the prioritisation of 
what needs to be done seems to have reduced the coverage of healthcare services 
being delivered at this hospital.  
Staff responsiveness and patient-centeredness 
The literature acknowledges that improving provider responsiveness to patients is 
also a healthcare quality performance attribute (Gronroos, 1998; Andaleeb, 2001). 
During the interviews, both top-level and operational managers spoke about 
improvement in physical facilities in the reception area as a mark of responsiveness 
to patients needs.  
An operational manager said:    
I think we now have a good reception area where patients can wait until they 
are attended to. We have now provided enough chairs, a television and proper 
signposting to guide customers. We now focus on customers; we receive them 
well, and we make sure they are satisfied with the services they receive. We 
provide good information to patients in the form of leaflets and signs to guide 
them well (Operational Manager HOM3) 
Although five out of sixteen operational managers interviewed, and all the top-level 
managers, claimed that the hospital is now patient-centred, frontline doctors and 
nurses presented an opposing view. These doctors and nurses express discontent that 
the reform has reduced their time for face-to-face interaction and consultation with 
patients. One doctor said:  
Yes, we are seeing many people since the reform started. However, everybody 
knows that seeing people just like that is not a statement that all is well or that 
we have solved all their problems. We do not have time with patients (Doctor 
HWD28) 
A nurse said:  
The problem with this reform is that we hardly know patients as we used to … 
The way we do nursing has changed. This is not the nursing I know; where we 
were trained, we had to take time to care for patients and to ensure that they 
had access to quality services. Things have changed. Government asks us to 
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provide self-directed information for patients to sort themselves out. 
Sometimes, we do not talk to them, we just ask them to follow the signs on the 
wall (Nurse HWN40) 
During the interviews, two out of every three frontline workers and seven of the 
sixteen operational managers interviewed complained about reduced time for care 
and hinted that inadequate time for care was undermining the quality of direct 
patient care. The nurses, in particular, were very unhappy about this. 
Both frontline workers and their managers mentioned two reasons for the reduced 
time for customer care, and they were the increased workload resulting from the 
introduction of targets, and administrative paperwork. A senior doctor was very 
clear about the implications for his work: 
We are focusing on targets and there is too much paperwork. We have lost 
focus on detailed clinical quality and procedures, so I do not think that the 
quality of care patients receives have increased. To provide quality service, 
you require adequate time for diagnosis and consultation (Doctor HWD7) 
Commenting on a similar claim of declining quality of care, a line manager 
(Operational Manager HOM9), commented on the aforementioned lack of time and 
work overload, and the fact that often, inexperienced staff have been assigned to do 
consultations. The manager who also expressed guilt noted that this practice 
undermines efficiency or effectiveness of service delivery. The manager provided a 
critical case to substantiate his claims:  
We cannot say we are getting it right all the time. The other time we had a 
case of a woman who was rushed in and out of the clinic even though it was 
evident that her case was malignant and chronic. In fact, I was very 
uncomfortable because this woman’s case would have been avoided if 
adequate time had been committed to her diagnosis. Besides, this woman was 
attended to by a house officer who is inexperienced because the chief was very 
busy. In fact, it is sad to say that she never recovered from the illness. What 
we have been saying is that there should be an element of professional sense 
regarding how we treat patients (Operational Manager HOM9) 
This concern about the time needed for patient diagnosis was also raised by nurses. 
One nurse in particular was concerned to explain the complexity of this task:  
We no longer have ample time to interact with patients. When you do not 
interact with patients well it is very challenging and problematic because it is 
difficult to dig out and gather the relevant information about the patient which 
would shed light on their overall health condition. Sometimes you know what 
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to do, but you lack adequate information from the patient’s personal and 
clinical situation (Nurse HWN10) 
Responses also indicate possible links between inadequate patient-service provider 
interaction and hence less than adequate diagnosis, and medical accidents and errors. 
For instance, one nurse said: 
We have to appreciate that we are not getting it all right, detailed diagnosis is 
required to produce good results (Nurse HWN19).  
Both doctors and nurses also complained that inadequate interaction time was 
undermining appropriate counselling with patients:   
Nowadays, we are always in a hurry and we do not have enough time to attend 
to patients and counsel them effectively. Sometimes even after we have 
provided treatment, they need further counselling to ensure that they continue 
with the treatment (Nurse HWN13).  
 There is no doubt that patients now have a lot of information. What is missing 
is that they may lack the ability to make use of the information given about 
their health. Health care is not just about the provision of drugs. We should be 
counselling people to reinforce our treatments. Do you know that some 
patients need counselling rather than drugs? I thing that rushing patients in 
and out is not good because they are missing good counselling and this affect 
the quality of the care we provide (Doctor HWD3) 
Strengthening these comments on the importance of good relationships and 
interaction with patients for overall quality performance, an operational manager 
said:  
Our work is not only about having time to talk with patients, we need to listen 
and know them well. Also knowing the personal life situation of patients is 
very important. When there is no time, it is even difficult to make out patients’ 
opinions and perceptions. I think what we are saying is that sometimes we do 
not give patients enough time to express themselves about their conditions and 
everyday habits (Operational Manager HOM12) 
A senior consultant provided an example of how inadequate interaction undermined 
quality performance and individualized care for a patient who was critically ill:    
The overriding importance of individualized care is enormous. It is extremely 
desirable that workers treat patients based on their personal characteristics. 
People do not understand why workers ask them to wait. Patients just feel that 
spending time on one patient while others are waiting is unfair. The other day 
a patient slumped and died while waiting for his turn. Every effort to 
resuscitate him failed. This same patient was in the hospital the day before 
and it was later discovered that an inadequate diagnosis had made it difficult 
to discover the health condition of the patient. This is a shame and it suggests 
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how the new work rule appears to have taken away our professional common 
sense (Doctor HWD9) 
It is clear from these reports that both frontline workers and their managers are 
experiencing the negative aspects of the new management system linked with the 
service delivery reforms, and that these negative aspects relate especially to the 
impact it is having on the quality of patient care. Although there is no guarantee that 
with more time for patient diagnosis and counselling, the quality of care would be 
improved, this suggests that health care delivery is more complex than is suggested 
by the performance measures being introduced. At the same time, the responses here 
make it clear that work practices, or behaviour, have changed in response to the new 
rules and incentives (or penalties) but, as everyone remarked, this change has 
potentially serious implications for health care.   
Timeliness and waiting times 
Waiting time and how to reduce it in Federal Medical Centres (FMCs) in Nigeria, 
especially at the general outpatients department (GOPD), is one of the central 
concerns of the reform. The term waiting time, as used in this study is the actual 
time a patient (customer) may have to wait for an appointment, as well as actually 
waiting in the hospital before s/he receives attention (Harrison and Appleby, 2005). 
Waiting time emerged as a key performance issue in the service delivery process as 
it is assumed to reflect worker efficiency in providing care. As noted by the policy 
view, reduction in patient waiting time is a major policy goal (SERVICOM book, 
2006). 
In support of this position, a top-level executive manager quoted from the policy 
document about the general concern of the reform regarding long waiting times. 
This executive noted that:  
There are frequent complaints from patients who attend federal government 
hospitals that they spend too much time waiting to be attended to, and that 
services at the Outpatient Department are sluggish and did not follow 
procedure (Top-level Manager HEM2)   
Another executive manager highlighted that: 
Before this change was introduced, visiting a public hospital was a frustrating 
experience. This is because patients are not sure if they will be attended to on 
time, or even at all.  People used to make caricatures of public hospitals and 
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say that anyone visiting should go with a sleeping mat because of delays. Now 
we have improved and we make sure that patients receive treatment as soon as 
possible and faster (Top-level Manager HEM3) 
 
Three managers (HOM7/HOM8/HOM16) claimed that, because of the reform (and 
the introduction of a waiting time target), the hospital no longer has patient 
overflows like before. One doctor reported:  
We are now treating patients very fast and there are no more delays. We 
attend to more patients now than when the policy was not in place. Yes, we 
now see patients as soon as possible. People no longer wait for a long time 
before they are attended to (Doctor HWD19) 
In spite of this acknowledgement of the value of reduced waiting time, the question 
of whether, and to what extent, this is a good indicator of quality service provision 
was raised by a number of informants. Frontline workers commented that focusing 
on reducing waiting time could undermine the quality of services they can provide. 
A senior doctor expressed the view that these new targets are damaging the quality 
of diagnosis and assessment of patients’ needs:  
I think that the process is undermining the good assessment of cases. This is 
worrying particularly for junior staff that may not have the experience to 
facilitate their decisions within the short time they have to consult with 
patients. I do not see the process of rushing to treat patients as good for 
healthcare (Doctor HWD1)  
Other frontline staff shared this opinion. For example, one nurse noted: 
I just feel the process is not good for quality care. I feel bad when I watch a 
patient discharged to create space for other patients in the ward because we 
want to meet the targets. I just think that some patients ought to stay a little 
more in the ward. We have been having so many readmissions into the wards 
because of early discharge and some of the patients come back with malignant 
cases of infection (Nurse HWN13) 
Another doctor was unhappy about the way their work had become like a 
‘microwave service’ which rushes diagnosis and assessment to the detriment of the 
patients (Doctor HWD33). Commenting further, HWD33 alleged that accelerating 
consultation can result in incomplete diagnoses and assessments, and since not all 
workers may be capable of handling the pressure, accidents were possible. Other 
staff (e.g. DoctorHWD29 and Nurse HWN18) believed that though it was good to 
treat patients on time, this should be done based on professional evidence and 
clinical diagnosis rather than on mechanical rules, which might not be appropriate 
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for everyone. In addition, a manager complained how the performance measurement 
culture has resulted in early patient discharge as part of the effort to reduce waiting 
time:   
We no longer keep patients long in the wards. This reform has enabled us to 
reduce length of stay of patients in the ward. This is sometimes not good but 
we are following the rule. The other time, we had a case of a patient being 
discharged too quickly and she was readmitted following re-infection at home 
(Operational Manager HOM 4)   
 
Therefore, the results suggest that the new approach to work practice has led to an 
improvement in operational efficiency in terms of reduced waiting time; 
nevertheless, there is no convincing evidence to suggest that this has in practice 
contributed to improving quality of healthcare services provided. From the detailed 
analysis, it would seem rational to think along the lines of the policy outline, that 
increasing speed and equality of access provides good orientation to healthcare 
work. The results of this study provide a rather contrary viewpoint. Largely, 
frontline workers and their managers believed that increasing speed and timeliness 
by reducing waiting time alone will not deliver quality care. These claims correlate 
with wider literature in other contexts (Bevan and Hood 2006a, Propper et al, 2008). 
The results suggest that the reform culture and orientation, as it relates to the 
aforementioned work practices, impedes effective consultation, adequate diagnosis, 
and counselling which, according to the frontline workers, are critical elements to 
realising improvement, in healthcare quality. Thus the results of this study suggest a 
contradiction with respect to quantity and quality performance, given that the drive 
for reducing waiting time is not recognised by different categories of health workers 
and their managers as having improved the quality of healthcare services provided.  
7.3 Discussion and Conclusions  
Chapters 6 and 7 have examined how different categories of workers in the case 
study hospital are affected by, and deal with, the reform processes with respect to 
changes in work practices. The findings suggest that the reform process has had 
significant implications for the delivery of health care services.  
The results that emerged from the qualitative data suggest that the operation of 
performance measurement based on national standards is perceived as a controlling 
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mechanism over the workers. The conceptualisations which emerge of “they” 
(government) using “them” (SERVICOM) to monitor “us” (workers) or to tell “us” 
what to do, suggest changing power relations within the hospital organisation. In 
addition, the “they”, “them” and “us” mentality seems to have produced a feeling of 
frustration and, as verbalised, a form of alienation and loss of control among the 
health workers. The implication is that workers reported a fall in their professional 
status due to the understanding that their profession has come under a structurally-
imposed regime by an agency with no professional accreditation. The results suggest 
that regulation of healthcare activities in this way influences what health workers are 
passionate about doing, based on their professional perception of how healthcare 
should be provided. All the discussions with the health workers pointed to 
demotivation and an erosion of professional power, discretion and autonomy. Both 
clinical staff and operational managers acknowledged feeling demoralised by, and 
dissatisfied with, the arrangement of using SERVICOM to ‘police’ their work.   
The managers reported that shifting power relations in hospital management has had 
a chilling effect on their authority to manage the hospital. This result is in line with 
the study findings by Blackler (2006), which reported that modernisation of the 
British NHS including the use of audit agencies, undermines hospital managers’ 
capacity to do their work as health professionals, and creates significant frustration 
among them.  There was consensus among the FMCU health workers that because 
of the reform, they are losing professional power and autonomy.  
The above findings correspond with reports on other public service sectors in other 
countries, such as education in the United Kingdom where OFSTED, the school 
inspection agency, was reported to have demoralised classroom teachers (Steer et al, 
2007; Shaw et al, 2003). The results from this case study hospital in Nigeria that 
performance inspection did not seem to improve health worker motivation and 
performance is consistent with the observations of Shaw et al (2003) that inspections 
of secondary school teachers fail to take account of teachers’ achievements. Others 
studies from England and Finland have equally suggested that inspection in hospital 
did not improve motivation of frontline service providers (Webb, 1998). 
Based on the interviews held with frontline staff and managers in the present study, 
there seem to have been a significant reduction in waiting time at FMCU. Given the 
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understanding that long waiting times were typical performance challenges in FMCs 
in Nigeria prior to the reform, accordinbg to past studies (e.g. Bamgboye and 
Jarallah, 1994; Ajayi, 2002), the results here suggest that there has been an 
improvement in operational efficiency. Other past studies (Chung et al, 1999; 
Jackson et al, 2001) have indicated that reduced waiting times enhances timeliness 
of access, and improves patient satisfaction (Dixon, 2004; Wilcox et al, 2007; 
Harrison and Appleby, 2005). However, there were inconclusive reports from 
FMCU that rushing to deliver care in an attempt to reduce waiting time could be 
dangerous to patients’ health. Propper et al (2007) found that long waiting time has 
remained a political issue for several UK governments, and has informed the 
development of targets as a way of reducing waiting times. In correlation with 
Propper et al (2008a/b), and Bevan and Hood (2006a/b), and despite the popularity 
of reducing waiting time, there is no robust empirical evidence to suggest that this 
measure has actually improved healthcare quality in NHS hospitals in England. 
While the debate goes on, however, there is an understanding, as raised by the 
results of this study that the drive for efficiency gains in reduced waiting time leads 
to unintended consequences.   
The evidence from this study also suggests that increasing speed in care operations 
did not give adequate room for interaction between patients and health care workers, 
and for counselling. The importance of this interaction has been discussed in other 
studies.  Adler and Hammet, (1973) and Heeg et al (1997) suggest that adequate 
counselling has a therapeutic effect, often addressed as a ‘placebo effect’ 4  on 
patients health, particularly for the treatment of chronic illnesses requiring palliative 
rather than curative measures (e.g. cancer or HIV/AIDS). This relates to the 
therapeutic effect that a patient receives from a particular treatment which arise from 
adequate counselling from the provider, and from the the patient’s expectations and 
preconceptions of what the drug is supposed to do, rather than from the drugs itself.  
There is also an indication that speeding up diagnostic activities in order to achieve 
the targets of reducing waiting time can hinder adequate information sharing 
between the providers and patients. While it was difficult to pin down any specific 
case where inadequate patient diagnostics had resulted in poor quality service, the 
                                                          
4
 According to Shapiro (1960, cited in Adler and Hammet, 1973 ), it is a psychological effect of 
medicine arising from interaction or medical procedures given with therapeutic intent, which are 
independent of or minimally related to the pharmacological effect of medication.  
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health workers at FMCU were very clear in their understanding that inadequate 
diagnosis predisposes workers to by-passing clinical procedures. Drawing from past 
studies (e.g. Burhans and Alligood, 2010; Suhonen et al, 2005), there is evidence to 
support the view that inadequate diagnosis can prompt workers (especially 
comparatively inexperienced workers) to commit “medical errors”. Other studies 
(Simmons and Elias, 1994; Kazaoka et al, 2007; Brady et al, 2009) also shed more 
light on this matter, and in particular on the link between inadequate diagnosis and 
early patient death. Again, the results from this case study hospital strongly indicate 
that increased workloads are telling on the health and work-life balance of health 
workers and this, along with  increased stress and pressure, could undermine patient 
health and safety (Aiken et al, 2001; Kelly, 2004; Leap and Berwick, 2005).   
While the claim by the clinical workers at FMCU that rising workload/stress is 
hindering their effectiveness remains inconclusive, other studies (e.g. Aiken et al, 
2002; Eriksen and Ursin, 2004; Svensen et al, 2007; De Cuyper and De Witte, 2007; 
De Cuyper et al, 2008) have provides evidence that an increased workload does lead 
to stress and reduces worker morale. Furthermore, junior clinical staff perceived 
their professional motivation to be low because a mounting workload for their 
seniors leads to them being less disposed to provide their junior colleagues with 
adequate support and mentoring.  This is particularly noteworthy given the critical 
role of mentoring in enhancing indidividual workers’ capacity to perform because of 
its role in skill development for junior clinical and frontline staff in particular 
(Buerhaus et al, 2005; Niedhammer et al 2003; Laudicina, 2001). All these authors 
point out that mentoring empowers the mentee, decreases job strain and increases 
job satisfaction; thus, there where there is inadequate mentoring, performance is 
likely to be poor.  
Another striking finding from FMCU relates to how performance measurement has 
led to a growing individualism, breeding unhealthy competition, fragmentation in 
the workplace, tension, distrust among colleagues, and reduced teamwork and 
willingness to assist co-workers. The implication of this is a reduced culture of 
intrinsic motivation among health workers. Again, this is in line with past studies 
(e.g. Frey, 2000; Francois, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2003), which suggest that 
individual-based performance measurement and incentives erode or crowd-out 
intrinsic motivation. 
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The fact that teamwork is a critical success element for effective healthcare practice, 
there is an indication that lack of teamwork may have undermined individual 
performance. This result corroborates past studies (e.g. Rafferty et al, 2001; Sims, 
2003; Dieleman and Harnmeijer, 2006), which point to an existing positive 
relationship between teamwork and staff effectiveness, and job satisfaction, 
particularly in service-based organisations such as those providing healthcare. Other 
studies have noted the importance of teamwork in securing collegial trust (Gilson et 
al, 2003; Gilson, 2005) and performance. Overall, the results of the present study 
shed light on how the perception of declining cooperation among frontline health 
workers creates a regressive work environment, and results in low morale, 
dissatisfaction, and poor performance. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the overall implication of the above is difficult to 
assess, the findings are suggestive, and clearly suggest a correlation between lack of 
cooperation among workers and commitment to group action. Past studies have 
highlighted how lack of cooperation can result in frustration and non-compliance 
(Cropanzano and Randall, 1993: Folger and Konovsky, 1989), as well as poor 
performance (Dooms and Van Oijen, 2005). Futhermore, it can be argued that while 
the conceptualisation of performance measurement culture and individual reward 
system is a market ideology, the results suggest that the reform has improved some 
aspects of health worker performance, even though there are claims that quality has 
been sacrificed in some cases.   
The findings on the effect of the policy changes on individual worker’s behaviour 
and attitude to work were mixed. On the one hand, workers reported a relative 
improvement in their performance and attitude to work. This related to the reduction 
in ‘bad behaviour’ such as charging unapproved or informal fees, pilfering drugs and 
supplies, and /or sitting around and not working. In this study, while these vices 
were not visible, they were mentioned in interviews. Besides, past studies in Nigeria 
(e.g. Uzochukwu and Onwujekwe, 2004; 2005) have acknowledged that this 
behaviour is common in the public service setting. Across many developing 
countries’ health system settings there are unconfirmed reports that frontline health 
workers often charge unapproved fees (Ensor, 2004), pilfer drugs and supplies 
(McPake et al, 1999; Ferrinho et al, 2002; 2004), or have a reputation for laziness 
(Delfgaauw and Dur, 2006). 
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With respect to health workers’ work attitude, the results suggest an improvement in 
terms of a reduction in absenteeism. While past studies in Nigeria have reported 
absenteeism as a mark of poor performance (e.g. in Nigeria-Bamgboye and Jarallah, 
1994; Ajayi, 2002), and from other developing country contexts (e.g. Chaudhury et 
al, 2004; Ensor and Witter, 2001; Ferrinho et al, 2002), providing evidence of 
attitudes towards absenteeism, and actual absenteeism, remains challenging because 
of the difficulty of observing this malpractice. The fact that the FMCU workers 
claimed that they sometimes ask their colleagues to ‘cover them’ suggests that 
tracking absenteeism is difficult. This corroborates past agency research (Baker et 
al, 1994; Goddard et al, 2000), which suggests that observing what individual 
workers actually do can be difficult. There is also evidence that the drive to achieve 
targets and receive individual recommendations seem to have predisposed health 
care workers to unfriendly competition and misbehaviour (e.g. misrepresentation of 
their efforts). This is also in line with findings from other studies (e.g. Bevan and 
Hood, 2006a; Mannion et al, 2005; Propper et al, 2008a/b).  
The results also suggest that while patient power may have increased, this may have 
undermined the confidence of health workers. The health workers at FMCU, 
particularly those nurses and doctors working in the Out-patient and Accident and 
Emergency departments, found it difficult to cope with some of the verbal abuse 
they reported having received from patients. These findings, though difficult to 
triangulate, nevertheless correlate with other studies (e.g. Lin and Liu, 2005; Pejic, 
2005; Kisa, 2008) which have highlighted that verbal abuse and intimidation of staff 
by patients is common in hospital settings.  
Overall, the results do suggest that differences in interest and personality, 
professional life, and expectations, influence individual motivation. All this is 
supported by past studies from elsewhere (e.g. Jones et al, 2008; Oreg, 2006; 
Kavanaugh et al, 2006), which highlight the fact that individual mind-sets about life 
influence attitudes to work.  Again, studies from China (e.g. Hu and Liu, 2004); 
England (e.g. Blackler, 2006); and Malawi (e.g. McAuliffe et al, 2009) suggest that 
levels of de-motivation and dissatisfaction tend to be influenced by individual 
worker characteristics. 
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In conclusion, the presentation in this chapter suggests that although motivation is an 
important component of health workers’ work lives that can impact on their work 
performance, there is a perception that health workers seem to be de-motivated by 
the changes in work practice. Many workers did not perceive that their motivation 
and performance had increased as a result of the changed work processes introduced 
by the reforms, because of the way increasing workload and stress is undermining 
their capacity to function optimally. In relation to SERVICOM, the results reported 
in this chapter suggest how the audit system is creating an awareness of how 
administrative norms seem to override professional knowledge of healthcare 
practice. The frontline workers, and even their managers, see the process as 
generating a frustrating work environment which does not support progressive 
relationships. However, there is suggestion that health workers who are nurses 
appeared to be more motivated than their doctor counterparts. In addition, workers 
with relatively long public service records expressed more anxiety than their junior 
colleagues about their job security and status. The results suggest that the health 
workers made important claims based on their subjective perception of the effects of 
the reform. It is, however, important to point out that sometime the way the workers 
presented their claims often suggests an undeniable ambivalence. This also sheds 
light to how underlying work culture and contexts shape individual perceptions of 
change effects.   
 
The next chapter presents further empirical data that also examines how health 
providers perceive the effects of the changes, but with respect mainly to their 
incentive, motivation and behaviour.  
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8 Incentive, Behaviour and 
Motivation of Health Workers   
 
8.1 Introduction 
The focus of this last data chapter is on pay incentives to health workers to change 
their work practice, behaviour, and to motivate them to perform better. It is 
important to reiterate that changing any organisation and workers’ behaviour, and 
motivation in particular is not often as easy as predicted. As noted in Chapter 4 
(Section 4.3.2), given the understanding that health workers’ behaviour, and 
motivation was clearly a problem for public health delivery, the second aspect of the 
reform, i.e. pay reform was specifically targeted to generate incentives in order to 
motivate workers to achieve the desired changes in work practice. As noted in 
Chapter 4, the reform of pay systems includes performance-related-pay; pay rises, 
monetization of fringe benefits, and changes in pension systems. The interest of this 
thesis in pay reforms lies largely in the performance-related-pay (PRP) element of 
the health reforms. This is the aspect of the pay reform that relates directly to the 
service delivery reforms or changes in work practice; it provides the link between 
pay and promotion based on good performance.  
Equally noted in Chapter 4, the Nigerian Government implemented PRP to motivate 
workers to change their work practice. However, it is possible to conclude from 
policy documents on pay that the government also initiated the pay reform to 
address the reported inadequacy (low pay) of public workers’ pay. Nevertheless, 
with respect to the health reform which forms the focus of analysis in this study, the 
performance-related-pay element was acknowledged as an attempt to link rewards to 
the realisation of targets. The philosophy is underpinned by the supposition that 
‘getting the incentives right’ is a way of motivating workers to change their work 
patterns in order to realise government national targets, i.e. PRP will foster good 
performance. As claimed in the policy document, linking pay to performance which 
is assessed by reference to standard criteria ensures consistency in performance 
assessment, thus ensuring remuneration that is fair and deserving across different 
levels and tasks performed. This goes much further than simply talking about PRP. 
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It reflects the thinking behind arguments for ‘fair wages’ across different worker 
categories and how this has contributed to changes in status.  
Although PRP is especially relevant to this thesis, the value of paying attention to 
the other elements of the pay reforms is indicated in a number of documents (Pay 
Reform Act, 2000; 2004). In order to attract, retain, and motivate skilled 
professionals in the Nigerian public service, a pay increase was considered essential. 
Nevertheless, while it might be agreed that pay rises is a pre-requisite to improved 
service delivery, the issue of poor pay administration has historically meant that, in 
Nigeria, public servants might receive pay in arrears or regularly receive late pay. 
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to suggest that the whole pay package 
and the payment process (routinely paid to a prescribed schedule) should equally be 
the focus of attention if workers are to be motivated to change work practice. As 
noted in Chapter 4, in general the reform is about changing health worker’s 
behaviour. Although there are several ways of doing this, the health sector reform 
considers just two approaches, the first about changing work practice by measuring 
performance, and the second about reforming pay system to generate incentives for 
individual health workers to encourage changes in their behaviour and work 
practices. The general perspective of the underlying principles of the health sector 
reform is that for reform to be effective, it must operate in such a way to facilitate 
proactive work practice, and at the same time, attract the willingness and effort of 
the health workers. As noted in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3), policy documents and key 
informant interviews were used to verify the link between changes in work practice 
and pay reforms.  
To understand PRP, it is important to set out the context within which it operates, 
particularly as it relates to the issues of pay and incentives for different categories of 
public workers. Firstly, the results indicate that different categories of health 
workers (doctors, nurse and managers) are obviously paid differently. Secondly, it is 
important to recognise that there has been a dramatic change in the pay of public 
health workers over the past three decades, with a marginal improvement in the pay 
of health workers.  On the average, public health workers have been paid more 
promptly and timely than before, yet, there has been tremendous variation in the real 
value of pay.  
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Thirdly, because of the pay changes, public workers claimed to have lost all in-kind 
fringe benefits which they previously enjoyed. The in-kind fringe benefit has been 
monetised, harmonised (i.e. paid across the board), and consolidated into their basic 
pay, and taxed alongside this.  Although there has been a recovery or a rise in pay 
(in norminal terms) compared to the 1990s, workers were very concerned and often 
compared their pay now with what they previously earned in the 1980s and 1990s, 
which seems to suggest that they are earning considerably less now. There is a 
general perception that public workers feel exposed to decline in real take-home pay 
due to rises in cost of living. This is coupled with the fact that they now have to 
worry about the loss of the in-kind benefits they enjoyed before the reform.  
In the context described above, the performance-related pay (PRP) incentive is 
applied, and the focus of this chapter is PRP, which is the core incentive component 
of the reform.  The operation of PRP sits within the wider context of the new public 
sector management debate and is about how to motivate public workers. The PRP 
incentive structure is concerned with linking rewards to individual performance. 
While there are questions about its effectiveness, there are indications from this 
study that the operation of PRP may have affected the motivation of the workers. 
The real contribution of this chapter is not simply looking at the reform incentive 
element; rather it puts it into context, with a view to understanding how, and to what 
extent, workers perceive the changes and how these changes motivate them within 
the public service sector.   
The analysis in this chapter draws on two main data sources: public service pay data 
(1983-2007) from the national pay office, and workers’ perceptions and 
interpretations of the changes in pay and status change. It begins by presenting the 
results from the analysis of the national pay data suggesting details of the pay trends 
in basic salaries (a function of changes in minimum wage). It then provides an 
account of how different worker categories see their pay changes, and how they see 
their relative pay, and changes in status. Finally, focusing on the performance-
related pay incentive, it provides a specific analysis of effects of the performance-
related pay on different categories of workers.  
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8.2 Pay Trends and Changes  
The first theme that emerges from the pay data analysis, as shown in Figure 8.1a 
below, is that nominal pay increased for all categories of health workers. At the 
same time, the rising cost of living (see Figure 8.1b) has resulted in the erosion of 
real pay (See Figure 8.2) for all categories of workers.  
Another theme about pay reform relates to relative pay. As noted by Katz and 
Murphy (1992) and Clark and Oswald (1996), relative pay is important. The results 
indicate that significant differences exist in real relative pay distribution within 
worker categories and levels. As can be seen in Figure 8.3, top-level doctors earned 
2.22 times more than lower-level doctors before the reform (1983-1999), 2.34 times 
more that lower-level nurses during the early part of the reform (2000-2002), and 
2.32 times more during the latter part of the reform (2003-2007). Conversely, as 
shown in Figure 8.4, top-level nurses earned 2.8 times more than lower-level nurses 
before the reform (1983-1999), 3.0 times more during the early part of the reform 
(2000-2002), and 2.9 times more during the latter part of the reform (2003-2007). 
In addition, as evident from Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6, significant differences in real 
relative pay exist between worker categories. For example, Figure 8.5 shows that the 
entry salary of doctors was 1.43 times more than the entry salary for nurses in 1983-
1997, 1.7 times more in 1998-1999, 1.45 times more during the early part of the 
reform, and 1.42 more in 2003-2007. Similarly, as shown in Figure 8.6, the analysis 
suggests that the end salary of doctors is 1.11 times the end salary of nurses in 1983-
1997, and 1.41 times in 1998-1999. This dropped to 1.12 times in the early part of 
the reform, and remained at 1.12 during the latter part of the reform. The results 
clearly suggest that pay inequality has been an issue. Of particular interest is the fact 
that, because of the reform, while inequality seems to have increased within 
categories (i.e. doctor to doctor, or nurse to nurse), there has been an equalisation of 
pay between categories (i.e. doctor to nurse). This is a significant achievement and 
tends to suggest that the reform has been successful in narrowing pay differentials 
between doctors and nurses.  
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Figure 8.1a: Trends and structure of nominal salaries for entry and end career for doctors and nurses  
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Figure 8.1b: Trends in consumer price index (CPI) (1985=100) 
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Figure 8.2 Trends in real entry and end salaries for doctors and nurses  
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The statistics presented above suggest that the real growth rate of doctors’ and 
nurses’ salaries for all levels has been negative since the 1980s and 1990s, but has 
risen sharply because of the reform. This indicates that there has been a recovery, 
although this does not yet appear to be sustained.  
 
8.3 Fringe Benefits and Allowances  
As indicated in Chapter 4, another distinctive characteristic of the pay changes is the 
monetisation and consolidation of fringe benefits and allowances. The importance to 
government of this aspect of the reform is that it is expected to facilitate sound 
budgeting and revenue generation through pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) tax once the pay 
package is consolidated. However, it is possible that the monetization of fringe 
benefits and allowances to workers is also important for thinking about motivation to 
work.  
As noted, prior to the reform public workers enjoyed in-kind benefits and 
allowances which were tax free. The fringe benefits consisted of free housing, 
transport, utilities, furniture, call and shift duty allowances, and meals. These in-kind 
benefits were mainly for senior workers as a mark of recognition for their length of 
service, and status. Under the reform, all in-kind benefits and allowances were 
monetized, consolidated and subjected to PAYE tax together with the basic salary. 
Of importance is the fact that as part of the distributive and harmonising nature of 
the pay reform, the government decided to pay all workers the monetised fringe 
benefits. At the same time, the monetised individual fringe benefits attracted 
differential cash equivalent for top, mid and lower categories of both doctors and 
nurses, as indicated in Table 8.1 below.  
Table 8.1Percentage composition of yearly benefits (in cash equivalent) as % of basic salaries 
Worker level  
(doctors and nurses) 
Furniture  Utility  Housing  Transport  Meals 
top 40% 20% 75% 29% 80% 
mid 40% 20% 60% 29% 60% 
low 40% 20% 60% 29% 40% 
Source: National Income, Salaries and Wages Commission Circular, 2003 
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Doctors and nurses are also paid cash allowances for call duty (doctors) and shift 
duty (nurses). The pay data indicate that allowances are paid at the rate of 4% of the 
basic salary per unit call for doctors, and 1.7% of basic salary per unit shift duty for 
nurses. As evident from Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8, fringe benefits and allowances 
constitute a significant portion of public health workers’ total take-home-pay.  
For example, as can be seen in Figure 8.7 below, doctors earn about 80% total pay 
or 4.0 times their basic salary as bonuses (benefits/allowances), while nurses earn 
about 77% or 3.0 times their basic salary as bonuses. Whereas top-level nurses earn 
2.74 times more in bonuses than lower level nurses, top-level doctors earn 2.33 
times more in bonuses than lower-level doctors. Therefore, the analysis of pay data 
suggests that benefits and allowances make up a significant proportion of health 
workers’ total salaries. This is consistent with past studies (e.g. Lindauer and 
Nunberg, 1994), which report that bonuses and allowances in developing countries 
amount to between 35% and 100% of basic salaries.  
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8.4 Health Workers’ Perceptions of Pay Change 
With respect to health workers’ perception of the pay change, all the workers 
acknowledged the pay rises and said that their nominal take home pay has increased. 
One of the nurses said: “The reform has increased our pay, everybody knows this” 
(Nurse HWN15). However, it was widely acknowledged that the pay rise has been 
eroded by the rising costs of food and services.  
Our pay is insufficient because prices of food and services in the market are 
too high. When we compare our pay now with our pay before, I just think that 
we have not gained anything, before prices were not as high as it is now 
(Operational Manager HOM9) 
Even though my pay has increased so much, I am always running out of 
money to pay bills and school fees. It is very difficult to make ends meet with 
our pay, prices are too high (Nurse HWN4) 
Government did not meet our expectation regarding what we think should be 
paid to us given our work and the prices of basic foods. Some of us are not 
meeting our needs; we are barely managing to survive, yes surviving is not 
living, but there is nothing we can do. Do you know that some workers ‘eat 
without meat’ in order to survive? (Doctor HWD22) 
Despite the recognition of the pay rise, both frontline doctors and nurses and their 
operational managers claimed that their salaries remained “insufficient” and they are 
not “making ends meet” implying that their salaries have been eroded by the rising 
cost of living. Although these views should not be taken at face value, as people will 
always say that their pay is not enough, the views of the workers correlate with the 
pay data presented in Figure 8.1a and Figure 8.1b.  
Another change in pay relates to the pay process. All interviewees claimed that the 
pay reform had improved the pay process, specifically in terms of regularity and 
timeliness of pay. This is in line with the objective of the pay reform, as outlined in 
the pay document: 
 It has come to the notice of government that public workers for long hardly 
receive their salaries as and when due. On many occasions, unpaid salaries 
have been in arrears of 2-3months. This situation has been a source of worry 
to public workers; government has put in place measures to improve pay 
scheduling as a way of ensuring that salaries are paid on time (NISWC, 2004) 
The literature also reports this as a common feature of, and a major challenge to, pay 
systems in sub-Saharan Africa (McCoy et al, 2008). The interviews here revealed 
that, prior to the reform, workers were hardly ever paid on time or on a regular basis. 
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Table 8.2 reveals that almost all workers reported improvements in their pay process 
and satisfaction with the regularity of their pay.  
Table 8.2 Health workers’ opinions on changes in the pay process  
% of workers 
satisfied or 
motivated by 
pay process and 
delivery 
mechanism   
All Managers  
(operational and executive) 
(n=22) 
Doctors 
(n=40) 
Nurses 
(n=45) 
Satisfied  Dissatisfied  Satisfied  Dissatisfied  Satisfied  Dissatisfied  
Timeliness of 
pay 
91% 
(20/22) 
10% (2/22) 100% 
(40/40) 
- 100% 
(45/45) 
- 
Regularity of 
pay 
100% 
(22/22) 
- 88% 
(35/40) 
12% 95/40) 91% 
(41/45) 
9% (4/45) 
Pay 
information  
100%  
(22/22) 
- 100% 
(40/40) 
- 100% 
(45/45) 
- 
Source: Field data, 2008/9  
Declaring that the “era of unpaid and delayed salary payment is over”, one manager 
noted: 
Before the reform, there were so many problems about our salaries. The first 
was that our salaries were very low and most importantly we hardly receive 
our salaries on time. Sometimes as was the case, government owed us salaries 
for up to 3 months. So before the salaries come, you have borrowed so much. 
Nowadays since this reform started, a good thing that has happened is that we 
now receive our salaries on time and there are no more arrears of unpaid 
salaries (Operational Manager HOM3) 
In general, this was a widely accepted view, as reflected in the following comments 
made by a doctor: 
Everybody knows that this reform has done well as we now receive out pay 
promptly and regularly. At every first week of the month we are sure of our 
pay. Before the reform, sometimes when you go to the bank for your pay, the 
bank will tell you that the salary cheque has bounced. Nowadays we no longer 
experience this. Also, they provide information like payslips about our pay 
(Doctor HWD7) 
More specifically, some emphasised how the change had improved workers’ welfare, 
even enhancing planning spending:  
To say the truth, I no longer borrow because salaries are now paid on time. 
Receiving my salary on time has been helpful particularly in making plans 
(Nurse HWN2)  
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Before, you hardly knew the deductions on your salary; you just go to bank 
and collect your salary. Now we receive our payslip and it tells us when the 
money has been paid into our account. Everything is now clear, if you 
discover a mistake you just take your payslip to payroll/account and they will 
correct it next month (Doctor HWD21)  
Meanwhile, a top-level executive, reiterating the mind-set of the government, said 
that the improvement in the pay process was part of the wider reform objective, 
which has sought to improve the government’s overall budgeting and planning 
system:  
The government has improved the pay process and budgetary procedures. All 
ministries are now expected to produce the pay schedule on time and send it to 
the Presidency for approval before the 3
rd
 week to enable public workers gets 
their pay on time (Top-level Manager HEM6) 
Furthermore, all workers indicated that they now received pay-slips specifying how 
much they are paid, as well as the deductions made. The interview data suggest that 
workers saw the changes as important, because the majority claimed that they no 
longer borrowed because of non-payment of salaries. The results indicate that apart 
from the amount, value and relativity of pay, public workers attached considerable 
importance to timeliness and promptness of pay as a predictor of how well the issue 
of pay motivates them.  
 
8.5 Health Workers’ Perception of Relative Pay  
During the interviews, two levels of comparison on relative pay were noticeable. 
The first relates to how pay compare within worker categories (e.g. doctor-to-doctor 
or nurse-to-nurse), and between worker categories (doctor vs. nurse). This is also 
looked at in terms of relative pay differentials for the highest-paid and lowest-paid 
workers. The second relates to how health workers perceive their pay relative to 
their colleagues in private hospitals. 
Regarding the first, the results of the ‘within category’ analysis suggest concern that 
the reform has caused a divergence in pay distribution between the top-and lower-
level doctors and nurses respectively. The trajectory of individual responses 
unequivocally suggests that doctors and nurses, particularly at the lower-level, 
reported that their top-level colleagues earned proportionately more. Although there 
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was no indication among the lower-level workers of a demand for equal pay, there 
were concerns that top-level workers earn disproportionately higher salaries, and this 
was construed as unfair. The workers’ narratives about relative pay correlate with 
the pay data presented in Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4. The rising tension over the 
relative pay differential of top managers and others is a concern in other health 
system contexts. For example, in the UK NHS it has been widely reported in the 
media that there is a significant pay disparity between top managers and other levels 
of public health worker. In a recent report entitled “NHS pay  disparity between top 
and lower workers exposed” (BBC News, 2010), in 2008/9 top NHS managers 
received an average pay  rise of nearly 7%, compared with less than 3% for general 
workers.  
Regarding ‘between category’ salary differentials, the opinion among nurses was 
that “Doctors earn more than nurses”, while doctors reported that “We cannot earn 
the same salary as nurses because our work and skill is higher”. The issue of doctor-
to-nurse pay differences triggered tension and the evidence suggests that it remains a 
source of contention. Twenty-seven of the forty doctors interviewed were of the 
view that they were comparatively better in terms of training, skill, expertise, and 
commit more effort to their work than nurses. One doctor said: “We are the pillars 
of hospital operations and nurses are supporting staff” and so should be paid higher 
(Doctor HWD17), suggesting a presumption that doctors are superior to nurses. In 
this context, the claim that doctors should be paid more because they put in more 
effort is consistent with past studies (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Georgiadis, 2008), 
which advocates that fair pay means pay according to effort.  
Meanwhile, an operational manager noted that relative pay differentials within 
categories create a sense of unfairness and tension: 
There has been a lot of tension since the reform started. This has often 
resulted to strikes. Nurses complain that doctors earn more than they do, and 
junior workers said that senior workers earn more. I think that people are too 
engrossed in comparing this or that (Doctor HWD19)  
Meanwhile, listening to nurses on the issue of relative pay produced a different view. 
One nurse strongly argued that healthcare delivery is team work and did not see why 
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there should be discriminatory pay differentials between doctors and nurses.
5
 
Claiming that “a nurse is treated as inferior to a doctor”, she noted:   
Government hardly listen to us as they do to doctors. They take our work as 
inferior. Nursing is a woman’s work; even a house officer who started 
yesterday earns more than a nursing officer who has put in 15 years in service. 
This is unfair. We are in this job together and work together to better the life 
of patients (Nurse HWN10)  
A consensus among nurses emerged from the interviews and discussions that their 
profession is treated as “inferior or second class” in healthcare delivery. One of the 
nurses claimed that:  
Anytime doctors go on strike, government give them better pay, but for us we 
are not as forceful as doctors. I think that is why they look down on us; even 
some doctors treat us as if we do not know anything, yet some of us because of 
our experience we provide advice to them. I think it is not good to think that 
we are less valuable or inferior to doctors. We are not saying that our pay 
should be equal, but at least it should be considerate and fair, we are all in 
this job together. Sometimes you just feel cheated and frustrated (Nurse 
HWN2) 
Furthermore, another, concurring with the “team concept” and the fact that their own 
length of service is not often considered, said:  
It is painful that my son who has studied medicine who is now working in this 
hospital earns more than my salary despite my years of experience. This is not 
justifiable in any way. You see no doctor can work without a nurse from the 
theatre to the consulting and treatment room. Yet, we are treated as second 
class in health care (Nurse HWN9) 
The issue of disparity between doctors and nurses remains rife and this study did not 
see the need to go into more details about it. Suffice to say, and as revealed by five 
out of the six top-level executives interviewed, the pay disparity between doctors 
and nurses is not unique to Nigeria. Although one of the executives candidly 
acknowledged that pay disparity has been a problem, it was widely stated that what 
people earn in the public service is a function of training and profession. Citing a 
policy document, a manager said:  
Pay in the public service is dependent on the principle of federal character, 
the point of entry of officer into the federal public service shall is based on the 
principles of experience, length of service, relevant qualification, training and 
                                                          
5
 There are ample media reports that nurses and their professional unions have long been calling for 
pay parity with doctors (The Nigerian Guardian, 2000; Nigerian This Day, 2001; Nigerian Daily 
Trust, 2009) 
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examination where applicable (Operational Manager HOM10 citing the Civil 
Service decree No 43, 1988) 
The result that nurses feel demotivated by the relative pay differences compared to 
doctors has also been recognised by other recent studies. Cloutier and Vilhuber 
(2008), for example, found that feelings of disparity in pay often make nurses 
grumpy and frustrated. A senior nurse stated, however, that even though their pay 
differs, things are no longer as bad. This study indicates that relating pay 
differentials rather than pay is a key determinant of health worker motivation. It has 
also been reported that relative pay differential is a global issue (Freeman, 2007; 
Freeman and Oostendorp, 2001).   
Another relative pay issue has to do with how public health workers perceive the pay 
changes, or what they earned, compared to their colleagues in private hospitals. Prior 
to the policy, and since the 1990s, health workers in private hospital organizations 
have earned more than their public sector peers (Ogunbekun et al, 1999; Alubo, 
2001), a situation that, as noted by literature, has contributed to many public health 
workers leaving to join these private organizations. Within the framework of the pay 
reform, the government promised to make public sector work very competitive 
(NEEDS, 2004). Concerning how the salaries of public health workers compared 
with those in private hospitals, many interviewees felt that their pay had indeed 
overtaken that of their private sector colleagues. Indeed, many workers were 
particularly happy in this regard and noted that, before the reform, private hospitals 
paid better than public hospitals.  
A senior manager drew attention to the positive effect this may have had on 
workforce management and increased worker retention.  
Because our pay has overtaken the private sector pay, a lot of people now 
want to work in the public sector. Before our experience was workers leaving 
and joining the private sector. Before the reform, we were losing 2-3 staff a 
quarter to the private sector. The tide has turned in our favour and private 
workers now want to join the public service because of improved pay (Senior 
Operational Manager HOM1) 
The view of the above manager was mentioned by all the six top-level managers, 
and six out of sixten other operational managers. The results that public health 
workers now earn better pay than their colleagues in private sector organisations 
correlate with recent country-wide assessment in Nigeria (Barnes et al, 2008), which 
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found that, between 2005 and 2008, the salaries of public health workers overtook 
those in private hospitals. Despite this development, frontline workers were 
concerned that the pay rise is not commensurate with the increased workload they 
face. One manager stated:  
Not everything we do is paid for. Sometimes, you just have to continue 
because our work is a humanitarian service. I think also that that is why we 
are called public servants. I see that so many people are complaining these 
days and even sometimes there are grudges when you ask people to serve 
(Operational Manager HOM11)  
Interestingly, the opinions of workers were inconsistent and often ambiguous. For 
example, while a third of doctors and nurses interviewed wanted to be paid for every 
job they do, the other two-thirds who claimed to be driven by intrinsic motivation, 
said that though not everything they do is paid for, there is need for fairness in pay. 
Meanwhile, for those driven by intrinsic motives, there is an indication that 
commitment and devotion to duty seem to have come under attack, or are being 
eroded: 
Many people are not happy with the way things are going. We need to be 
encouraged to do more. I do feel happy doing extra towards saving lives. 
Helping people in need is why I chose to be a doctor. If we are looking to be 
paid for everything we do, patients will be abandoned to die. I do not like to 
see patients die while I can help. However, I discovered that sometimes some 
doctors are made to do work as if they are being punished. We need to be 
encouraged to do more. Sometimes, many colleagues comment that they need 
to be encouraged to do extra work (Doctor HWD18)  
“I am just doing this work because I want to, not because of the money, 
because the salary is not commensurate with our work. I have remained in this 
job, not necessarily because of money, but you feel bad because they are 
commercialising our work, yet, there are no facilitates. For example, we do 
not have functioning dialysis equipment. Sometimes we refer our patients to 
private hospitals that have facilities” (Nurse HWN32) 
It is important to underscore that the claim that pay is not commensurate with effort 
remains complex. While doctors, for example, said that they put in more effort than 
nurses, measuring individual effort in practice is complicated and contentious. The 
take-home message is that workers’ own subjective perceptions of the link between 
efforts and rewards appear to stand out as a stronger motivator than the pay rise. 
While this seems to correlate with the existing literature on human capital theory 
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994; Armstrong, 2002), which found that individual morale 
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falls when one perceives that higher efforts are not adequately rewarded, it 
contradicts mainstream classical economic theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Elliot, 
1991), which supposes that higher pay means an increase in motivation. Contrary to 
traditional stereotypes, which suppose that paying workers more will increase their 
motivation, the results of this study suggest that feelings of unfairness due to a 
disproportionate reward of pay for effort may have implications for public-spirited 
attitudes. This was found to be very consistent with past research (e.g. Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegan, 2001), which highlighted how perceptions of 
unfairness in the distribution of performance-related financial incentives could result 
in declining intrinsic motivation. Previous studies, such as those on equity (Adams, 
1965) and organizational justice (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Cropanzano and Randall, 
1993), support this view.  
The results also suggest that, in general, despite the acknowledgement of pay rises, 
health workers stated that they were not motivated, with the doctors seeming to be 
more discontented than the nurses. While their reasons remain inconsistent, a 
common theme was that the reform did not provide adequate incentives to make up 
for the changes in the work-balance of doctors. One of the doctors said that, as result 
of the rigid work process introduced by the reform, they no longer have adequate 
time to do private practice, through which they receive additional earning. The 
statement by this doctor, which was also mentioned by ten out forty other doctors 
interviewed, was clear: 
Working in government hospitals gives doctors the opportunity to do private 
practice in their spare time. While I cannot say that this has stopped, there are 
a lot of checks about our work and sometimes increased workload mean a 
reduction of time for private work. Most of us meet up with earnings from 
private practice (Doctor HWD11).  
One of the nurses attested to the above statement and confirmed that: “Doctors are 
better off because they can do their own work or work in a private hospital” (Nurse 
HWN29). The study results suggest that, although both nurses and doctors indicated 
that their intrinsic motive for working in a government organisation seems to have 
been eroded, nurses seem to indicate less discontent than doctors. 
One doctor noted that, compared with previous years, the motivations of those doing 
government work had changed: 
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Years back when we joined this service, there was a strong willingness to 
serve, but now, what we have been experiencing is that people are hardly 
serving with their whole heart. I do not think it pays any longer to commit 
one’s devotion and commitment because status and position, and the 
associated benefits have been removed. There is lot of politics and infighting; 
I think that a lot of things have spoiled this work (Doctor HWD24) 
One operational manager clearly reported that apart from pay, public health workers 
are equally, or even more, motivated by intrinsic factors such as the decision to serve, 
status as a government worker, and a good working environment or work context:   
For a public servant, pay is never enough. There are good times and there are 
bad times. Apart from pay, other things make you choose to be a public 
servant. Money is not everything. If anyone thinks that making money is all it 
takes to work then I do not think that public service is the best place. A lot of 
us value social status which working as a senior government official provide, 
and including the benefits in the society. I think that this is no more. We 
entered into this job 32 years ago because we wanted to serve, yet, I think that 
you cannot serve without earning a living. Although we are “public servants” 
I think that it is important that we have congenial working environment that 
will encourage public servants to serve well (Operational Manager HOM4) 
During the interviews, many frontline doctors and nurses, and even their managers 
asserted that the spirit of “public service” built on altruism appeared to have been 
eroded because of an increasing sense of individualism and unfairness perceived to 
be associated with the incentive structure, and loss of status in the public service 
generally. This is consistent with Le Grand (2003), who notes that public sector 
workers are also driven by self-interest and not simply by external incentives, as 
often supposed.  The view given above highlights the complexity of public workers’ 
motivations and is consistent with the literature (Dixit, 2002; Prendergast, 2007). 
The central message is that public workers are motivated by a variety of factors. 
Nevertheless, past studies suggest that across developing countries, for example in 
sub-Saharan public health systems, perceived inadequate pay stands out as one of 
the major motivational challenges (McCoy et al, 2008).  
 
8.6 Health Workers’ Perceptions of Status Change 
The literature suggests that status in an organisation and society influences workers’ 
perception of self-worth, self-concept (i.e. perceived personality) and motivation 
(Agrawal, 1977; Franco et al, 2002). Two aspect of the incentive system shaped 
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doctors’, nurses, and their managers’ perceptions of their status and position within 
the organisation and society. The first relates to the shift in the nature of fringe 
benefits; from in-kind, which are based on earned status and length of service, to 
harmonised cash-based fringe benefits, which are open to all. The second, which 
perhaps is most important because of the way it links the service delivery or changes 
in work practice reform and individual worker performance, relates to the 
introduction of performance related pay incentives, which operate as a merit reward-
based on individual workers’ performance and, at the same time, influence 
individual workers’ promotion.  
With respect to fringe benefits, the interview results suggest that workers valued in-
kind fringe benefits because they enhanced their status within the organisation and 
society. This is also because, prior to the change, fringe benefits were a privilege 
reserved for senior workers, as recognition for long years of service and status. 
Senior workers said that they considered in-kind fringe benefits as a “legacy” from 
government, which improved their “status” in society.  
When we joined this job, we were attracted by fringe benefits like official cars 
and good accommodation. Some of us did not go to private sector because 
such did not exist. Fringe benefits were not only a legacy of government work, 
it is what government gives to us to improve our status in society, having hope 
that one day you will be a boss with a government driver taking you here and 
there and to your village during Christmas. It was the dream of every public 
servant to progress in their job to become qualified to receive the fringe 
benefits (Operational Manager HOM2) 
Another worker pointed out how in-kind fringe benefits serve to compensate for 
inadequate pay compared to the private sector – particularly as it had been pre-
reform: 
Before this reform, in-kind fringe benefit was earned based on position and 
length of service. It distinguished public servants and it was a mark of respect. 
After this reform, government has monetized and harmonized the fringe 
benefits to make sure that all public servants enjoy this. I think this is good 
because we are all servants and it is just fair to give everybody (Nurse 
HWN38) 
Meanwhile, the harmonization of fringe benefits seems also to have impacted on the 
existing status quo in which “status”, “class” or “position” no longer determine who 
receives such benefits. One senior worker said that it is not fair that, after she had 
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waited for so many years, her expectation of living in a government apartment and 
using an official government car had been dashed by the reform. 
We are no longer treated with respect as it was 30 years ago. It has just 
reached my turn and government has removed official cars and no more living 
in government residential quarters. To be frank, not having these in-kind 
benefits is demoralising because some of us have waited for our turn (Senior 
Nurse HWN6) 
The general perception of senior workers is that public work no longer commands 
the high status it enjoyed thirty years ago, and senior workers are now treated as 
equals with respect to the payment of fringe benefits and allowances. Many other 
senior nurses and doctors, who feel that their expectation of enjoying in-kind fringe 
benefits has become unattainable, express discontent and argue that it is a breach of 
their contract of employment. One of the doctors recounted how they joined the 
public service not necessarily because of pay (because it has never been enough), but 
because of the extra benefits they recieved. A frontline senior doctor said: 
When we joined this job, part of the agreement was that government will 
provide these in-kind benefits as additional attraction and incentive to work in 
the public service. This was good because it improved our image in the society. 
Things have changed our position in the society is no longer viable as a senior 
government worker. The truth is that when you think about the fact that you 
will not get the in-kind benefits, it will somehow affect your devotion (Senior 
Doctor HWD2) 
On the contrary, interviews with junior level workers suggest that they valued and 
supported the harmonization of fringe benefits. One junior worker said:  
The fringe benefit is good, it is good to recognise everybody, and this is fair 
and supportive (Junior Doctor HWD39). 
All the junior workers interviews allude to what was mentioned by HWD39, and 
said clearly that providing fringe benefits is good on equity grounds.  
The results as shown in Table 8.3 below indicate that overall workers were not 
satisfied with monetization initiatives because monetised cash benefits are not in line 
with the rising cost of living. While middle-level and all lower-level workers 
asserted their support for harmonization of fringe benefits, the majority of top-level 
workers felt it introduced an “equalization effect” which undermined their cherished 
“status and position”.  
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Table 8.3: Percentage of health workers reporting their level of satisfaction with changes in fringe 
benefits  
% of health workers 
reporting level of 
satisfaction with 
changes in fringe 
benefits   
Monetization  Harmonization  Consolidation  
Satisfied  Unsatisfied  Satisfied  Unsatisfied  Satisfied  Unsatisfied  
Top-level workers 
(n=20) 
35% 
(7/20) 
65% 
(13/20) 
15% 
(3/20) 
85% 
(17/20) 
40% 
(8/20) 
60% 
(12/20) 
Middle level workers 
(n=41) 
20% 
(8/41) 
80% 
(33/41) 
95% 
(39/41) 
5% (2/41) 34% 
(14/410 
66% 
(27/41) 
Lower level worker 
(n=46) 
11% 
(5/46) 
89% 
(41/46) 
100% 
(46/46) 
- 20% 
(9/46) 
80% 
(37/46) 
Source: Field Data, 2008/9 
 
Finally, in general, all workers across all categories were dissatisfied with the 
consolidation of fringe benefits. While the reason was not always stated clearly, the 
analysis suggests that by consolidating fringe benefit into salaries, government 
removed the “tax exemption” that was enjoyed on cash benefits. Thus, the workers 
argument is that the consolidated strategy is taxing the “cash benefits” so reducing 
their value further. 
Further analysis suggests that senior consultants and others with relatively long 
lengths of service were unhappy and demotivated because promotion is now largely 
based on individual performance, rather than on seniority and length of service. One 
senior male nurse expressed this view in the following way: 
I do not think that that linking rewards and even promotion to individual 
performance respects our deserved privilege as senior staff who have given 
many years to the service. I have been in this service for 28years yet the other 
day a worker who joined ten years ago was promoted last month to the same 
rank as myself because they said she has performed well. This is discouraging 
(Senior Male Nurse HWN5)   
Other senior doctors and nurses expressed similar discontent about the shift in the 
criteria that inform promotion decisions.  
Conversely, junior frontline workers were rather favourable to the initiative arguing 
that it means that one will no longer wait for years without promotion. So, junior 
staff sees the link between individual performance, rewards and promotion as a 
means of getting accelerated promotion: 
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Before the reform you had to wait years before you could receive (if at all) 
promotion. What this reform implies is that your future is in your hands. You 
either wait for so many years or do what they say and get promoted. The 
problem I find with the new arrangement is that doing what they say to get 
promotion is not synonymous with improved quality performance because it is 
difficult to measure everything workers do (Junior Male Doctor HWD33) 
The results suggest that senior workers are more likely to be motivated if they 
believe that changes in incentive systems did not undermine their organisational 
self-esteem or status. Given the contrast to the junior and senior workers, these 
study’s results are consistent with the understanding that relative status/position is a 
critical determinant of the motivation of public health workers, particularly senior 
workers. This result could be explained in line with the understanding that status and 
position in the public service is a link to other benefits outside pay. The issue about 
the complaint by the senior workers is not that they do not like to compete, but it 
was rather seen as derogatory that their length of service, which should form the 
basis for promotion and status within the organisation and even in society, has been 
eroded by the introduction of performance-related pay incentives. This seems to 
have created a sense of psychological deprivation and, thus, a source of 
demotivation for some and demotivation for others.  
The study results suggest that older frontline workers seem unenthusiastic about the 
culture of harmonising fringe benefits and disregarding status and length of service 
in assessing who gets the benefits. According to them, this is inappropriate and 
unappealing because it contradict the traditional culture of the public service.  
 
8.7 Effects of the Performance Related Pay on Health Workers  
As highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, the interest of this thesis in pay 
reforms as an incentive relates largely to the performance-related-pay (PRP) element 
of the health reforms. This relates directly to the service delivery reforms or changes 
in work practice, thus providing the link between pay incentive and promotion based 
on good performance. This section, therefore, accounts for the results of the 
perceived effect of the changes in pay incentive, and relate more to pay to individual 
workers’ incentive.  
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8.7.1 Individualism, teamwork and collegial behaviour  
The literature asserts that effectiveness of healthcare practice depends on a large 
variety of factors, particularly teamwork and collegial behaviour among workers 
(Firth-Cozens, 2004; Gilson et al, 2005). Another perceived effect relates to how the 
operation of the incentive structure has introduced selfishness and individualism 
which, as suggested undermines individual commitment to one another, cooperation 
and teamwork. A nurse had this to say:   
When you make people work as if they are in the marketplace, do not expect 
them to share their information, otherwise it will no longer be competition. 
How can you expect me to share information I know will make me a winner to 
another? This is the problem. This reform has created selfishness in our work, 
people hardly cooperate as before and this is not appropriate for healthcare. 
We work and achieve in teams. They are destroying teamwork in this practice 
(Nurse HWN18) 
Corroborating the above statement, another nurse with relatively longer years of 
experience than HWN18, said:  
 This reform has encouraged individual effort and rewards. So many people 
are just after the reward and can do anything to get it. In principle, everything 
is presented as good but in practice, the process is far from being good. There 
is a lot of finger pointing, people are no longer their brothers’ keeper, and 
people are just concerned with themselves. Although I am not jealous of those 
workers presented with an award, no one really knows how they did it. A lot of 
rumours going around are about this issue and so many people have become 
selfish and even hoard information (Nurse HWN13) 
A female doctor also pointed out how the behaviour changes referred to above 
undermined the professional ethos of cooperation and teamwork: 
When we are signed up to do this job as a ‘public servant’, we solemnly and 
sincerely swear that we will faithfully serve with high level devotion and 
commitment to duty, and to cooperate with one another to achieve the 
corporate goal of the public service which is to serve the public putting 
personal interest apart. Now this reform has introduced selfishness and 
personal pride. I think that a lot of people are no longer ‘public servants’, they 
have become servants to themselves while undermining the efforts of others. 
This is against professional norms and public sector ethos and this makes one 
rethink ones commitment (Female Doctor HWD9) 
The statement of HWD9 is very instructive, and was also referred to by others. 
Confirming the view of HWN18 and HWD9, a ward manager said:  
In this work, we need each other. Doctors need nurses. However, this reform 
is bringing in an individual focus. People hardly help each other especially if 
it does not contribute to their immediate gain. I think that the reform has 
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introduced winners and losers mentality rather than a win-win relationship, 
this is telling on teamwork. Those who did not win an award often become 
envious and jealous, and this reduces their willingness to cooperate with 
colleagues and even makes them see us managers as their enemies 
(Operational Manager HOM5) 
 
The extracts drawn from the interviews with HWN13 (see Table 6.3.6) suggests that 
the feeling of being “left out” in the performance incentive and reward list despite 
one’s own perception of having worked hard or even harder than those rewarded, 
creates resentment and results in an unwillingness to keep and maintain altruistic 
behaviour. As captured in the word of one of the operational managers, “Nowadays, 
people are just on their own and after reward, status and promotion. You hardly see 
people do things just in the name of good service” (Male HOM9). At face value, this 
seems an overstatement; however, it is an indication of how reward can be linked to 
individual commitment.  
Commenting on the relevance of teamwork to health care delivery, a senior nurse 
said that it is only by working together that quality nursing care can be realised:  
Our work is team-based; no single nurse can make it. We need each other to 
build on what we do. When we don’t work in teams, patients become 
vulnerable and could be abandoned. It would have been nice if the reward 
process valued team awards than individual awards. This naming and 
shaming process is unfair, creates unequal opportunities and in fact is divisive 
and threatens good nursing work (Nurse HWN2) 
The result suggests that more nurses than doctors spoke more about the link between 
the reform operation and the breakdown of team spirit and intrinsic behaviour.  
One doctor said: 
People are no longer concerned with doing the work as public servants. 
Everybody is on his/her own. There is lot of conflict and lack of trust among 
frontline worker and their managers. There are rumours that some managers 
and even SERVICOM is using the process to recommend their favourite for 
promotion (Doctor HWD12) 
 
The statement by HWD12, which represents the potential implication of lack of trust 
outlined in Section 6.3.2.1, suggests how the reform has resulted in conflict, and 
perhaps a reduction in intrinsic public service behaviour.  
A nurse also said that:  
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I came into this job because I wanted to serve, but from what I am seeing, 
somebody can be cherry-picked for coming early to work for example, and be 
given double promotion over others. This is not good. While you are there 
serving and doing your best, others who may be lucky to be seen, or who blow 
their trumpet will be promoted. When you are not recognised, commitment to 
serve is nonsense since we are told that this will not be rewarded. I feel really 
bad about this (Nurse HWN13) 
Overall, the results suggest that the reform process breeds unfriendly competition, 
and reduced commitment and helping behaviour among workers. One nurse added 
that everybody is working for their own benefit, saying “People hardly work as a 
team anymore” (Nurse HWN28).  
The results suggest that the operation of the performance-related pay incentive for 
frontline health workers creates a competitive spirit which has led to an ‘every 
worker to him/herself’ mentality, which is perceived to undermine the traditional 
professional ethos of teamwork and cooperation in healthcare practice. This has led 
to isolation and indifference, thus undermining the collective work ethics which are 
essential to good healthcare, and the frontline workers perceived this as 
demoralising. The results support existing findings that extrinsic incentives based on 
competitive performance arrangements have too narrow an understanding of what 
motivates frontline health workers, and there is no convincing evidence to 
demonstrate that competition enhances individual performance and quality 
healthcare (Gibbs et al, 2009; Propper, et al, 2008a).  
 
8.7.2 Perceived unfairness in the operation of performance-related 
incentives  
This study also highlights how the relationship in perceived fairness and unfairness 
of the procedure and process of performance measurement and distribution of 
performance related pay incentives operate as a motivational determinant. The 
importance of fairness in the distribution of performance-related rewards was 
highlighted, but there were ambiguities and inconsistencies in the conceptualisation 
of what amounts to being fair or unfair in the reform process. First, as it relates to 
the conceptualisation of the reform and the incentive system in particular, and as 
noted in Section 6.2, clinicians believed that excluding them from the decision-
making processes that shaped their incentive is considered unfair. A senior doctor 
said: 
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We do not see the rationale for excluding us from the reform development. It is 
very unfair to use outsiders and non-clinicians to fabricate how we should do 
our work (Doctor HWD1) 
 
Commenting on the development of the performance measures, the frontline 
workers also claimed that they were not consulted about how performance should be 
defined or measured. One of the nurses said: 
I perceive the conception of the reform process as discriminatory. We know 
our work; I do not know why they did not involve us. The process is biased 
and we cannot trust it because it is not in line with our clinical expectations 
(Nurse HWN18) 
 
Second, the frontline workers also made mention of unfairness with respect to the 
performance measurement process and individual reward. This was highlighted as 
important because of the link between performance measurement outcomes and 
allocation of performance-related incentives. The frontline workers commented that 
performance measurement that categorises who is to be given performance pay is a 
cherry-picking exercise which selects one as ‘good’ and naming the majority as 
‘bad’ performers. They found this particularly unfair because their work practice is 
not in any way segregated. Both categories of workers (doctors and nurses), and 
their managers and union representatives, spoke against the sense of unfairness in 
the reform operations.  
 
What we have told government is that our individual work is difficult to 
measure. We work in teams, so instead of rewarding individuals (which is 
divisive) it is better to reward and encourage teamwork. The process of just 
picking out one person from a group is unfair and does not acknowledge 
differences in local contexts, skill and experience (Union representative)  
 
It is difficult to believe that the performance measurement and performance 
related pay is valid and fair process.  It is difficult to believe that a worker 
who everybody believed is not working hard is declared a winner (Doctor 
HWD23) 
 
Workers hardly see the process as fair and even look at us managers as the 
enemy of their progress (Operational Manager HOM5) 
 
In line with the above, the results also highlight that frontline health workers point 
clearly to a sense that the perceived selectivity of who is to be rewarded and who 
should not creates a ‘winners and losers’ mentality. In the above context, there were 
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rumours that the process is not honest, and frontline workers stated that operational 
managers, or even SERVICOM staff, use the evaluation and reward process to 
recommend their favourites for quick awards and promotion. The perception of bias 
and favouritism suggests that the categorisation of a worker as a ‘good’ performer is 
not the same thing as saying that they have actually performed. This is because of 
the supposition that the performance assessment carried out by SERVICOM may 
have been incorrect. There were also rumours among the frontline workers that the 
drive for performance-related awards may have created room for cheating. One of 
the doctors clearly noted: 
Human beings are smart, people are desperately cunning. Though it may not 
be evident on the surface, people do a lot of things to make their way through, 
sometimes people sort out their way through their friends, social links, 
personality and politics. Those who do not get along with the system will only 
complain, but this complain has no impact. The truth is that nobody will tell 
you everything they do to better their lives. Sometimes, this is based on some 
form of ‘you scratch my back and I will scratch yours’ (Doctor HWD6) 
  
The above statement suggests that bias and favouritism, which is perceived as a 
systemic procedural failure may have clouded the good effects of the reform 
elements. Workers who had not already received good assessment or performance 
rewards did not accept that they had been adequately assessed, and this added to the 
poor relationships with their colleagues, their managers and with SERVICOM. 
Although the evidence was hard to pin down, there were rumours that award winners 
may be results of ‘playing the system’. Equally, they may have used their 
connections or some competitive advantage over the colleagues. For example, 
related to the perceived difficulty in segregating individual performance, a senior 
frontline doctor indirectly accepted the imperfection of the system and asserted that 
lack of trust and perception of unfairness is a systemic issue in Nigeria:  
It is hard to believe that everyone who has won an award achieved it through 
merit. People can do many things to get what they want. This is Nigeria where 
many things happen though networks. Although the rumours are there, so far, 
no one has been charged (Doctor HWD3)  
Another challenge to the procedure of performance measurement is that the workers 
perceive that it creates an unequal opportunity for all workers. Two nurses expressed 
their views:  
I came into this job because I wanted to serve, but from what I am 
experiencing I fell that people who work hard are not seen.  Others who may 
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be lucky to be seen, or who blow their trumpet will be promoted. I feel really 
bad about this because the assessment is not accurate and is unfair (Nurse 
HWN13)  
We do not have the same ability and are not working in the same unit. Nobody 
from our unit (HIV/AIDS) has won an award. I just observe some units (e.g. 
Accident and Emergency, and General Outpatient units) are always favoured. 
I am focused in doing my work. Therefore, nobody will recommend me 
because I do not have a smiling face (Nurse HWN19) 
 
It is clear from the analysis that the way workers and their managers conceive of the 
fairness remains ambiguous. However, it is intresting to note that there are different 
interpretations of fairness, which produce different interpretations of reality and 
outcomes. Largely, health workers’ articulation of their sense of fairness is clearly 
visible in the texts and, though subjective, remains an instructive result. The results 
of this study suggest that, despite the normative significance in the perceived 
diversity of fairness, it was, however, difficult to pin down exactly what constitutes 
shared values with respect to fairness.  
The results also demonstrate that workers’ subjective perception of unfairness of the 
reform operation and associated relationships impacted negatively on the work 
environment. The analysis of unfairness in organisational relationships has been 
reported on business work environments in a number of studies (Lind and Tyler, 
1988; Cropanzano and Folger, 1991; Dooms and Oijen, 2005). In particular, Dooms 
and Oijen (2005) highlighted the fact that perceived procedural unfairness (i.e. 
unfairness linked to process) such as in individual workers’ assessments, was one 
factor that endangered the possibility of realising corporate policies and objectives. 
Greenberg and Cropanzano (2001) also pointed to the fact that perceived 
distributional unfairness (i.e. unfairness linked to the distribution of incentives or 
rewards) can result in undesirable behaviour among organisation workers. To sum 
up, the results of this study suggest that an effective work environment plays a 
critical role in reform effectiveness, it encourages trust among organisation actors, 
and it creates an operational arena that boosts the perception of fairness among 
actors in the reform. Throughout the texts, and as outlined in Section 6.2.1 and 
Section 6.2.2, the sense of being “left out” in designing the performance incentives 
seem to have created a sense of alienation and professional demotivation among the 
health providers. 
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A senior male doctor said:  
It is important to involve us in decisions about our work. However, this 
government never considered our views. I think this is not good. They just 
called a meeting and told us what they have decided to do during the 
seminars.  Based on our experiences since the reform started, there is every 
reason to think that some of us were ill-informed about the way the reform 
was going to impact on our work (Male HWD2) 
A nurse was of the view that, “When you involve people, they will cooperate, but 
this government has pushed the policy on us” (Nurse HWN23). Overall, two-thirds 
of the frontline doctors and nurses and ward managers expressed their demotivation 
about the way government imposes change on them and even uses “outsiders” to 
plan and regulate their work.  
8.8 Discussions and Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the effects of how different worker categories perceive 
the reform pay incentives and their effects. Clearly, the issue of public worker 
incentives has been the centre of debates about motivation of health workers across 
developing countries health system contexts (Nigeria included) (McCoy et al, 2008; 
WHO, 2006; Hongoro and Normand, 2006; Stillwell et al, 2004). Generally 
speaking, the use of performance-related pay incentives based on ex post evaluation 
of individual workers’ performance (Gibbs et al, 2004; Baker et al, 1994; 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) draws from the economic logic of human behaviour 
which presumes that workers are rational and self-interested, and will willingly 
commit to achieve a set organisational goals (i.e. targets), if information about their 
work is provided and that they are rewarded accordingly (Williamson, 1985; Neely 
et al, 1995; Otley, 1999). The results indicate that there is no convincing evidence to 
show that individual workers’ morale has improved within the context of operation 
of performance-related incentives associated with the service delivery reform. There 
are several reasons for this. The first relates to the belief that the incentive process is 
discriminatory and introduce a selecting process which labels workers as losers or 
‘bad performers’ and winners or ‘good performers’. The results suggest that workers, 
especially the majority who are categorised as bad performers, feel that they have 
been disproportionately penalised and unfairly treated. This might have implications 
for worker motivation. This result correlates with relatively old empirical research 
210 
 
drawn from process theories of motivation (e.g. Adams, 1965), which found that 
perceived unfairness in social relationships erode morale.  
Second, it was clear from the analysis that senior workers in particular reported that 
they are demoralised. This is because linking pay and promotion to individual 
performance contradicts their expectations of an easier ride for promotion. Although 
the supposition surrounding the reform incentive arrangement point to the traditional 
mainstream economic perception that public workers are motivated by extrinsic 
incentives (Frank and Lewis, 2004; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008), the results of this 
study suggest that intangible factors, such as social status and position, provide more 
intrinsic motives and have a crucial influence on public health workers’ motivation. 
This suggests that health workers appear to value non-financial incentives more 
highly as motivators than extrinsic incentives. The results correlate with past studies 
(Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006) which found that across many developing countries, 
particularly within the African region, public health workers are motivated more by 
non-financial factors. It also corroborates Franco et al’s research (2002), which 
suggests that public health workers’ motivation is not often simple, but relates to a 
number of factors associated to individual, social and organisational contexts.  
The third reason has to do with the understanding that frontline workers did not see 
any strong link between their efforts, and the possibility of receiving the 
performance incentive as prescribed. The fact that, despite their efforts, they 
complained of not having received a reward and promotion suggests a perceived 
weak link between workers’ efforts (i.e. achieving the reform targets) and receiving 
the reward and promotion. The frontline workers perceive the process as unfair and 
defective. The results correlate with Rainey et al (1986) and process theories of 
motivation (Vroom, 1964), which found that, where there is weak link between 
efforts, expectations and results, motivation wanes. As noted by past studies (e.g. 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Snyder and Stukas, 1999; Wigfield and Eccles, 2000), it 
is supposed that expectations serve as perceptual and interpretive filters that 
influence individual motivation and performance. The fact that some claimed that 
even though they has done well, they could not receive recommendations for an 
award, point to the fact that they consider the performance measurement process that 
underpins the selection of who is to be rewarded as inconsistent and subjective. The 
results suggest that inability to achieve ones’ expectations tends to erode the intrinsic 
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motivation to cooperate or perform. Overall, there is a suggestion that the focus on 
extrinsic performance incentives which undermine the intangible benefits, such as 
status and position, appear to have had a deleterious effect on the intrinsic aspect of 
their job. This results correlate with Deci and Ryan (1985), Frey (2000), and Frey 
and Jegen (2001), who found that emphasis on extrinsic motivation erodes intrinsic 
motivation, which is the core driver of individual public workers’ willingness to 
work, and their commitment and devotion to duty.  
Meanwhile, frontline health workers held appreciably more negative views about 
performance-related pay because it was particularly noticeable that although they 
have claimed to have done well, and thus deserve rewards, they grumble and express 
discontent that their expectations were not realised.  This denial appears to create 
psychological deprivation and demotivation. The workers press on to say that that 
the performance goals linked to performance incentives, and the selection and 
distribution process of the incentives, are somewhat unclear, and perhaps 
unachievable. The results corroborate literature on expectancy theory (Wigfield and 
Eccles, 2000; Lawler, 1971; Vroom, 1964), which stresses the importance of 
expectation as a predictor of individual motivation and behaviour. Also, Lawler and 
Suttle, (1973) found that worker expectation is related to their motivation and 
performance.  
Another issue is connected to the view that performance-related incentives have 
encouraged dysfunctional behaviour, individualism, tension, infighting and 
grievances, which add up to create an unhealthy work environment. As noted earlier 
by other studies (Bevan and Hood, 2006a/b; Goddard et al, 2002; Marsden and 
French, 1994), there is believable evidence drawn from other studies that such 
situations not only lead to dysfunctional behaviour, low morale, and erosion of 
intrinsic motivation, but also to poor performance by individual workers. Another 
worrying effect acknowledged by the workers is the assertion that it is rather 
unfortunate that the incentive system undercut cooperation, and the spirit of 
teamwork and selfless service which forms the traditional ethos of public service 
work.  
Finally, although the pay rise is not directly linked to the performance of workers, it 
is important to note that, workers showed surprisingly negative views in that they 
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still complained that they are not motivated, even though they earn more. This 
contradicts traditional economics which suppose that paying workers more will 
motivate them to do better. Rather, it supports the emerging understanding of the 
behavioural happiness research (Easterlin, 1995; 2001), which supposes that higher 
pay does not necessarily imply higher satisfaction. Easterlin (2001) found that more 
pay does not make a worker happy or motivated.  In line with social comparison and 
equity research literature (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Adams, 1965), this study sheds 
light on how individual workers’ subjective perceptions of changes in relative pay 
with respect to relevant others shape their motivation. In this context, it seems 
suggestive that the widespread complaint of inadequate pay across developing 
countries’ health systems has also been reported   (e.g. McCoy et al, 2008; WHO, 
2006; Hongoro and Norman, 2006; Drager et al, 2006), and in this context, despite 
the huge pay rise, indicates that this may not mean that public health workers are not 
being paid enough, but that their pay compares poorly in relative terms, and 
compared to the cost of living. This clearly points to the complexity in the use of 
extrinsic incentives and public health sector motivation, which have been 
highlighted by past studies (Perry and Wise, 1990; Dixit, 2002; Prendergast, 2007). 
In general, the overall study results indicate that there is no convincing evidence to 
suggest that performance-related incentives have improved the effectiveness of the 
individual workers within the case hospital organisation. The results suggest that the 
practice of rewarding performance was found to be defective and, thus, failed to 
provide adequate motivation to individual workers for several reasons. First, the 
workers found that despite the fact that they had worked hard, thus meriting the 
incentive, they were not recommended. Consequently, they did not feel that the 
performance measurement/assessment process and the distribution of the 
performance-related incentives were comprehensive in accounting for their efforts. 
They perceive the incentive process as unfair, imperfect, and inconsiderate.  
Second, the perceived  imperfect performance measurement process induces 
frontline workers to attempt to engage in self-interest seeking behaviour (in order to 
win awards) that make it appear they are doing well relative to their colleagues but 
in fact, is contrary to the goals of the reform. Because this opportunistic behaviour 
operates as a hidden action which the implementers are unable to observe or detect, 
it undermines the effectiveness of the reform. This conforms to the principal agent 
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literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Baker et al, 1994), which demonstrates how 
asymmetrical information could make it difficult for SERVICOM to ascertain 
individual worker performance. This explicitly provides a compelling explanation 
and acknowledgement of the subjective nature of the individual workers’ 
performance measurement process linked with the performance-related incentive 
system, and suggests how the distribution of performance incentives may not have 
been ‘truly’ based on perfect knowledge of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers. Besides, 
and as noted, there is an understanding that frontline workers may have neglected 
deep-seated clinical procedures which contribute to achieving and maintaining the 
clinical quality of their work, since they are not rewarded for following such 
procedures. 
In the contexts of the above situations, and based on the perceived positive 
correlation between available incentives (Croxson et al, 2001; Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002; Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006), and individual health worker’s 
motivation and performance (Kanfer, 1999; Franco et al, 2002; 2004; Manongi et al, 
2006), there is no convincing evidence from this study to suggest that the incentive 
system has enhanced workers’ capacity to perform better. A final message from this 
chapter is that frontline health workers overall are strongly driven by their 
professional ethos including status, recognition and constructive support from 
colleagues as intrinsic elements of their vocation, and adversely affected by financial 
incentive. The result confirms that non-financial incentives play a critical role in 
increasing the motivation of frontline health workers and supports findings from 
other studies (Franco et al, 2002; Dielemann et al, 2003; Mathauer and Imhoff, 
2006). 
A take-home message from this section is that there is marked relationship between 
individual health workers’ subjective perceptions of fairness in the distribution of 
performance-related pay, which operates as an extrinsic incentive, and their intrinsic 
motivation (i.e. commitment and devotion to their vocation) and their desire to 
change their behaviour to perform better. It is, however, appreciated that the 
perception of fairness and unfairness was not straightforward, but rather ambiguous, 
and in some instances, inconsistent between different worker categories.  
Nevertheless, the study has shed light on how intrinsic elements of incentive shape 
health workers’ motivation.  
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9 Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of this study was to understand policy reform processes and 
organisational change in the public health sector in Nigeria, with particular emphasis 
on exploring how health sector reform works by investigating how frontline health 
providers perceive of, and respond to, reform as an organisational change process.  
The study addresses three distinct but closely related research questions about the 
reforms: 
1. What changes did the health reform introduce with respect to work practices 
and pay systems?  
2. How do frontline health providers perceive the change process as it relates to 
their day-to-day work practices?  
3. How the different categories of workers in the hospital perceive the reforms 
have influenced their motivation to perform their jobs?   
The study sheds light on public sector service reform processes that are at the centre 
of public debate in many countries.  It focuses specifically on health sector reforms 
implemented in Nigeria between 2000 and 2007, and on changes introduced in 
Federal Medical Centres (FMCU) or tertiary hospitals. In Nigeria, these tertiary 
hospitals are key organisations responsible for the delivery of health care, and 
therefore are central to the reform process. The study is based on research 
undertaken in Nigeria in 2007 at the Federal Medical Centre, Abia State over a 
twelve-month period. Information was collected from a number of sources including 
policy documents, semi-structured interviews, and direct observation by the 
researcher.  
To address the first research question: “What changes did the health reform 
introduce with respect to work practices and pay systems”, the study engaged in a 
systematic review of the reforms with respect to policy context and content (Chapter 
4). This was followed by an analysis of the policy process (Chapter 5) which 
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detailed how the reforms operate in practice within the research case study hospital-
the Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia (FMCU) in the capital of Abia State in 
southeastern Nigeria. This analysis included detailing the role of the government 
reform implementation agency, SERVICOM. To address the second research 
question: “How do frontline health providers perceive the change process as it 
relates to their day-to-day work practices”, detailed interviews with different 
categories of health workers, including managers and frontline staff, were conducted 
and reported on in Chapter 6. Addressing the last research question, “How are the 
different categories of workers in the hospital affected by the change process, and 
how do they deal with it”, also involved the detailing of the experiences of different 
categories of health workers, and their senior and operational managers, within the 
case hospital. The analysis of these experiences is detailed in Chapters 7 and 8.  
The study is mainly informed by two bodies of knowledge: New Public sector 
Management (NPM) and elements of organisational change theory that address the 
issue of worker motivation and behavioural change. This study has provided 
important insights into the understanding that, although the promotion of demand-
driven public service delivery has apparently been enthusiastically adopted in many 
developing economies, including Nigeria, the operational realities are complex. It 
has been widely argued that the way in which this interest in changing public sector 
service delivery has been formulated in policy, and in its mode of implementation, 
has been highly prescriptive and top-down, and this has had implications for policy 
effectiveness and organisation outcomes. It is also argued that the socio-political 
context in which the reforms are being sought, the policy implementation process in 
a specific local environment, and the attitude of clinical workers working in that 
environment who are often the target of such reforms, all determine policy outcomes 
and need to be considered in both policy formulation, implementation, and in 
monitoring and evaluation procedures. 
It is important to recognise that a key limitation of the study potentially lies in the 
fact that the data were collected from one case hospital organisation. Although the 
case hospital organisation consists of various other actors such as patients and other 
non-clinical staff, the focus of this study was predominantly health workers and their 
managers who are primarily involved in healthcare delivery.  
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Based on a more critical reflective discussion of the challenges and limits of the 
research design, robust triangulation of evidence was a major challenge. The thesis 
recognises that ambiguity and inconsistency permeated most aspects of the health 
workers’ subjective narratives, and there is suspicion that workers will always 
complain and grumble whatever the circumstances. Nevertheless, the research 
process made attempts to seek out further information that would enhance 
explanations and or substantiate claims. Together, pondering over the robustness of 
the evidence, there is an indication that the analysis and discussions did not take the 
individual worker’s narrative at face value. The lack of ‘hard’ or objective data limit 
the extent to which this research could make generalisations. Thus, the findings of 
this study need to be interpreted with caution, and viewed within the expressed 
experiences and accounts presented by the respondents, and within the specific 
context.  
It is important to recognise that there are some issues that the research design simply 
cannot engage in, or resolve conclusively, yet, it still shed some light on them. In 
particular, based on the case study, it seems likely that the findings of this study 
could be beneficial and supportive for future understanding and conceptualisation of 
how reform works. The findings can optimistically provide the basis for future 
research and practical recommendations for public health management action which 
could complement or improve the effectiveness of reform and performance of public 
health workers in particular.  
9.2 Framework for understanding the reform process 
This study has shed light on public service delivery reform processes with an 
emphasis on how health professionals, in this research doctors and nurses 
responsible for delivery of healthcare in tertiary hospitals in Nigeria,  perceive, and 
respond to, the effect of the reform on their work.  These doctors and nurses are the 
target group for the realisation of the health and related salary reform objectives in 
Nigeria. Driven by the research aim of contributing to the understanding of policy 
change processes in the context of service delivery reforms, and the role of the 
various policy and organisation actors, this study adopted an actor-oriented approach 
to understanding policy reform (Long, 2001). The actor-oriented approach provides 
a more appropriate framework for dealing with how different organisational actors 
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interact in the context of change. It stretches further than the positivist view of 
reality, and is informed by the understanding that the subjective perception of 
primary actors are socially constructed and interpreted based on individual actor’s 
interest, power and position. While this suffers a limitation in that it cannot be taken 
as objective, it provides a more realistic way of relating with the daily experiences, 
processes and interactions of the actors. Meanwhile, the analysis and interpretation 
of the reform process goes beyond the face value to include the dynamics of social 
contexts and work culture, which add flavour to developing in-depth view of how 
workers perceive and interpret the reform effects.   
In line with issues that emerged during the research process, the framework of 
analysis recognises the dynamics of power and interest among actors (e.g. 
implementers and the clinicians, clinicians vs. clinicians, and clinicians and patients) 
especially at the organisational levels wherein the reform operates. Lukes (1974) 
points out that this involves an inherent element of power and interest of one agent 
over another agent (e.g. clinical workers). In practice, power relations reflect 
differences in ideas and perceptions about a given problem within the social, 
economic and political sphere of the reform. This  relates directly to issues of control 
or regulation in order to restrict, it forges discipline or normalises one’s action and 
discretion (Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1980), it reconfigures existing interactions and 
agency among actors within a social relationship (Long, 2001; Giddens, 1984), or 
reshapes existing incentives, sanctions and operating culture (Lukes, 2005). Within 
the understanding of power relations is an underlying concept of relationship and 
interaction among actors (e.g. trust or distrust relations) (Holmes, 1995; Kramer, 
1999; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001) which also contributes to shaping behaviour and 
maintaining a healthy working environment. 
The framework of analysis draws largely from the understanding that change 
happens not simply because of prescription of what should be done but, most 
importantly, because of the day-to-day operational realities, and the varied 
negotiations, manoeuvres, relationships, and interactions engaged in by 
organisational actors who operate with a significant level of agency. Given the 
centrality of motivation for behavioural change in the realisation of the reform goals 
at the individual worker level, the framework points to the relevance of social 
context, professional culture, and norms in shaping individual workers’ behaviour, 
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rather than simply formal rules or extrinsic incentives. This framework builds on the 
well-established sociological literature on organisational change (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Giddens, 1984; DiMaggio, 1988), which emphasises the role of agency and 
autonomy of actors in shaping the motivation to act. While conventional policy 
analysis, which conceptualises reform as a logical and segregated activity (Grindle 
and Thomas, 1991; Sabatier, 2007), has largely overlooked this aspect of 
organisational life, the evidence that emerged from this study suggests the contrary, 
that reform, which operates as an organisational change process, is a complex 
process. By virtue of the dynamic nature of organisational processes and interaction, 
communication and interpretation of information about the reform within, and 
between- different actors is hardly straightforward and the outcomes are 
unpredictable. 
In addition, with respect to how the reform is perceived by different actors, this 
study’s framework emphasises how the diversity of interest, life experience, status 
and length of service of individual workers can influence how frontline workers 
perceive, and respond to, changes in their workplace.  
In accordance with the above conceptualisation, Figure 9.1 summarises the 
framework of the present study in terms of how the reform came about, how it 
operated within the case study hospital in Nigeria, how the various actors working in 
the hospital engaged with and perceived the processes of change, and how the 
reform’s effects were percieved.  
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Figure 9.1 Framework for the study of policy reform process and its effects  
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Overall, the framework used in this study was found to be appropriate for 
developing a detailed understanding of the dynamics of what happens once policy is 
developed and implemented, and especially of how policy recipients translate and 
respond to the policy and the processes of change being introduced. Beginning with 
the understanding that the reform sits within the context of changing social, political 
and economic situations in Nigeria, this study conceptualised the reform as a change 
process.  This conceptualisation served as a means to analyse the views of multiple 
actors within a specific public health sector setting.  
In this study, the understanding of policy reform processes transcend seeing policy 
reform as a linear and discrete event, which when implemented will automatically 
result in predicted outcomes. Rather, policy reform needs to be seen as a messy and 
complex process. This study’s framework supports the idea that change happens not 
by prescription of what should be done, often driven by ascendency and interest, but 
through the actions, agency, relationship and processes engaged in by organisational 
actors on the ground where policy is orchestrated and implemented. This study is, 
therefore, of the view that understanding policy reform processes and effects needs 
to accommodate possible contradictions imbued within the existing culture, agency, 
norms and professional identity of health workers who are involved in the delivery 
of healthcare.  
The framework begins with the understanding of the reform objectives, then moves 
from the content or instruments to understanding how the reform operates in practice 
by focusing on the actions of the target groups in response to the changes. It ends by 
demonstrating the links between implementation processes and actor responses to 
introduced changes, and predicted reform outcomes including the effects on 
frontline workers. The approach began with gathering data about the reforms (both 
the health and related pay reform), their content and context, and how the health 
reform in particular was initiated. The analysis of these data was used to develop an 
understanding of what changes were expected, and why, and which occurred with 
respect to work practices and incentives. Then, data about the actual implementation 
process, and including the actual actions of the different actors involved (including 
SERVICOM), were collected. These data provided a detailed picture of the reform 
process itself. Thereafter, data on hospital practice based on the perceptions of 
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different categories of health workers were gathered to address research questions 2 
and 3.  
Overall, the framework provided a comprehensive understanding of the actions of 
the actors involved in the reform process, and an in depth description of the different 
views of the actors that was used to develop an understanding of reform 
effectiveness at the organisation level. It is understood that the on-going policy 
reform process represents a sound strategy for changing how government service 
delivery agencies operate. Nevertheless, the connections between the reform 
process, human behaviour and performance, and outcomes, though predictable to 
some extent, remain uncertain especially when the full range of factors that 
influence behaviour and motivation are incorporated into the analysis.  
The specific findings of this study are summarised below beginning with the reform 
context and content, and implementation process. This is followed by health 
workers’ perceptions of the policy reform processes. Finally, the findings on the 
effects of the reform on health workers are presented.  
9.3 The reform-context and content, and implementation process 
The health reform that attracted my interest in this study involved, first, changes in 
hospital procedures (i.e., performance measurement practices) and more importantly, 
a shift in the culture of public service delivery from one driven by the provision of 
medical care led largely by the clinical professions, to a demand-led system within 
which the public become clients purchasing services that are expected to meet their 
needs and interests. These changes have involved the establishment of a 
performance audit agency, in this case called SERVICOM. The role of SERVICOM 
is to ensure worker compliance with the reform, and to guarantee quality assurance, 
both to the public, and government. With reference to the second element of the 
reforms related to changes in pay systems, the main interest of this thesis has been 
on the performance-related pay elements because it is this component of the pay 
reforms that is directly linked with the health service delivery reforms. Pay 
incentives given to individuals for “good behaviour” are used to motivate and 
encourage compliance with the changes in work practice deemed essential for 
achieving client-driven services. 
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Clearly, the reform is linked to the classical economic conceptualisation of human 
behaviour based on the scientific management approach to industrial organisation. 
The contemporary debate and discourse underpinning the reform which primarily 
focuses on changing the way government and public workers operate is largely 
linked to New Public Sector Management (NPM) theory (Brignall and Modell, 
2000), within which change is driven by a market ideology of individual competition 
and rewards. 
The health reform in Nigeria represents a new way of thinking about how to 
organise and manage public health sector services, and an important dimension of 
the reform relates to changing human behaviour. So, a major part of the policy 
reform involves discrete problem identification, for instance through the introduction 
of targets, performance measurement, and getting the incentives right for individual 
rewards to attract “good behaviour”, reinforce further compliance, optimise the use 
of resources and improve the quality of care.  
Based on the views of the professionals providing clinical services in the FMCU, 
there is suggestion that it is difficult to measure individual performance, and hospital 
activities are hardly isolated.  Rather, as was pointed out by many informants, the 
provision of clinical services frequently depends on teamwork, possibly involving 
group action but also individuals providing parts of a sequenced set of services. 
Little support was given by any medical staff to the introduction of individual 
rewards, and no one pointed to evidence that they had improved healthcare delivery. 
At the same time, everyone agreed that the target of timely and transparent services 
for all clients had been achieved.  
Clinical staff pointed to the benefits to them even of this change, meaning there were 
no long queues gathering over days with patients prepared to sleep in waiting areas 
in order to ensure that they were seen by a nurse or doctor. Nevertheless, this state of 
affairs – no carry-over of patients from one day to the next – had not been achieved 
without some costs. As detailed in Chapter 7, these costs included a sense of work 
overload, anxiety, stress, and tiredness, all of which has been noted by other 
researchers. Absent from the reform is any sense that there would be costs to be born, 
and for anyone to be in a position of saying that the changes had been successful, 
there must be monitoring of outcomes. We cannot say that these are unpredicted 
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outcomes because earlier research, admittedly in different contexts, had already 
pointed to some of these costs. Another cost relates to the way SERVICOM has 
wielded significant power over the health professionals, which has often led to fear 
of job loss, demotivation and a sense of losing control. The hospital managers found 
the bossy attitude of SERVICOM devastating and believed it has had negative 
effects on their capacity to manage, created role complexity, and eroded the 
professional agency, discretion and autonomy of health workers in general in doing 
their work as they, professionals, know how to.   
In the view of the health professionals, although the emphasis of giving power to 
customers with which they can become involved in decision-making processes 
remains a viable option, the extent to which this may have actually resulted in 
improved care for customers remains contentious. It was mentioned that clinical 
staff felt demoralised that patients often abuse them, but perhaps what was worse for 
the clinical staff was the reporting by clients to SERVICOM on ‘bad service’.  
In particular, given the nature of healthcare practice, it seems inappropriate to 
believe that following the Social Charter will lead to better services for all customers, 
irrespective of their health condition. This study finds that this one-cap-fits-all 
ideology, which is a common feature of NPM recommendations, is problematic and 
has serious implications for individualised care. The broader picture is that the 
reform operates as a market ideology which supposes equal treatment as a way of 
encouraging customer rights and dignity. Indeed, it is fair to say that customers 
should be treated fairly; nevertheless, based on the views of the frontline workers, 
this study finds that following a rigid rule in order to achieve equality of access to 
services alone is not enough. The central argument raised by the frontline workers 
demonstrate that based on the unpredictable nature of customers’ needs, it is 
inappropriate to assume that healthcare practice consists of rational decisions which 
can be predetermined in advance, meaning that customers’ needs are regarded as 
homogenous with well-ordered, and pre-set or mechanical approaches to meeting 
those needs. 
It has been demonstrated in this study that, not only expert knowledge, which is 
often drawn from outsiders’ views of what is consider socially and politically 
desirable,  but also the practical views of those involved in day-to-day practice at the 
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organisation level  are important in designing effective change. While this study has 
not taken a fault-finder position on the reform, it has however suggested that the 
paternalistic view of government in policy design is rather parochial and seems to 
neglect the fundamental element of how change happens within professional 
organisations like public health services. The study’s results suggest that 
government seems to have initiated and implemented the reform based on national 
interest, and on the premise that, at the very least, workers will follow set directives. 
Yet, there is no indication that the views of the workers were effectively engaged; 
thus, the knowledge and agency of the professionals seem to have been overlooked. 
The relevance of professional agency has been highlighted by past studies 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Giddens, 1994; Lipsky, 1980), and in line with the 
views of the workers, undermining the conventional professional 
values/norms/culture in place of bureaucratically set rules and targets did not seem 
to augur well in healthcare practice. There was huge distrust among the workers 
about the empirical and methodological reliability of a performance measurement 
culture in healthcare practice, particularly in Nigeria where information is 
inadequate. Besides, the findings of this study suggest that the way the reform is 
being implemented suggests to the workers that their profession has been polarised 
between, on the one hand, the bureaucratic implementation agency and 
workers/managers, between managers and workers, and finally among colleagues 
(who are under pressure and competition to achieve individual rewards). This 
finding is supported by the work of other researchers (e.g. Freidson, 2001), which 
demonstrates that the introduction of bureaucratic control, exposure to a market-
related work process and management represents an attack on the structural practices 
and the professional ideology underpinning the healthcare profession, and leads to 
stratification of the health profession.  
 
9.4 Health workers’ perceptions of the reform process  
While the reform is presented as necessary, hospital workers did not always express 
a favourable attitude towards the reform because they perceived that it was imposed 
on them. This study finds that hospital workers perceived the reform process in 
which SERVICOM is regulating their work as bossy and officious. According to this 
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view, health workers were not only concerned about the changing nature of their 
work content and characteristics; most important to them was the perception that 
they are losing control of the work they do. In addition, the perception that 
government is using SERVICOM as non-health professionals to tell health 
professionals what to do, and even measure how they do their work, raised feelings 
of discontentment. 
The view of the frontline workers, as demonstrated in the results, suggests that there 
is little trust that SERVICOM has the capacity to know what they do, or be in a 
capacity to contribute constructively and meaningfully to improving how they 
should do their work. At the same time, while generating performance information 
represents, a cohesive measure put in place to hold workers to account and to 
provide evidence to guide further improvement, this study finds that while the 
performance measurement is supposed to generate information that will be useful in 
addressing a wide variety of problems and situations related to access and use of 
services, hospital staff perceived that the available performance information from 
SERVICOM is inconsistent and lacks clinical relevance. It is not entirely surprising 
then that, despite the proliferation of the reform idea about the role of SERVICOM, 
this study lacks convincing evidence to suggest that SERVICOM has contributed to 
improving clinical practice.  
The whole point of the reform, which is about performance measurement by targets, 
was perceived by the majority of the health workers as inconsistent with the reality 
of health care practice. The concept posits a very simplistic idea. It assumes that 
healthcare practices operate as discrete and divisible activities which can be 
observed and measured quantitatively. Based on the perception of the workers, this 
study finds no evidence to demonstrate that emphasis on individual efforts and 
performance, and making individual workers to do their work faster in pursuance of 
efficiency gains with a set mechanism that separates implementation from doing as 
effective. The study finds that at the core of the reform process is the belief in 
quantitative measurement of individual efforts, but the fact that healthcare activities 
are scarcely measurable suggests that there may not have been any advance in 
improving healthcare service delivery. 
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Another consensus, which emerged among the frontline workers and their managers, 
relates to the fact that the performance measurement culture operates as means of 
monitoring and maintaining organisational control. The conceptualisation of the 
reform sits within the ideology of “business culture” (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; 
Neely, 1999), an approach borrowed from the private or industrial sector, in which 
control is presented as a means of improving efficiency and effectiveness in the 
public health sector.  
Nevertheless, despite the rather broad and somewhat ambiguous specification of the 
role of administrative control, frontline workers felt that using an outsider agency 
(SERVICOM) to tell them what to do, or to measure how they do their work, signify 
stripping them of their authority, and thus threatening their medical professionalism 
and autonomy. As evident in this study, the use of SERVICOM as an audit agency 
largely supports broader tenets of new public sector reform (Hood et al, 1999; 1999; 
Power, 2000).  This is also in line with principal-agent literature (e.g. Holmstrom 
and Milgrom, 1991; Besley, 2006), goal-setting literature (Locke and Latham, 2002; 
2006) and clinical governance literature (Scally, 1998; Swage, 2004), which 
supposes that setting goals or targets for workers, and measuring how they achieve 
the goals provide incentive that will enhance operational efficiency.  
This study finds that hospital workers did perceive the use of administrative 
managers to control how they do their work as inappropriate. There are several 
likely explanations to this. First, there were claims of existing tensions between 
hospital workers and SERVICOM, in that SERVICOM (i) does not have the 
requisite experience to do their work since they are not health professionals, (ii) is a 
little highhanded in their operations (iii) gives rise to controversy and doubt 
regarding the consistency and robustness of its assessments because of feelings that 
erros are likely (iv) and the attempt by government to improve service delivery using 
strategic control measures is perceived by workers as narrow, counterproductive and 
inconsistent with the operational realities of healthcare. Overall, the results suggest 
that the performance measurement process, including the published performance 
information by SERVICOM, is perceived as fragmented and poorly developed and 
has no relevance to clinical operations and decisions. The irrelevance of 
performance information has also been reported in other contexts (e.g. in the UK 
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National Health Service, see Checkland et al, 2007) which draw attention to 
methodological challenges in data collection as a key issue.  
In general, this study finds that frontline workers, managers and union 
representatives expressed concern that the reform was imposed on them and thus 
operated as a top-down mechanism to change. This study also finds that the 
operation of performance measurement by targets as a prioritisation and 
formalisation of work practice is perceived as defective and inappropriate because it 
does not give a whole picture of healthcare practice. The hospital staff felt that 
performance measurement by targets focuses on results rather than process, is 
administratively oriented, and did not seem to capture the professional norms. 
Another issue related to SERVICOM’s activities and the reform implementation 
process is the confrontation of identities between professional views and 
bureaucracy. 
9.5 The Effects of the Reform on Health workers  
Analysis related to research question 3, that is, how the different categories of 
workers in the hospital are affected by, and how they deal with, the change process 
demonstrated that the reform has had significant effects on health workers.  
This study finds that frontline workers said that the use of an audit agency gave rise 
to feelings of dissatisfaction at work because of the sense of being under regulation 
and control by administrative managers who are non-health professionals. 
Furthermore, frontline workers’ sense of shifting power relations, victimisation and 
alienation impacted negatively on their morale and job satisfaction. The findings are 
in line with past studies (Scott, 1982; 2002; Friedson, 2001), which demonstrated 
that perceptions of loss of control undermine worker morale and individual 
productivity. As noted, the use of the construct that “they” (government) are using 
“them” (SERVICOM) to tell “us” (health workers) what to do signifies a deepened 
expression of alienation, and professional victimisation of health workers.  
9.5.1 Workload, stress, tiredness and burnout 
This study offer evidence emphasising that the operation of the policy reform has 
increased daily workload with respect to: (i) increased pressure to achieve targets; 
(ii) increases in hours worked and number of customers attended to on a weekly 
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basis; (iii) increased administrative responsibility (paperwork); (iv) increased levels 
of anxiety, stress and burnout; and (v) increased reports of workplace assaults and 
abuse. These results corroborate past case studies across developing countries 
(Aiken et al, 2001; 2002a/b) and specifically within the African context (e.g. Ghana-
Witter et al, 2007; Uganda-Burnham et al, 2004; Kajula et al, 2004; South Africa-
Bhayat and Cleaton-Jones, 2003; Walker and Gilson, 2004), which suggest that 
organizational restructuring appears to create heavier workloads for frontline service 
providers.  
This study offers evidence that highlights a significant relationship between 
workload, working relationships and the ability to deliver effective care. The 
workers reported cases of back pain, depression, insomnia and tiredness associated 
with increased workloads. This correlates with past studies (e.g. Akerstedt et al, 
2002; Kawada and Ooya, 2005), which noted an association between increased 
workload, and the health and performance of health workers. In their study, Surani et 
al (2007) highlight how increased workloads interfere with health worker’s sleep 
and rest time, resulting in increased fatigue and poor performance generally. Also, 
Lockley et al (2007) found that increased workloads among health providers 
resulted in sleep deprivation and under such conditions, and under such situations, 
workers were more likely to make imperfect clinical judgements, resulting in 
performance errors and accidents.  
Another conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the increased workload 
of senior clinical staff reduces the time available for them to provide support and 
mentoring to junior clinical staff. This reduction in mentoring seems to be critical for 
the professional development of clinical staff. Thus, the claimed link between 
inadequate management and clinical support and medical error and overall 
performance of clinical staff is well supported by wider management literature 
(Kotler et al, 2006; Parry and Song, 1993). This conclusion echoes the evidence in 
Reid et al (1999) that clinical support, particularly for frontline clinical staff, is 
essential for effective healthcare delivery. In addition, the results here indicate that 
increased workloads impact negatively on workplace relationships, creating envy, 
finger-pointing, and thus suggest an implication for workers’ capacity to perform at 
an optimal level.  
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9.5.2 Incentive to improve performance 
Pay systems have been a concern over the years with respect to time and size of 
payment. This present research suggests that although there is a rich and diverse 
discussion highlighting a range of possibilities of the operation of performance-
related pay (PRP) in achieving in particular the health reform target objectives, how 
this directly links to behaviour change is not straightforward. Yet, the most 
important assumption underpinning PRP is that workers’ behaviour towards 
incentives is readily predictable; thus, linking rewards to performance provides a 
nudge that encourages and reinforces good behaviour, and improves individual 
performance. The findings, however, seem to contradict this classical economic 
assumption. Several reasons were attributed to this.  
Against the claim that linking pay to performance will encourage individual 
competition, innovativeness and better performance, this study finds that selecting 
individuals for reward created a regressive work environment. It induces conflicts 
and unhealthy behavioural tendencies such as jealousy and envy among clinical 
workers. This study has provided evidence that individual-based rewards undermine 
existing corporate teamwork and helping attitudes among clinical staff, as well as 
hindering effective information sharing. There was a general perception that these 
behaviours and attitudes reduce cooperation and commitment to one another, trust 
and effective communication, and information sharing among clinical workers. The 
study has offered evidence that PRP may be disruptive in that it undermines good 
relationships and an organisational climate especially in a service-related 
organisation (such as healthcare organisation), where teamwork and cooperation is 
clearly required. 
While the results remain inconclusive because of inadequate objective data, it 
nevertheless, offers evidence suggesting that frontline workers, in an attempt to win 
awards, often engage in behaviour which encourages misrepresentation of efforts or 
performance. This finding is, however, interpreted to be in harmony with health 
organisations in other contexts (e.g. the UK National Health Service) where such 
behaviour had often been reported as ‘gaming’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006a/b; Propper 
et al, 2008a/b). This study offers suggestion that the anxiety among hospital workers 
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that their colleagues may have cheated tended to crowd out individual intrinsic 
commitments and devotion to public service duty.  
This study finds that the clinical staff did not indicate that performance related pay is 
necessarily essential or has had any positive influence in motivating them to perform 
better in healthcare delivery. It conclusively, shows that it is counterproductive in 
that it undermines their professional ethos and work culture of commitment, 
selflessness, cooperation and trust among colleagues.  
Another conclusion advanced by this study is that the drive for individual reward 
erodes intrinsic motivation and “public service” behavioural tendencies. This tends 
to weaken the traditional or prevalent societal discourse that public servants are there 
to serve and not for self-interest. This study presents the view that there has been a 
changing trend which suggests that unless you win an award, you remain a poor 
performer. Consequently, those who may not have been given an award, but are very 
committed to their vocation, are drawn into rethinking their altruistic behaviour.  
Despite the acknowledged evidence that workers pay has been increased in norminal 
terms, this study reveals that the perception of “inadequate pay” undermines 
individual worker’s morale. This is because the perceived rising workload (efforts) 
is seen as not commensurate with real pay expectations, and this is consistent with 
past studies (e.g. Ackerlof and Yellen, 1990; Stutzer, 2004). Workers who spoke 
about the inability to “make ends meet” also commented that it affects their 
commitment, and altruistic behaviour in, their vocation. Past studies (e.g. Folger and 
Konovsky, 1999; Pfeiffer and Langton, 1993) demonstrate that pay operates as a 
mediator of organizational exchange relationships, and as a predictor of how 
workers perceive their work.  
 
9.5.3 Health workers’ Motivation 
The first major conclusion in this study related to motivation is that the perception of 
being ‘left out’ of the reform’s design and implementation impacted negatively on 
health workers’ perceptions of motivation. Moreover, in terms of the policy 
implementation process, hospital workers expressed unhappiness and professional 
demoralisation because they perceived that they are being put under control.  
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Overall, the perceived lack of recognition of health workers’ professional interest, 
and the imbalance of interest and power between different actors (e.g. 
reformers/implementer, frontline workers/managers, and patients) in the new form 
of management of public sector organisations creates a sense of professional 
humiliation, alienation and demoralisation.  
The perception of professional demoralization and dissatisfaction among health 
workers in the context of organizational restructuring in the public health sector has 
also been reported by studies in other developing countries (Witter et al, 2007a-
Ghana; Burnham et al, 2004; Kajula et al, 2004-Uganda; Walker and Gilson, 2004-
South Africa) and in developed countries such as Germany, the USA, the UK and 
Canada (Aiken et al, 2001).  
In general, the extent to which the policy reform has impacted on the motivation of 
individual health workers remain complex. The findings of this study also 
highlighted the fact that frontline hospital reported less motivation to do their work 
because of increases in workload with respect to hours worked, administrative 
paperwork, stress and anxiety, and pressure to achieve targets.  
An important finding that emerged from this study was that outside pay, workers 
were motivated by their perceptions of fairness in the performance measurement 
process and distribution of individual rewards. This finding correlates with the 
procedural and distributional justice literature (Greenberg, 1990; Tyler and Bies, 
1990) and equity-related studies (Adams, 1965) which suggest that a perception of 
unfairness de-motivates workers. It was suggested that feelings of unfairness erode 
the intrinsic morale of workers. As the motivation and behaviour of frontline health 
workers remain significant in delivering care in a changing work environment, this 
raises an important message of relevance to current and future settings of public 
sector incentive systems.  
This study did not provide concrete evidence to suggest that performance 
measurement motivates workers, and, thus did not improve individual health 
workers’ performance. The workers spoke about their lack of trust in the process 
because it lacks “clinical orientation and relevance” and does not give the “whole 
picture of our work”. The big picture that emerges relates largely to the performance 
measurement operations, which are, “what to measure, how to measure it, and who 
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is to do the measurement”. The workers expressed discontentment regarding a lack 
of consistency in the performance measurement process in capturing the operational 
sequence of their work. The results here are consistent with the findings of other 
studies (e.g. McLntyre et al, 2001; Boyne, 2003a/b; Boyne et al, 2006a/b; Andrews 
et al, 2006; Adair et al, 2006), which highlight that performance measurement 
especially in a healthcare setting is problematic. 
 
9.5.4 Health worker s’ behaviour and attitude to work 
Several findings emerged regarding the effects of the reform on the behaviour and 
work attitude of health workers. First, a major finding in this study with respect to 
workers’ behaviour is that it did not seem to match with the expectations of the 
reforms. For example, rather than stimulating healthy relationships and competition, 
the perception of ‘unfairness’ in the performance measurement and reporting process 
[procedural injustice] and in the allocation of a reward to individual efforts 
[distributional injustice] resulted in negative consequences for individual worker 
behaviour. For example, the drive among the workers to avoid shame, or to improve 
one’s self-esteem by winning pay awards, predisposed workers to misrepresent their 
work efforts, or neglect some vital aspect of their work.   
Second, this study finds that measuring and rewarding individual performance 
undermines team spirit and collegial relationships. The finding suggests that 
individual frontline workers are now “on their own” as each struggles to outshine the 
other to win an award. A further implication of this, as revealed by this study, is the 
perceived erosion of cooperation or helping behaviour among frontline clinical staff. 
Apart from the fact that this development has often led to conflict, this study 
suggests that individual drive for awards undermine team spirit and effective work 
connectivity because it hinders effective information sharing among colleagues. The 
results correlate with past studies, for example, while Thorndycraft and McCabe 
(2008) found that lack of team spirit undermines individual and organisation 
performance in healthcare, Reid et al (2002) claimed that, in an organisation, this 
results in internalised aggression, not only causing poor individual performance, but 
also a willingness to leave the organisation.  
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Good relationships were perceived by hospital workers to be very important in their 
work. The findings from this study revealed a significant shift in these relationships. 
It is appropriate to bring to notice the widespread blame culture, rumours, hidden or 
secretive behaviour, the breakdown of teamwork, and the perceived hoarding of 
information as evident indication of broken relationships. The findings demonstrate 
that the implication presents interesting evidence. First, broken relationships which 
predispose individualism (i.e., undermine team spirit and professional trust) also 
predispose frontline workers to cut corners in clinical procedures. This pertains to 
misrepresentation and under-reporting of performance. Examining other studies (e.g. 
Propper et al, 2008a; Bevan and Hood, 2006a, Goddard et al, 2000; Goddard et al, 
2002) it has been reported that subjecting workers to performance measurement 
culture by targets encourages gaming behaviour. As noted by Goddard et al (2000: 
105), fear of failure or the joy of winning predisposes “unintended behaviour, which 
may encourage workers to behave in ways which are directly contradictory to what 
is expected”. Bevan and Hood (2006a) reported that unintended behaviour among 
health workers arose because of the drive to meet individual targets. In line with 
other studies, (e.g. Karatepe and Uludag (2007), there is a suggestion that an office 
culture based on individual performance leads to conflict, exhaustion and de-
motivation, particularly among frontline service providers. 
 
9.5.5 Healthcare quality  
Overall, this study did not seem to have enough evidence to suggest that the reform 
has achieved its objective of improving the quality of health care. Nevertheless, this 
study provides evidence that suggests achievements in many ways. The findings 
demonstrate that there has been an improvement in clients’ access to healthcare in 
terms of reducing crowded queues, and waiting times, and at the same time 
increasing workloads, which could be seen as an improvement in efficiency of 
operations and fairness of access because of the way customers are treated on a first-
come-first-served basis. Added to this is the evident improvement in the information 
which is made available to clients, which also signifies an improvement in 
individual worker accountability.  
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However though the reform has contributed to reducing waiting times, it also 
resulted in an unintended outcome. For instance, this study finds that it reduces time 
for care and interaction with patients which, to the workers, is problematic. This 
study produced claims of an existing relationship between reducing time for care and 
perceived reduction in quality of care for patients. What was evident from the study 
was the suggestion that reducing waiting times which has resulted in changing the 
relationship and reducing the contact between providers and patients appear to be 
detrimental to patients’ health and quality of care. While this finding remains 
preliminary and contentious, it is however useful because it gives a sense of what the 
frontline health workers think of the effects of the reform, and it also correlate with 
other studies (e.g. Simmons and Elias, 2002; Mannion et al, 2005; Propper et al, 
2008a) which argue that reducing waiting time has implications for quality of care, 
and patients’ health and safety.  
Another most important insight from this study relates to the shift towards customer 
centeredness. This study concludes that the culture of customer services, which is 
considered critical to public health service delivery, has improved. In comparing 
their service attitude before the policy reforms, many workers said that they [and 
their hospital] are now customer-friendly as they attend to customers promptly, 
timely, responsively and respectfully. Yet, this study provided evidence that overall, 
clinical staff felt that, the new culture of “quick service” is not delivering quality 
care.  
In general, the findings provide empirical support for the contention that 
prioritisation of work, performance measurement, and performance-related pay did 
not seem to have improved the capacity of health workers to perform better, or the 
quality of healthcare more generally. The implications of the above summarised 
findings of this study are highlighted below.  
9.6 Conclusions  
The objective of this study was to explore how different categories of hospital 
workers perceived and responded to a policy reform process implemented within the 
case hospital organisation in which they work. The study has indicated how day-by-
day organisational processes and practices of healthcare professionals have been 
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influenced by the reform. Of course, reform is important in providing guidance for 
action, but everyday work processes and interactions among actors at organisation 
level, and within the wider sense of public health workers’ culture, is also, or even 
more, important to the success of any reform. 
Furthermore, in a context where individual workers are required to follow a defined 
performance measurement culture, work longer and change their relationship with 
patients (clients), this study provides an interesting perspective of how the reform 
has implied changing work roles and increased workload with negative impact on 
collegiality and cooperation among health workers. The results regarding the way 
the reform is being implemented, entailing the use of an external policing agency, 
suggest there is a sense of loss of professional control and autonomy. In other words, 
the presence of the regulatory agency implies that workers’ agency and discretion 
are restricted, and their capacity to provide services based on their professional 
knowledge is constrained.  
The findings of this study also suggest that while setting rules and rewarding “good 
behaviour” among frontline workers is intended to improve individual performance, 
it has failed to find a significant positive relationship between linking performance 
to reward and improvement in individual performance. Rather, there was convincing 
evidence to suggest that focusing on individual efforts/results and rewards 
degenerated to perception of unfairness in work processes and relationships. That is 
to say, it created disengagement, distrust and jealousy, envy, blame culture, and a 
retrogressive and unhealthy work culture. The results suggest that the reform does 
not specifically support the core professional culture and ethos such as teamwork. 
While the results remain contentious, the consensus view of the workers is that 
encouraging team spirit enhances patient recovery and good health, intead of 
focusing on individual results or the number of people coming in and out of the 
hospital’s doors. At the same time, however, effective involvement and engagement 
of the professional ideas of the frontline health workers and their managers from the 
start in the policy reform process was strongly advocated as a good option to 
designing and implementing workable change options. While this seems crucial, 
there is no convincing evidence to suggest that it is guaranteed.  
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Arising from the findings, it seems legitimate and inviting to conclude that the on-
going policy reforms in Nigeria have practical implications when placed next to 
current policy issues in other contexts e.g. the UK NHS. Examining the evidence as 
revealed by the clinical workers and their managers, the arguments presented fit well 
within the current debates of health policy reforms in the UK. What is evident is that 
the present coalition government in the UK tends to be responsive towards the 
professional views of healthcare professionals, and has accepted to scrap a target 
culture, which is described as a “pointless and disruptive reorganisation of the UK 
NHS (BBC News, 2011). This is also followed by a recommendation to downplay 
the role of audit agencies, i.e. a crackdown on centralisation and prioritisation 
policy, towards favouring decentralisation of hospital resources management. It also 
involves giving power back to professionals to do their jobs. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the on-going reforms in the Nigerian public sector came into 
effect under joint efforts between the Nigerian government and the UK government 
through the office of Public Sector Reforms in UK. With the current policy events in 
the UK, the future of the reform in Nigeria seems bleak. This Nigerian case is an 
example of the dilemma often faced by governments of developing countries while 
trying to learn from more developed countries.  
This study concludes that policy reform has the potential for promoting a 
progressive work environment, and ensuring that health professionals-those 
responsible for delivering healthcare- perform optimally in healthcare delivery, 
particularly in a developing country context like Nigeria. This study has suggested 
that while the on-going policy reform process, driven by dominant narratives, and 
new thinking about how public hospitals should be organised and managed, remain 
significant moves to bring about meaningful change, there is inadequate and 
convincing evidence to suggest that the initiative fits within the operating practice, 
context, and changing work circumstances associated with healthcare delivery. Yet, 
while the policy reform process remains an assiduous effort to generate good 
working environments in order to run government offices better and deliver better 
healthcare services, there is inconclusive evidence to suggest that this has been 
achieved. At the same time, the future of the policy reform process must await a 
wider testing in other hospital settings or industry.  
237 
 
9.7 Implications and Limitations of the Study 
The main implication of this study is that the policy reform process within the 
healthcare sector is not as straightforward as often predicted. Based on the findings, 
this study argues that realising effective change through policy reform processes 
should be seen not as a discrete or linear event, but as a product of the day-to-day 
practice of actors, involving elements of interest, contradictions, manoeuvres and 
relationships among actors at the organisation level. Thus, policy-makers and 
organisational managers should take into account the existing practices, experiences, 
cultures and norms that are widely held by those involved in healthcare delivery 
when developing strategies to change how health workers do their work. 
Furthermore, not only the institutional aspect of change but also the perceptual 
views of frontline workers and their managers of their work and job contexts are 
important factors that shape the effectiveness of policy reforms.  
This study, however, stands out for its in-depth focus, and has demonstrated how 
policy reform processes that are often construed based on dominant narrative and 
discourse operate in practice revealing how micro-processes and interactions 
engaged in by actors at the organisation level shape how policy operates. This 
clearly has implications for policy-makers, researchers and development 
professionals involved in policy processes in Nigeria. The understanding gained 
from this study has provided an input to the understanding of policy reform 
processes in the health care industry, and is intended to have practical applications 
for health care management and policy-making in general.  
Overall, based on the findings from the case hospital, there is no convincing 
evidence to demonstrate that the current policy reform has been successful in 
achieving its objectives. It is true that some efficiency gains may have been recorded 
in terms of speed of operation and reduction in waiting times, but the way in which 
government is going about implementing the policy processes tends to have 
overlooked the prioritised interest of health workers based on their work culture, 
practice and experience. The study also suggests that the hospital workers felt ‘left 
out’ in the policy reform design, and the way the reform is implemented suggests 
that they are being policed, and, thus that they are losing control of their jobs. The 
findings of this study contribute to the understanding of policy reform processes in 
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practice. Drawing evidence from micro-level processes and as perceived by those 
involved in healthcare service delivery, this study provides a deepened 
understanding of what happens on the ground as policy reform is designed and 
implemented.  
This study is thought to be the first of its kind in analysing health workers’ 
perspectives and responses to the on-going health care reforms in the Nigerian health 
care service. While the study was focused on a case study of a hospital, it can as well 
serve as a platform for future research work not only in Nigeria, but also in other 
developing countries. This study has added to the literature by providing insight into 
how micro-level processes and professional norms and culture contribute to shaping 
how policy operates in practice, an aspect which is often ignored by researchers and 
policy-makers.  
The findings of this study, though exploratory in nature, can positively serve as a 
basis for future research. Based on this study, one area that may need future attention 
relate to how to redistribute and balance the power and interest of actors 
(reformers/implementers, workers, and patients) in such a way to facilitate 
meaningful negotiation, strengthen relationships, and promote engagement in the 
wider issues of what should be done, how, and for whom. There is a need for clear 
timeliness of what need to be set as performance measures, how performance should 
be measured, as well as how to instigate rewards for performance that is consistent 
with the existing professional culture of public healthcare practice. Clearly, the 
findings suggest that effective and transformative change happens through dialogue. 
Such dialogue will need to involve responsibility, trust and power balance among all 
actors. In particular, given that responsibility is required to ensure that frontline 
workers and their managers are held accountable for the implementation of 
government reform and the delivery of quality healthcare outcomes, somehow 
frontline health workers need the power to be able to make informed decisions to 
change the way they do their work. There is a need to look at the issue of changing 
public health workers’ behaviour in its broadest sense and to focus on issues that 
enhances their engagement, intrinsic motivation and professional culture, as it relates 
to the social context in which they do their work.  
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Appendix 
Appendix: 1A Demographic characteristics of research participants 
 
Demographic 
Characteristics  
Executives managers  (n=6) Operational managers  (n=16) Doctors (n=40) Nurses (n=45) 
Number (%) Number (%) Number % Number % 
Sex  
Female  2 33 4 25 7 17 39 87 
Male  4 67 12 75 33 83 6 13 
Length of service          
< or 10 years  - - - - 4 10 8 18 
11-20 years  - - 2 12 6 15 12 27 
21-30 years  1 17 8 50 20 50 18 40 
>30 years  5 83 6 38 10 25 7 15 
Age in years          
<30 years  - -   - - 4 9 
30-39 years  - - 1 6 4 10 5 11 
40-49 1 17 5 31 8 20 12 27 
50-59 3 50 8 50 20 50 18 40 
60 and above 2 33 2 13 8 20 6 13 
Demographic 
Characteristics  
Planning office  (n=6) Performance agency (n=5) Administrators (FMOH) (n=4) Policy consultant (n=1) 
Number (%) Number (%) Number % Number % 
Sex  
Female  2 33 2 40 3 75 1 100 
Male  4 67 3 60 1 25 - - 
Length of service          
< or 10 years  - - - -     
11-20 years  - - 1 10 1 25   
21-30 years  1 17 2 40 2 50 1 100 
>30 years  5 83 2 40 1 25   
Age in years          
<30 years  -        
30-39 years  -  1 25     
40-49 -  1 25 1 25 -  
50-59 5 83 2 50 3 75 1 100 
60 and above 1 7 -    -  
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Appendix 1B Interview number and types 
 Policy makers Executive 
manager 
Operational 
manager  
Doctors Nurses  
No of 
interviewees  
16 6 16 40  45 
No of interviews  19 9 24 54 62 
Interview types 
Semi-structured  16 6 16 40 45 
In-depth  3 3 8 14 17 
 
 
Appendix 1C List of demographic and job characteristics questions  
Name of unit……………………………………………..  
Specialty………………………………………………….. 
Date ……………………………………………………… 
i. How many years have you worked at this public hospital? 
a) Less than 10 years 
b) 11-20 years 
c) 21-30years 
d) More than 30years  
ii. Are you working part-time or full time in your job? 
a) Part time 
b) Full time  
iii. Are you a male or female? 
a) Male  
b) Female  
iv. What is your age? 
a) Under 30 
b) 30-39 
c) 40-49 
d) 50-59 
e) 60 and above 
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v. How many years have you been a government worker?  
a) Less than or 10 years 
b) 11-20years 
c) 21-30years  
d) Above 30 years  
Awareness of the reform  
vi. How did you hear about the reform? 
a) Memo/circular 
b) Seminar/workshop 
c) Media  
d) Through our union 
Would you like to be involved in further interviews in respect of this research? 
Please kindly sign to confirm your agreement to be involved. The participation is 
voluntary and has no monetary reward. All your comments will be treated 
confidentially. May I also ask that you provide your contact details? 
Name: ……………………………………………………………… 
Ward/unit: …………………………………………………………. 
Mobile Phone Number: ………………………………………….. 
1D Key informants (government policy-makers and top administrators)  
i. Could you please describe the changes in the public service arising from the 
policy reform and as it relates to your work? 
ii. How was the change created, initiated and expected to be implemented in the 
public service?  
iii. What is the government rationale for creating and initiating the changes and 
what specific objectives do the changes seek to achieve? 
iv. Do you think that the ongoing changes have made any significant impact? If 
so how? If not why? 
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1E Policy consultant  
i. What were the terms of reference for your involvement in the public service 
reform in Nigeria?  
ii. How did you become involved and who contacted you? Was this based on 
experience with public service reform in UK and other developing country 
contexts [based on past experience] or in partnership with your office? 
iii. How were your experiences of doing the Nigeria project? To what extent did 
you become familiarized with the local context, especially at the service 
delivery end? Are there other contacts/informants through you I can also 
speak to?  
iv. What input did you provide to the policy reform design, implementation and 
monitoring process? Was this just at the research level, writing the service 
delivery map or in its implementation? 
v. What is your view about the transferability [adaptation and learning] of 
policy reform from the United Kingdom to Nigeria? 
vi. Does the Nigerian public service have the same or similar problems such as 
operations of the public service, initiation, implementation of policy, worker 
behaviour and customer experience? What are the similarities and 
differences at the policy- and workers-level? 
vii. Do you think that the policy reform outcomes in terms of worker behaviour, 
hospital performance and general policy implementation outlook will be 
comparable with other experiences such as those in the UK or in other 
developing country contexts? 
viii. What is your view and experience of performance targets and their influence 
on service provision and hospital performance? What have they done for the 
UK? What are the possible expectations for Nigerian public service workers 
such as doctors and nurses in public hospitals?  
ix. Generally, have you been working [or worked] in other developing countries 
apart from the UK? Is it possible to comment on your experiences from other 
developed or developing country contexts in relation to the Nigerian case?  
x. Based on your experience, do you think that the Nigerian public service is 
different in any way from that in the UK or other countries?  
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1F Hospital executive and operational managers   
i. Could you please describe the nature of the specific changes (named) in the 
public service as in this hospital? 
ii. What is the focus of the change (named); how did the change come about 
and what do you think is driving the change?  
iii. What do you feel about the conceptualization and initiation of the change in 
this hospital?  
iv. Do you think there are other surrounding issues about the change?  
Process and operations 
i. How is the change currently being implemented, and are work processes 
clear and adequately structured? 
ii. Are roles within the organization clearly defined and aligned?  
iii. Does the reform operating structure support clear lines of authority and the 
accountability of managers and workers? 
iv. How do you feel about the performance audit agency and its competence to 
do its work? 
v. Do you think that making available public performance information on 
service providers is helpful appropriate and likely to lead to better 
performance?  
vi. How helpful is the published performance information for management 
decisions and clinical operations?  
 
Effects and outcomes  
i. What do think are the effects and outcomes of the change at the management 
level of this hospital organization? 
ii. How and to what extent has the change (named) impacted on your perceived 
role as a manager?  
iii. How and to what extent has the change (named) shaped your understanding 
of and commitment to public service management? 
iv. Is there anything about the reform that seems to enhance or hinder public 
hospital management and operations? 
v. How has the reform enhanced organizational performance? 
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1G Workers union representatives  
i. I understand that you are a member of the [named union]; what is your 
union’s opinion regarding the state of heathcare in this country? 
ii. What have been the big changes in this hospital and in public health sector in 
the past? 
iii. What have been the changes between 2000 and 2007? How did they happen 
and what have been your union’s opinions regarding the reform? 
iv. What are the big issues your union members have had to deal with 
concerning the reform? 
v. What have been the views of your union about the ongoing changes? 
vi. How and to what extent is your union involved in the design, initiation and 
implementation of the ongoing change in public hospital organizations? 
vii. What impact do you think these changes have had or are having on your 
profession?  
viii. Do you think that making available public performance information on 
service providers is helpful appropriate and likely to lead to better 
performance?  
ix. Do you think that the ongoing changes have helped in service delivery? If so 
how? If not why? 
 
1H Service performance audit agency (SERVICOM) 
i. What do you think is the focus of your work? 
ii. Does SERVICOM have a clearly defined way of assessing the performance 
of service providers? 
iii. How motivated and trained are SERVICOM staff to do their work?  
iv. Does the Social Charter provide an adequate framework and guide for 
creating client-focused care?  
v. Do you think that this is adequate in dealing with the challenges of service 
delivery? 
vi. How do you collect and analyse the performance data?  
vii. Does SERVICOM have the mechanisms to ensure that the performance 
information collected is error-free? 
viii. How would you describe your relationship with the service providers? 
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ix. What have been the outcomes of your work and what possible challenges do 
you face in doing your work? 
 
1I Frontline Doctors and Nurses  
General context and content  
i. Could you please describe the nature of the specific public service changes 
(named) in this hospital? 
ii. What is the focus of the change (named); how did the change come about 
and what do you think is driving the change?  
iii. What do you feel about the conceptualization and initiation of the change in 
this hospital for example?  
iv. Do you think there are other surrounding issues about the change?  
 
Process and operations 
i. How is the change currently being implemented? What do you think about 
the performance implementation agency (SERVICOM)? 
ii. Did you contributed to the policy design and how do you assess the policy 
process? 
iii. How do workers see the introduction of performance measurement and 
changes in pay including salaries and fringe benefits?  
iv. Do you think that making available public performance information on 
service providers is helpful/appropriate and is it likely to lead to better 
performance?  
v. What do you think about the process and operations of the change and your 
work as a public worker including hours worked and time you actually spend 
on healthcare provision? 
 
Effects and outcomes  
i. What do think are the effects and outcomes of the changes in work practices 
at the level of the hospital organization and hospital workers? 
ii. How do you think the pay (salaries, fringe benefits and allowances) of public 
health workers compares within and between worker categories and levels? 
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iii. How and to what extent has the change (named) impacted on your perceived 
motivation, behaviour and performance/that of the general workers? 
iv. Do you think there is a significant difference in the motivation, behaviour 
and performance of public health workers because of this reform? If so in 
what ways? If not, why?  
v. As a healthcare service provider, would you say that the changes in work 
practices have worked well in improving service delivery and meeting the 
needs of patients (clients)? 
vi. How and to what extent has the change (named) shaped your understanding 
of and commitment to the public service mission, vision and ethics or that of 
the general workers? 
vii. What are your key concerns about the reform with respect to your work and 
workplace organization? 
viii. Do you think the changes have had influence on work relationships and 
interactions in this hospital? If yes, can you give examples? 
ix. Has your experience of the changes in work practices and pay influenced the 
way you feel about your work and government work generally? 
Job satisfaction and pay fairness  
i. Kindly indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
a) I consider my salary as fair in relation to other workers in the same 
category/level in this hospital 
b) I consider my salary as fair in relation to others workers in different 
categories/levels in this hospital 
c) I consider my salary as fair in relation to others workers in the same 
category/level in private sector hospitals 
 
ii. The difference in salary between top-level and lower-level workers in this 
hospital is too large. 
a) Strongly disagree  
b) Disagree 
c) Agree 
d) Strongly agree  
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iii. Overall how satisfied are you with your salary with respect to your 
expectations? 
a) Very dissatisfied 
b) Dissatisfied 
c) Somewhat satisfied  
d) Very satisfied   
 
iv. Overall how satisfied are you with your work in the context of change in 
salaries? 
a) Very dissatisfied 
b) Dissatisfied 
c) Somewhat satisfied  
d) Very satisfied   
 
v. Overall how satisfied are you with your work in the context of change in 
fringe benefits? 
a) Very dissatisfied 
b) Dissatisfied 
c) Somewhat satisfied  
d) Very satisfied   
vi. Overall how satisfied are you with your work in the context of the changes in 
work practices? 
e) Very dissatisfied 
f) Dissatisfied 
g) Somewhat satisfied  
h) Very satisfied   
vii. Besides the above issues that we have discussed are there other concerns 
workers have regarding the reform’s design and implementation process, and 
in respect of how you do your work in this hospital? Do you have any 
specific questions for me? 
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Appendix 3 SERVICOM Evaluation forms  
Appendix 3a: The SERVICOM Charter Check List  
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Appendix 3b: The SERVICOM Charter Evaluation Form  
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Appendix 3c: The SERVICOM performance measurement Evaluation Form  
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SERVICOM form ctd 
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SERVICOM form ctd 
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Appendix 3 The SERVICOM’s Report on performance of federal tertiary hospitals in Nigeria 2007 
Hospital 
Agency  
Overall 
rating  
Major weakness  Major 
strength  
Recommendations  
Federal 
Medical 
Centre, 
Umuahia  
2.4 out of 4 
(60%) 
-There are no clearly 
defined processes 
involved in monitoring 
performance against ALL 
set standards to show 
that the organization 
adheres to its set 
standards in rendering 
services to its customers  
-The complaints 
procedure has no set 
time limit for responses to 
customer complaints 
which negatively affects 
the resolution of 
complaints 
-Though customer 
satisfaction is tested but 
there is need for regular 
customer satisfaction 
surveys to be carried out 
to further strengthen the 
process of ascertaining 
their actual needs   
None 
recorded  
-There should be clearly defined processes involved in monitoring 
performance against ALL set standards. This will ensure that set standards are 
adhered to for continuity of good service  
-The existing system of record keeping in the general outpatient department 
should be overhauled to forestall bureaucratic bottlenecks and strengthen 
efficiency  
-Detailed standard waiting times for initial and subsequent waits should be set 
and adequately published at all service points for use by both customers and 
the staff. This will prevent preferential treatment being given to some 
customers and eliminate unnecessary delays 
-Front line staff should be trained to develop standard waiting times for initial 
and subsequent visits. Staff should show sensitivity at the service window and 
ensure timely service delivery to all customers  
-The office and desk of officials should be clearly marked to indicate names 
and functions for easy location by customers  
-The organizational chart of the general outpatient department should be 
displayed at all service points for easy access to the required service  
-Systems should be put in place to monitor performance and to ensure that 
staff comply strictly with them; Management should provide water dispensers 
in all patients’ waiting areas for both patients and staff 
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SERVICOM Report Continue… 
Hospital Agency  Overall rating  Major weakness  Major strength  Recommendations  
University 
teaching Hospital, 
Benin 
2.4 out of 4 
(60%) 
-Systems are not in place to monitor 
performance against standards  
-Costs for services are not within the reach 
of all customers as most customers 
complain of high charges for drugs 
compared to what is obtainable in private 
drug shops  
-Complaint and redress procedures not 
efficient  
-Hospital does not achieve most of the 
targets and no explanations given 
-There are clear 
directions and signage 
leading to various 
service points 
-All information is 
given in plain language 
with minimal technical 
jargon 
-Feedback process to 
track customer 
satisfaction exists 
-Systems should be put in place to monitor 
performance  
-Alternative ways of reducing cost of drugs 
should be considered  
-Summary of customer complaints received 
should be published  
Federal Medical 
Centre, Yola  
2.2 out of 4 
(55.5%) 
Systems are not in place to monitor 
performance against All standards 
No refreshment is provided in the customer 
waiting areas  
Front line staff have not been trained to 
handle complaints 
Customers can reach 
the service without 
difficulties and there 
are no physical or 
bureaucratic obstacles  
Services are provided 
throughout the 
advertised times  
The hospital sets 
standards for customer 
care 
-Systems should be put in place to monitor 
performance  
-Managers should provide water dispenser in 
all patients waiting areas  
-The hospital should publish information in 
other languages for the benefit of customers 
who may not understand English 
Ahmadu Bello 
University Of 
Teaching 
Hospital, Zaria  
2.1 out of 4 
(52.5%) 
Poor performance is not explained 
• No set standards for waiting times 
• Consultation with customers not recorded 
• Cost and payment procedures not 
displayed. 
Customer friendliness  -Honest explanations should be given for 
delays 
-Standards for monitoring should be set 
-Cost and payment procedures should be 
displayed. 
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SERVICOM Report Continue... 
Hospital 
Agency  
Overall 
rating  
Major weakness  Major 
strength  
Recommendations  
The Federal 
Medical Centre, 
Ido-Ekiti 
1.7 out 
of 4 
(42.5%) 
 
-Summaries of budget, expenditure and audit reports 
are not published and available for the benefit of the 
public. 
-The Hospital has not provided suitable facilities for 
customer’s privacy especially during consultations 
 -The Hospital should provide refreshment facilities (i.e. 
water dispensers at all patients’ waiting areas.  
-Frontline staff should be trained to handle complaints. 
-This will ensure that customers’ complaint are 
promptly dealt with 
-Recorded complaints should be analysed and 
published for the benefit of customers 
National 
Hospital: Out- 
Patient 
Department 
(Office of the 
Secretary to the 
Government of 
the Federation) 
 
1.8 out 
of 4 
(45%) 
- Set standards where available are not met  
- Existing complaints procedure is not structured and 
managed to address the complaints of customers 
- Services have high charges 
-Poor staff attitude 
- Services are not adapted to suit the needs of 
customers 
- No arrangement is made for the needs of special 
customers. 
Reception 
experience  
-Documentation for set standards and targets to 
monitor performance should be provided, regularly 
reviewed and raised  
-The hospital should encourage consultation with 
customers to address the issue of high charges 
-There should be set standards for waiting times 
-Staff should be trained on customer care 
-Summary of budget, expenses and audit reports 
should be provided in the public domain 
-Services should be adopted for the benefit of those 
with special needs 
-There should be a clearly identified customer relations 
officer.  
Asokoro 
Federal Capital 
territory (FMC) 
1.9 out 
of 4 
(47.5):  
-No provision for the needs of physically-impaired 
customers  
-No set standards for main service provided by the 
organization. 
-Results of consultation with customers are not 
recorded 
-Appointment procedures are not detailed at service 
outlets and summary of budget, expenditure and audit 
reports are not provided for the benefit of customers. 
Customer 
friendliness  
-Performance should be monitored and honest 
explanations provided for service failure  
-Detailed standards for waiting times and appointments 
for initial and subsequent visits should be provided for 
all customers 
-Summary of budget, expenditure and audit reports 
should be provided for the benefit of customers. 
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SERVICOM Report Continue…   
Hospital Agency  Overall rating  Major weakness  Major 
strength  
Recommendations  
Asokoro Federal Capital 
territory (FMC) 
1.9 out of 4 
(47.5):  
-No provision for the needs of 
physically impaired customers  
-No set standards for main service 
provided by the organization. 
-Results of consultation with 
customers are not recorded 
-Appointment procedures are not 
detailed at service outlets and 
summary of budget, expenditure and 
audit reports are not provided for the 
benefit of customers. 
Customer friendliness  -Performance should be monitored and honest 
explanations provided for service failure  
-Detailed standards for waiting times and 
appointments for initial and subsequent visits 
to the hospital should be provided for all 
customers 
-Summary of budget, expenditure and audit 
reports should be provided for the benefit of 
customers 
National Hospital: Out- 
Patient Department 
(Office of the Secretary 
to the Government of 
the Federation) 
 
1.8 out of 4 
(45%) 
Set standards where available are 
not met  
Existing complaints procedure is not 
structured and managed to address 
the complaints of customers 
Services have high charges 
Poor staff attitude 
Services are not adapted to suit the 
needs of customers 
No arrangements for the needs of 
special customers. 
Reception experience  -Documentation for set standards and targets 
to monitor performance should be provided, 
regularly reviewed and raised  
-The hospital should encourage consultation 
with customers to address the issue of high 
charges 
-There should be set standards for waiting 
times 
-Staff should be trained in customer care 
-Summary of budget, expenses and audit 
reports should be in the public domain 
-Services should be adopted for the benefit of 
those with special needs 
-There should be a clearly identified customer 
relations officer  
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Appendix 4: Pay data  
 4a: Nominal salaries of different categories of doctors in Naira currency (1983-2007) 
Year  Entdoctor d10term d11ent d11term EntMdoctor d12term  d13ent d13term d14ent d14term  EntTdoctors d15term 
1983 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1984 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1985 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1986 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1987 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1988 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1989 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1990 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1991 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1992 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1993 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1994 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1995 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1996 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 41483 32046 46221 
1997 20800 31142 22100 32960 24203 35687 26743 37008 28693 154,632.00 127,380.00 173,328.00 
1998 73,980.00 102,168.00 82,524.00 111,332.00 91,176.00 123,332.00 102,780.00 136,464.00 114,144.00 154,632.00 127,380.00 173,328.00 
1999 73,980.00 102,168.00 82,524.00 111,332.00 91,176.00 123,332.00 102,780.00 136,464.00 114,144.00 475,783.00 371,743.00 533,315.00 
2000 227,640.00 314,364.00 253,920.00 345,612.00 280,543.00 379,250.00 316,260.00 419,916.00 351,216.00 475,783.00 371,743.00 533,315.00 
2001 227,640.00 314,364.00 253,920.00 345,612.00 280,543.00 379,250.00 316,260.00 419,916.00 351,216.00 475,783.00 371,743.00 533,315.00 
2002 227,640.00 314,364.00 253,920.00 345,612.00 280,543.00 379,250.00 316,260.00 419,916.00 351,216.00 603,675.00 497,299.00 676,672.00 
2003 291,605.00 402,703.00 325,272.00 442,731.00 359,382.00 485,832.00 401,271.00 532,794.00 445,622.00 603,675.00 497,299.00 676,672.00 
2004 291,605.00 402,703.00 325,272.00 442,731.00 359,382.00 485,832.00 401,271.00 532,794.00 445,622.00 603,675.00 497,299.00 676,672.00 
2005 291,605.00 402,703.00 325,272.00 442,731.00 359,382.00 485,832.00 401,271.00 532,794.00 445,622.00 694,226.00 571,894.00 778,175.00 
2006 335,348.00 463,108.00 374,063.00 509,141.00 413,289.00 558,707.00 461,462.00 612,713.00 512,465.00 2,875,791.00 2,875,791.00 12,000,000.00 
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4b: Real salaries of different categories of doctors in Naira currency (1983-2007) 
cpi 
(1985)=100 
Year  REntLdoctors RTLdoctors rd11ent rd11term REntMdoctors RTMdoctors   rd13ent rd13term rd14ent rd14term  REntTdoctors RTTdoctors 
67.9 1983 306.33 458.65 325.48 485.42 356.45 525.58 393.86 545.04 422.58 610.94 471.96 680.72 
94.8 1884 219.41 328.50 233.12 347.68 255.31 376.45 282.10 390.38 302.67 437.58 338.04 487.56 
100 1985 208.00 311.42 221.00 329.60 242.03 356.87 267.43 370.08 286.93 414.83 320.46 462.21 
105.4 1986 197.34 295.46 209.68 312.71 229.63 338.59 253.73 351.12 272.23 393.58 304.04 438.53 
116.1 1987 179.16 268.23 190.35 283.89 208.47 307.38 230.34 318.76 247.14 357.30 276.02 398.11 
181.2 1988 114.79 171.87 121.96 181.90 133.57 196.95 147.59 204.24 158.35 228.93 176.85 255.08 
272.7 1989 76.27 114.20 81.04 120.87 88.75 130.87 98.07 135.71 105.22 152.12 117.51 169.49 
293.2 1990 70.94 106.21 75.38 112.41 82.55 121.72 91.21 126.22 97.86 141.48 109.30 157.64 
330.9 1991 62.86 94.11 66.79 99.61 73.14 107.85 80.82 111.84 86.71 125.36 96.84 139.68 
478.4 1992 43.48 65.10 46.20 68.90 50.59 74.60 55.90 77.36 59.98 86.71 66.99 96.62 
751.9 1993 27.66 41.42 29.39 43.84 32.19 47.46 35.57 49.22 38.16 55.17 42.62 61.47 
1180.7 1994 17.62 26.38 18.72 27.92 20.50 30.23 22.65 31.34 24.30 35.13 27.14 39.15 
2040.4 1995 10.19 15.26 10.83 16.15 11.86 17.49 13.11 18.14 14.06 20.33 15.71 22.65 
2638.1 1996 7.88 11.80 8.38 12.49 9.17 13.53 10.14 14.03 10.88 15.72 12.15 17.52 
2863.3 1997 7.26 10.88 7.72 11.51 8.45 12.46 9.34 12.92 10.02 14.49 11.19 16.14 
3149.2 1998 23.49 32.44 26.20 35.35 28.95 39.16 32.64 43.33 36.25 49.10 40.45 55.04 
3357.6 1999 22.03 30.43 24.58 33.16 27.16 36.73 30.61 40.64 34.00 46.05 37.94 51.62 
3923.8 2000 58.02 80.12 64.71 88.08 71.50 96.65 80.60 107.02 89.51 121.26 94.74 135.92 
4268.1 2001 53.34 73.65 59.49 80.98 65.73 88.86 74.10 98.38 82.29 111.47 87.10 124.95 
5151.5 2002 44.19 61.02 49.29 67.09 54.46 73.62 61.39 81.51 68.18 92.36 72.16 103.53 
5493.3 2003 53.08 73.31 59.21 80.59 65.42 88.44 73.05 96.99 81.12 109.89 90.53 123.18 
6318.4 2004 46.15 63.73 51.48 70.07 56.88 76.89 63.51 84.32 70.53 95.54 78.71 107.10 
7446.4 2005 39.16 54.08 43.68 59.46 48.26 65.24 53.89 71.55 59.84 81.07 66.78 90.87 
8059.6 2006 41.61 57.46 46.41 63.17 51.28 69.32 57.26 76.02 63.58 86.14 70.96 96.55 
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4c: Nominal salaries of different categories of nurses in Naira Currency (1983-2007) 
 n8ent n8term n10ent n10term n12ent n12term  n13ent n13term n14ent n14term  
1983 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1984 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1985 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1986 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1987 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1988 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1989 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1990 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1991 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1992 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1993 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1994 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1995 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1996 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1997 14576 26902 18843 31142 22268 35687 24690 37008 26135 41483 
1998 43,428.00 63,084.00 60,264.00 86,004.00 70,848.00 102,168.00 79,212.00 112,332.00 87,612.00 123,332.00 
1999 43,428.00 63,084.00 60,264.00 86,004.00 70,848.00 102,168.00 79,212.00 112,332.00 87,612.00 123,332.00 
2000 157,512.00 235,123.00 218,004.00 314,664.00 269,580.00 379,250.00 301,452.00 419,916.00 333,420.00 475,788.00 
2001 157,512.00 235,123.00 218,004.00 314,664.00 269,580.00 379,250.00 301,452.00 419,916.00 333,420.00 475,788.00 
2002 157,512.00 235,123.00 218,004.00 314,664.00 269,580.00 379,250.00 301,452.00 419,916.00 333,420.00 475,788.00 
2003 205,617.00 306,949.00 279,263.00 402,703.00 345,332.00 485,832.00 382,482.00 532,794.00 423,043.00 603,675.00 
2004 205,617.00 306,949.00 279,263.00 402,703.00 345,332.00 485,832.00 382,482.00 532,794.00 423,043.00 603,675.00 
2005 205,617.00 306,949.00 279,263.00 402,703.00 345,332.00 485,832.00 382,482.00 532,794.00 423,043.00 603,675.00 
2006 236,459.55 352,991.35 321,152.45 463,108.45 397,131.80 558,707.00 439,854.30 612,713.00 486,499.45 694,226.00 
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 4d: Real salaries for nurses in Naira currency 1983-2007) 
Cpi 
(1985=100) 
Year  REntLnurses  RTLnurses rn10ent rn10term REntMnurses RTMnurses  rn13ent rn13term REntTnurses RTTnurses 
67.9 1983 214.67 396.20 277.51 458.65 327.95 525.58 363.62 545.04 384.90 610.94 
94.8 1984 153.76 283.78 198.77 328.50 234.89 376.45 260.44 390.38 275.69 437.58 
100 1985 145.76 269.02 188.43 311.42 222.68 356.87 246.90 370.08 261.35 414.83 
105.4 1986 138.29 255.24 178.78 295.46 211.27 338.59 234.25 351.12 247.96 393.58 
116.1 1987 125.55 231.71 162.30 268.23 191.80 307.38 212.66 318.76 225.11 357.30 
181.2 1988 80.44 148.47 103.99 171.87 122.89 196.95 136.26 204.24 144.23 228.93 
272.7 1989 53.45 98.65 69.10 114.20 81.66 130.87 90.54 135.71 95.84 152.12 
293.2 1990 49.71 91.75 64.27 106.21 75.95 121.72 84.21 126.22 89.14 141.48 
330.9 1991 44.05 81.30 56.94 94.11 67.30 107.85 74.61 111.84 78.98 125.36 
478.4 1992 30.47 56.23 39.39 65.10 46.55 74.60 51.61 77.36 54.63 86.71 
751.9 1993 19.39 35.78 25.06 41.42 29.62 47.46 32.84 49.22 34.76 55.17 
1180.7 1994 12.35 22.78 15.96 26.38 18.86 30.23 20.91 31.34 22.14 35.13 
2040.4 1995 7.14 13.18 9.23 15.26 10.91 17.49 12.10 18.14 12.81 20.33 
2638.1 1996 5.53 10.20 7.14 11.80 8.44 13.53 9.36 14.03 9.91 15.72 
2863.3 1997 5.09 9.40 6.58 10.88 7.78 12.46 8.62 12.92 9.13 14.49 
3149.2 1998 13.79 20.03 19.14 27.31 22.50 32.44 25.15 35.67 27.82 39.16 
3357.6 1999 12.93 18.79 17.95 25.61 21.10 30.43 23.59 33.46 26.09 36.73 
3923.8 2000 40.14 59.92 55.56 80.19 68.70 96.65 76.83 107.02 84.97 121.26 
4268.1 2001 36.90 55.09 51.08 73.72 63.16 88.86 70.63 98.38 78.12 111.48 
5151.5 2002 30.58 45.64 42.32 61.08 52.33 73.62 58.52 81.51 64.72 92.36 
5493.3 2003 37.43 55.88 50.84 73.31 62.86 88.44 69.63 96.99 77.01 109.89 
6318.4 2004 32.54 48.58 44.20 63.73 54.65 76.89 60.53 84.32 66.95 95.54 
7446.4 2005 27.61 41.22 37.50 54.08 46.38 65.24 51.36 71.55 56.81 81.07 
8059.6 2006 29.34 43.80 39.85 57.46 49.27 69.32 54.58 76.02 60.36 86.14 
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Call Duty all 4% Total allowance Basic salary and Allowances  % All  to Total  Ratio of All to Basic 
Entryd Midd Endd Entryd Midd Endd EntryDBB MidDBB EndDBB %allTEntryD %allTMidD %allTEndD Entryd Midd Endd 
84.93 141.51 197.09 213.30 326.35 497.65 266.39 414.79 620.83 80.07 78.68 80.16 4.02 3.69 4.04 
73.84 123.03 171.35 185.45 283.73 432.67 231.60 360.62 539.76 80.07 78.68 80.16 4.02 3.69 4.04 
62.66 104.39 145.40 157.35 240.75 367.12 196.52 305.99 458.00 80.07 78.68 80.16 4.02 3.69 4.04 
66.57 110.92 154.48 167.19 255.80 390.07 208.80 325.12 486.62 80.07 78.68 80.16 4.02 3.69 4.04 
 
Shift Duty all 1.7% Total All Basic salary and allowances  % All to Total Ratio of All to Basic Ratio of Doc all to Nur 
EntryN MidN EndN EntryN MidN EndN EntryNBB MidNBB EndNBB %allTEntryN %allTMidN %allTEndN EntryN MidN EndN EntryN MidN EndN 
25.45 49.85 74.73 125.18 203.06 342.87 162.61 276.37 452.76 76.98 73.47 75.73 3.34 2.77 3.12 1.70 1.61 1.45 
22.13 43.34 64.97 108.83 176.55 298.09 141.38 240.28 393.63 76.98 73.47 75.73 3.34 2.77 3.12 1.70 1.61 1.45 
18.78 36.77 55.13 92.35 149.80 252.94 119.96 203.88 334.01 76.98 73.47 75.73 3.34 2.77 3.12 1.70 1.61 1.45 
19.95 39.07 58.57 98.12 159.17 268.75 127.46 216.63 354.88 76.98 73.47 75.73 3.34 2.77 3.12 1.70 1.61 1.45 
Appendix 4e: Trends in the distribution of bonuses (allowances and finge benefits) for doctors  
Real basic salaries (Doctors) Rent 60% 60% 75% Transport 29% Utility 20% 
 
Furniture 40% Meal 40% 60% 80% 
year  Entryd Midd Endd Entryd Midd Endd Entryd Midd Endd Entryd Midd Endd Entryd Midd Endd Entryd Midd Endd 
2003 53.08 88.44 123.18 31.85 53.06 92.39 15.39 25.65 35.72 10.62 17.69 24.64 21.23 35.38 49.27 49.27 53.06 98.55 
2004 46.15 76.89 107.10 27.69 46.13 80.32 13.38 22.30 31.06 9.23 15.38 21.42 18.46 30.76 42.84 42.84 46.13 85.68 
2005 39.16 65.24 90.87 23.50 39.15 68.15 11.36 18.92 26.35 7.83 13.05 18.17 15.66 26.10 36.35 36.35 39.15 72.70 
2006 41.61 69.32 96.55 24.97 41.59 72.41 12.07 20.10 28.00 8.32 13.86 19.31 16.64 27.73 38.62 38.62 41.59 77.24 
Appendix 4f: Trends in the distribution of  bonuses (allowances and fringe benefits) for nurses 
Real basic salaries Nurses Rent 60% 60% 75% Transport 29% Utility 20% 
 
Furniture 40% Meal 40% 60% 80% 
 EntryN MidN EndN EntryN MidN EndN EntryN MidN EndN EntryN MidN EndN EntryN MidN EndN EntryN MidN EndN 
2003 37.43 73.31 109.89 22.46 43.98 82.42 10.85 21.26 31.87 7.49 14.66 21.98 14.97 29.32 43.96 43.96 43.98 87.91 
2004 32.54 63.73 95.54 19.53 38.24 71.66 9.44 18.48 27.71 6.51 12.75 19.11 13.02 25.49 38.22 38.22 38.24 76.43 
2005 27.61 54.08 81.07 16.57 32.45 60.80 8.01 15.68 23.51 5.52 10.82 16.21 11.05 21.63 32.43 32.43 32.45 64.86 
2006 29.34 57.46 86.14 17.60 34.48 64.60 8.51 16.66 24.98 5.87 11.49 17.23 11.74 22.98 34.45 34.45 34.48 68.91 
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